



Scan to know paper details and
author's profile

United Nations Recognition of Indigenoussness against the Social Realities of the Mbororo's of Cameroon: An Epistemological Issue Surrounding the Conceptualisation of Local Imageries

Assana

University of Ngaoundéré

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the UN recognition of autochthony in the light of the socio-cultural and politico-economic realities of the Mbororos of Cameroon. In fact, during the 20th century, for various reasons that can be linked to the will of the colonialist, the State and the quest for security, the settlement of normadic societies appeared as an important phenomenon. In Cameroon, this settlement took place through changes in their ways of life.

Keywords: indigenous peoples, un, imagination, settlement, development, mbororo of cameroon.

Classification: DDC Code: 121 LCC Code: BD161

Language: English



London
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333
Print ISSN: 2515-5784
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 18 | Compilation 1.0



© 2022 Assana. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncom-mercial 4.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>, permitting all noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

United Nations Recognition of Indigenes against the Social Realities of the Mbororo's of Cameroon: An Epistemological Issue Surrounding the Conceptualisation of Local Imageries

Assana

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the UN recognition of autochthony in the light of the socio-cultural and politico-economic realities of the Mbororos of Cameroon. In fact, during the 20th century, for various reasons that can be linked to the will of the colonialist, the State and the quest for security, the settlement of nomadic societies appeared as an important phenomenon. In Cameroon, this settlement took place through changes in their ways of life. Against the backdrop of the deterministic and miserable approaches to indigenous Mbororo people, this study draws on the theories of the decoloniality of power (Capucine and Fatima Hurtado, 2009; Dussel) and Raymond Boudon's methodological individualism (1977) to demonstrate that the definition and identifying criteria of autochthony established by the UN do not suit the Mbororo people's imagination and their propensity for settlement.

Keywords: indigenous peoples, un, imagination, settlement, development, mbororo of cameroon.

Author: PhD. in Political Science Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Ngaoundéré (Cameroon) Department of Political Science.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

A major spectre threatens reflection on the indigenous Mbororo peoples. This is miserabilism, that is, the tendency to portray the Mbororo in the mode of vulnerability, marginality

and poverty¹ (See, for example, Kossoumna Libaa, 2008; (Seignobos, 2011: 6 and 20; Tidjani, 2015; Davis, 1995 : 213-228; Kamdem, 2017; Kabamba Mbambu; Bonne Mbang, Owona Ndounda, 2019 quoted by Assana, 2021; Jabiru Muhammadou, 2017: 37-48; Tidjani 2018; Mamoudou, 2021: 579-591) on the one hand, and/or the awareness of their backwardness (Pelican, 2008, pp.540-560 Mouiche, 2011 and 2012) on the other.

The general tendency is to emphasise on the non-dominant and vulnerable situation of the Mbororo in the scientific and academic fields as well as in UN bodies. The miserably reason places the researcher in a logic of over-emphasising the “structural paradigm”², which consists of overestimating the social constraints that weigh on the behaviour of the Mbororo. It is as if the Mbororo cannot assume the role of a “historical

¹ In this context, the debates often come to a standstill and rarely avoid two pitfalls. The first, which is well known in the social sciences when it comes to tackling sensitive subjects (Passeron, 1991), is that of 'miserabilism', which tends to describe the Mbororo as mere passive victims to be defended. This drift is particularly present in the discourse of human right NGOs, the international bodies of the UN, which tirelessly denounce the 'enslavement of human beings'. While these NGOs are certainly in their role in condemning the exactions committed against the Mbororo, one cannot help but question the univocal discourse that only relates the most extreme facts of dependence. Without questioning the cases of enslavement that these NGOs record, it is nevertheless necessary to analyse local apprehensions of Mbororo autochthony in order to go beyond this fixed vision (Assana, 2021).

² This paradigm is embodied in the United States by culturalism and then functionalism (Merton, 1968); in France by structuralism (Talcott, 1973) and by the theory of habitus developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1980, 1992, 1994 and 2003).

subject”³. This consideration of the Mbororo autochthony and the spaces they occupy through the prism necessarily synonymous to “backwardness” and disconnection from “civilisation”, a form of exclusion and marginalisation of the indigenous (Sepulveda, 2020) is a vision which, however recurrent, is nonetheless based on “reductive colonial imaginaries which still seem to guide the way autochthony is conceived and constructed throughout the world”⁴ (Atsiga Essala, 1999:166; Sepulveda, 2020).

In the course of our studies on the Mbororo of the Ngaoui district in the Adamawa region of Cameroon, we noted the discrepancy that exist between the criteria for the definition and identification of the autochthony established by the unique socio-political trajectory of this Mbororo category. From a perspective extended to the Cameroonian level, this text analyses the international recognition of autochthony in the light of the socio-cultural and politico-economic realities of the Mbororo of Cameroon. This study contributes in the enriching of reflections on autochthony as a political and contingent category, leading to diverse interpretations. It refutes the idea of an autochthony rooted in the past by showing that indigenous identities are resolutely contemporary, constantly negotiated in the light of contemporary realities. The present reflection therefore invites us to approach autochthony from “below”. To be more precise, the construction of the research object is also crossed by the concern to break with the prevailing overemphasis on the structural analysis of autochthony.

The choice of Cameroon as a framework for analysis is motivated by the fact that, it is one of the states that have ratified the United Nations Declaration on Rights of the Indigenous Peoples.

³ The concept of the historical subject is largely operational for analysing the Mbororo's access to development in the Cameroonian context; it allows access to a combative phenomenology whose main issue is the search for a new social, the alternative which is none other than development (Motaze, 2009: 94).

⁴ We need only think of the way in which various forms of evolutionism have led to the treatment of 'colonial', 'dualist', 'traditional', 'archaic' or 'primitive' societies, as analysed by the West, as historical flaws or delays (Penafiel, 2008: 100).

In fact, autochthony has become a legal category recognised and enshrined in the 1996 constitution. This constitutional recognition aims at protecting the rights of the indigenous peoples. Among its estimated population of more than 20 million, about ten percent are identified as indigenous peoples, thanks to experts work carried out at international and regional levels, based on pre-established criteria (see *Peuple indigene au Cameroun. Guide a l'intention des professionnels des medias*, 2015: 9). It is in a context marked by the mistrust of certain states towards the universal category of “indigenous peoples”⁵, that Cameroon has gradually identified itself with the international movement of

⁵ The assertion of the existence of indigenous peoples has generated controversy, both politically and scientifically. Firstly, states are not always willing to respond to the claims of these groups and often attempt to limit the scope of the indigenous category in their legislative definitions. In this context, some African states have considered 'all Africans' to be indigenous (Lee, 2006). Some different forms of popular categorisation of the term autochthony have also led some scholars to warn of the 'biologising, ethnic or culturalist biases of identity' (Bayart and Geschiere, 2001: 127; Cutolo and Geschiere, 2008) that such a notion may underlie. These authors show how the idea of autochthony in Côte d'Ivoire, for example, was mobilised from the 1990s onwards to describe exclusionary practices with the aim of reviving divisions between indigenous groups and other so-called allogènes (Bonnecase, 2014). Nevertheless, several States refuse to accept this more 'open' definition of autochthony and consequently to recognise the existence of indigenous peoples within them. This is the case of some Asian States. As Ian Baird explains, this is based on the 'salt water' theory, according to which the emergence of indigenous people is exclusively linked to the imposition of an apriori European colonial power that crossed the oceans to establish itself in the form of settlement colonisation' (quoted by Sepulveda et al, 2020). The article by Paul Nicholas provides a concrete illustration of this through the case of Bangladesh, which, as the author points out, declared through its ambassador to the United Nations in 2012 that 'Bangladesh has no indigenous population'. Indeed, in Bangladesh, as in many other Asian countries, these population can at best be officially labelled as 'ethnic minorities', but this does not prevent some of them, such as the Jummas, from claiming to be 'indigenous people' (*Ibid*). This is also the case in Australia (Virginia, 2021: 60). In so doing, UN recognition of autochthony must deal with resistance inherited from national ways of considering the indigenous question.

indigenous people⁶. In this way, the ratification of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People (UNDRIP) and the official celebration of the International Day of the World's Indigenous People (IDIP) are an indicator of Cameroon's willingness to take into account the concerns of indigenous people. Furthermore, the socio-cultural and politico-economic trajectories of the Mbororo in Cameroon have aroused our scientific curiosity, because they seem to contradict the criteria for assessing autochthony established by the UN and relayed by certain states such as Cameroon (Assana, 2021). This study focuses on the Mbororo and draws on our long-standing work in the Adamawa region.

As a preliminary consideration, it is appropriate to sacrifice the good old Durkheimian precept that one should first define the words one will use (Durkheim, 1987), as the intelligibility of things can only be ensured in addition to the stabilisation of language thus achieved. To this end, we shall endeavour to define the Mbororo ethnonym and indigenous peoples in turn, the key concepts around which these analyses are therefore organised.

The Mbororo are part of an ethnic group that the British have called the *Fulani* or Fulani in French (Tchoumba, 2005). The ethnonym Mbororo is given in the sub-region to the “Fulani of the bush”, that is, the Fulani who have remained faithful to pastoral nomadism, as opposed to the settled Fulani who are called Foulbés (Bocquénié, 1986; Burnham 1996: chap. 5; Kossoumana Libaa, 2008: 169; Vircoulon, 2021: 7). The term Mbororo is therefore, as Dognin considers, a 'cultural epithet' that refers to “sociological realities and varied ways of life”. They live in at least 18 (eighteen) African countries including Nigeria, Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania,

⁶ It should be noted that the changes in developing countries are driven by the World Bank, whose policy (OP/PB 4.10) aims to 'contribute to the mission of reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development (...) by ensuring a development process that fully respects the dignity, human rights, economic systems and cultures of indigenous people (Bellier, 2009: 88). These examples show that the partnership between international organisations, states and indigenous people is leading to new formulations, revealing suggestive approaches.

Cameroon etc. (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020). The Mbororos are a people who came from Nigeria to settle in Cameroon in the Adamawa region, after which they migrated to other regions. The number of Mbororos in Cameroon is very significant. It is estimated at 1.85 million people (*Ibid*). They are present throughout the Cameroonian territory, but are found in greater numbers in the West, East, North-West and North northern regions (Adamawa, North and Far North).

In order to understand the concept of indigenous people, we will use the definition expressed in the World Bank's operational manual, which states that:

The terms “indigenous people” (...) describe social groups with a social and cultural identity that is different from that of the dominant groups in society and which makes them vulnerable in the development process. Many such groups have a status that limits their ability to defend their interests and rights to land and other productive resources, or that limits their ability to participate in and benefit from development (*Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Indigenous Communities*, 2005, p.105)

This definition identifies five (5) essential elements for a good understanding of this notion: cultural specificity⁷, the situation of non-dominance, marginalisation from an economic, political and socio-cultural point of view, but not necessarily numerical as observed by Schulte-Tenckhoff, 1997: 7), low participation in development and the inability to defend their rights and interests. Unlike the notion of minority which focuses on numerical weakness (Pierrée-Caps, 2008, p.1028 cited by Mouangue Kobila, 2009: 37; Mouiche, 2012), or of “indigenous population” which are legitimised by the primo-

⁷ The elements that allow for the identification of indigenous peoples include: historical continuity, on the understanding that they are pre-conquest and/or pre-colonial societies; territorial roots, their ancestors already inhabited the country or region; distinct social, economic, cultural and political institutions (they have retained some or all of their institutions).

settlement or anteriority of settlement on a territory and exclusive rights to ancestral land (see Ngando Sandje, 2013: 160; Mouiche, 2013: 289; Claire Médard, 2006: 166-167; Ngando Sandje, 2013: 24; Quetu, 2020:), that of “indigenous people” integrates socio-cultural specificities or ways of life. The notion of indigenous people refers to the so-called “traditional” way of life that many are no longer able or willing to practice; it is being understood that this way of life must necessarily be inscribed in the territories that are also considered “traditional”, from which many indigenous people have been expelled, directly or indirectly, through various processes in the course of history (Sepulveda, Glon and Dumont, 2020). What is at stake here is the notion of legal personality, which the people have in international law and which gives access to the rule of law (Bellier, 2013: 25). The “indigenous” category is not subject to an absolute definition; it is delimited by a set of criteria that give it a certain malleability (Bellier, 2013). It makes reference to the colonised, marginalised and oppressed people who are linked by a historical continuity with societies prior to their escape. It is within this general framework that the notion of indigenous people must be understood.

In the quest for their emancipation, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Population and international financial institutions such as the World Bank have officially recognised and identified these nomadic Mbororo pastoralists alongside the “Pygmies” who are hunter-gatherers as “indigenous peoples” (*Report of the Working Group of Experts of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on Indigenous Populations and Communities*: 102). In Cameroon, the question of identity mainly (re)emerged during the political movements of the 1990s, after a long period of hibernation imposed in the name of the principle of unity⁸. It was through a general formula that the rights of minorities and indigenous people entered the new Cameroonian constitution (Ngando Sandje, 2013: 155). This article presents the problem of the

⁸ For an overview of these movements, see Maurice Kamto, 1993: 215; Janvier Onana, 2002: 182 cited by Assana, 2021).

criteria for assessing autochthony. the main question formulated from the problem is to know: do the international criteria of appreciation of autochthony decided by the UN bodies, the World Bank and relayed by Cameroon and the cause entrepreneurs (MBOSCUDA) take into account the socio-cultural and politico-economic realities as thought and lived by the Mbororo community of Cameroon? Our hypothesis is as follows: no, the model of assessment of autochthony adopted by the UN and the World Bank does not take into account the socio-cultural and politico-economic realities as thought, lived and felt by the Mbororo community in Cameroon. These assessment criteria are better adapted to the contemporary social realities of the Mbororos.

To verify this hypothesis, data was collected through documentary research. Our approach is based on the decoloniality of power (Capucine and Fatima Hurtado, 2009; Dussel,) and the methodological individualism of Raymond Boudon (1977). Decoloniality allows us to study the composition that takes place among the indigenous Mbororo people. Methodological individualism on the other hand, rehabilitates indigenous imaginations and rationalities excluded by structural determinism in the study of indigenous people. The discussion of the data collected gave rise to two sets of concerns: The first presents the UN’s recognition of autochthony does not suit the perception of the Mbororo people (I) on the one hand, and the dynamics of the Mbororo populations which are tending towards settlement (II) on the other hand, in Cameroon.

II. UN'S RECOGNITION OF AUTOCHTHONY: A REALITY THAT DOES NOT ADAPT WITH THE POPULAR PERCEPTION OF THE MBOROROS IN CAMEROON

The affirmation of the notion of “indigenous people” since the 1960s places the construction of the indigenous movement in a history of globalisation (Bellier and Legros, 2001; Muehlebach, 2001: Fritz et al, 2005 cited by Bellier, 2009). Having become a global issue, the problem of autochthony has been taken on by international legislation, primarily within the UN.

The criteria that have gradually shaped the landscape of autochthony in this forum and in the specialised agencies that deal with the issue have evolved over time (Morin, 1992; 1994; Bellier and Le Gros, 2001; Bellier, 2006; Pessina Dassonville, 2012: 7-29; Belaidi et al, 2016). In a study published in 1987, the Ecuadorian sociologist José Martínez Cobo established criteria (Cobo, 1987) which were later specified in particular by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) with the aim of unifying indigenous people throughout the world (ACHPR, 2005 cited by Quetu, 2020: 2). However, in legal terms, the UN is the matrix (the house) of indigenous rights, which the use of the symbol of the laurel crown reminds us of (Bellier and Gonzalez- Gonzalez, 2015: 138).

Meanwhile, the UN's recognition of autochthony seems to impose a conception of about the indigenous groups that is frozen in time, far from their social reality and depriving them of their capacity to adapt and to be flexible, whereas for most anthropologists, a society is a set of social relations; it can have different forms and is renewed over time' (Glaskin and Douset, 2011 cited by Virginie, 2021: 65). In this way, the apprehension of autochthony also calls for the new method of approach developed for Africanist research: the "politics from below" (Savonnet-Guyot, 1981: 799). Indeed, international and institutional apprehensions are incapable of restoring autochthony in its specific African dimension. For Africa can also and above all, be explained by Africa, its own history, its own specificities, and its own realities. But this "within" is at several levels: at the top and at the bottom. Autochthony is can be explained not only at the institutional or at the state level, in order to analyse the UN's fabrication of autochthony as an unsuited reality to the popular Mbororo imaginary, it is important to study the contrast between the identification with the international movement of indigenous peoples by internationalised Mbororo families (A) and its contestation by non-internationalised Mbororo families (B).

2.1 *The Identification of the Internationalised Mbororo Families with the International Indigenous Peoples' Movement*

The international recognition of Autochthony in the UN context has created a 'window of opportunity' (Mc Adam, et al, 1996) for Mbororo entrepreneurs who now intend to bring their rights to the national and international public stage. Indeed, from the 1990s onwards, some Mbororo activists in Cameroon and also throughout Central Africa, identified themselves with the international indigenous peoples' movement. The discourses of these "cause entrepreneurs" (Cobb and Elder, 1972 cited by Quetu, 2020: 1) consisted of "indigenising" the social image of the Mbororo, that is, 'the social production of discourses and symbols that represent groups and territories' (Avanza and Laferté, 2005: 142, *Ibid*), to make them coincide with the international definition of indigenous peoples. In order to identify MBOSCUDA's identification with the international indigenous peoples' movement as a window of political opportunity, it is important to study the instrumentality of Mbororo Autochthony (1) and the advertisement of their problems (2).

III. THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF MBORORO AUTOCHTHONY

Ethnicity is a resource that can be mobilised and used to maintain political power. At the heart of this are instrumentalist and constructivist approaches to ethnicity that emphasise the logics of construction, invention, permanent reinvention and socio-political use of ethnicity (Poutignat, Streiff-Feinart, 1995; Becker, 1996: 144 quoted by Bigombe Logo, 1999: 236). Ethnicity as a mode of expression of differential identities that have had been strategically muzzled throughout the administration of President Ahidjo (1960-1982). The instrumentality of Mbororo autochthony only acquires significance through the work of investing local actors. The dynamics of instrumentality of the Mbororo ethnicity implemented by the intellectual and political elites, have crystallised the process of "renting primary solidarities" (Bigombe Logo, 1999: 234). This has led to a real constitution of "the politics

of affection” (Sindjoun, 1998) through the spectacular exploitation of the marginal and marginality complex. If we look closely, autochthony makes sense for national and internationalised actors, such as the representatives of Mbororo associations, who have seen in the indigenous peoples' movement, an opportunity to internationalise their trajectories and assert their claims. It should be pointed out that the great novelty of the democratisation process is the appearance of community spokespersons, of ethno-regional representatives, or the transition from a crude or restricted cultural pluralism to an organised or mobilised cultural pluralism (Sindjoun, 1994: 194-230; Sindjoun, 1998 quoted by Sindjoun, 2000: 29). In the language of sociology, it is the representative spokesperson that makes the group, and in that of politics, it is the group that gives itself a representative (Le Bart, 2003; 2004). Democratisation has opened up 'windows of opportunity' allowing political and social actors to draw attention to the issue of ethnicity (Sindjoun, 1998: 14).

In the light of the above, the development of the indigenous peoples' movement is a factor that can explain the political activism of the Mbororo associations, but it must be seen in conjunction with the reconfiguration of the Cameroonian state from 1996 onwards. For these actors, autochthony is both a lever for political action and a source of income. Democratisation has rather accelerated clientelist practices and encouraged the proliferation of identity-based movements (Chetima, 2018). In this new context, the belly politics” itself became the 'politics of affection' (Sindjoun, 1998) in that, the rise of the elites depended on their ability to mobilise the electorate in favour of the regime in power (Mbuagbo, Robert, 2004; Nyamnjoh, 1999, *Ibid*). From 1990 onwards, the number of Mbororo associations increased sharply, thus revealing the effects of the opening up of political positions on the creation of associations. While there were only two registered Mbororo associations in Cameroon, the nomadic Fulani (Mbororo) seized the opportunities of political liberalisation to create cultural associations such as *Mbororo*

Social and Cultural Development Association abbreviated as MBOSCUDA⁹, Society for the Development of Livestock and Commerce (SODELCO), Association of Mbororo Students of Cameroon (ASEMCA), FULANI, ADJEMA (Association for the Development of Mbororo Youth of Adamawa and FEMBOBAT are eloquent examples (Ndebi, 2015; Assana, 2017; Jabiru Muhammadou, 2017: 37-48). Through their identification with the international movement on indigenous people, the representatives of these associations have become the under-takers of the Mbororo's cause. From now on, mobilising as an indigenous person in Cameroon means 'anchoring oneself in a system of rights that generates political, financial, and symbolic resources, resources that only internationalised activists can benefit from' (Quetu, 2020: 11).

However, the actual impact of the identification of the Mbororo with the international indigenous peoples' movement from above is not satisfactory for the non-internationalised Mbororo families. One of their main accusations is about financial management. The biased distribution of benefits has led to divisions within the Mbororo community and the erosion of popular support. The ANDC's message to the international community reads.

It is good to know that all the aid given to MBOSCUDA A-CM is used to buy cars and luxury villas. Also these scammers use these funds to buy their goods in COTONOU. Moreover, their children are enrolled in major universities in Europe and the USA. It should be noted that these men who claim that the Fulani or Mbororo are marginalized live in the big cities of Cameroon: Yaounde, Douala and others. We therefore urge you to come to the field and touch the realities. So, stop sending money into the hands of these MBUSCUDA A-CM impostors. Because “enough is enough”. (*Message, to the international community from ANDC*).

These testimonies also show how popular actors, although they are supposed to be the primary

⁹ MBOSCUDA was established in 1992, while SODELCO was established in 1993 (Jabiru Muhammadou, 2018: 42).

beneficiaries of projects carried out by local associations and international donors (Chartier and Rivière, 2018), they are being excluded from the financial opportunities offered to the Mbororos. The origin of these many conflicts between the Mbororos lies not only in their identification with the international indigenous peoples' movement, but also and above all, in the exploitation of the 'ethnic rent' by an elite that is greedy for financial power. In other words, while identification with the international indigenous peoples' movement may have led to popular mobilisation, non-internationalised Mbororo families have understood over the years that, the status of spokesperson claimed by the Mbororo because entrepreneurs were also, if not more than anything else, a strategy for access to power and an accumulation path. In this way, access to political or associative positions with a view to defending the rights of the Mbororos has often gone hand in hand with the improvement of the conditions of its spokesmen. Among these men is the Chief who is in charge of the Presidency of the Republic" (*Interpellation de la communauté internationale. Message from the National Association for the Dignity of the Fulani Community (Bororo) ANDCP*). In fact, autochthony is especially meaningful for internationalised actors who have seen the indigenous peoples' movement as a strategy for achieving both personal and collective goals. The dissemination of the term 'indigenous peoples' therefore initially benefited a hard core of internationalised activists, who structured themselves as such from the end of the 1990s. In addition to the instrumentality of Mbororo autochthony, their problems have been publicised.

IV. PUBLICISING MBORORO PROBLEMS

Problems are defined within the framework of a claim process carried out by actors qualified as *claimmakers* (producers of claims), independently of the objective conditions of the problems (Hassenteufel, 2008). The advertising of the Mbororo problem is an important phenomenon in Cameroon. Indeed, the advertising of the Mbororo problem contributes to the rise of 'protest potential' (Barnes and Kaase,

1979). This rise in 'protest potential' reveals their capacity to defend their interests and their rights to land and other productive resources. It is manifested in the demands and the acquisition of the culture of interpellation, which are no longer solely inscribed in the national framework, but in a transnational space, recognised and legitimised by the international community. As can be seen, the international recognition of Mbororo indigenusness constitutes a legal basis for claims. It aims to give these population a legal status that is likely to protect them against threats from dominant societies, states or multinational companies (Bellier, 2009: 78). If we look closely, the gradual institutionalisation of the international indigenous peoples' movement has given a new meaning to cause entrepreneurs. Through their connections to political and the international arena, these activists have become indigenous cause entrepreneurs in Cameroon, that is, 'actors who attempt to set the problem and bring a (social) issue to the public arena (in particular the public agenda)' (Bergeron, Castel and Nouguez, 2013: 263). It is precisely this connection that made possible the action taken by Mbororo activists from the late years to seek humanitarian intervention.

The rise in protest potential is manifested in political demands and the denunciation of the exploitation of the Mbororos in professional circles and land management (Saidou, 2021: 535). It also manifests itself in claims for the reclassification of chieftaincies into 2nd and 1st class. In fact, the claims for the reclassification of the 3rd class chieftaincy of Ngaoui into 2nd class by the Mbororo in the democratic movement are certainly one of the most obvious illustrations of the scope of 'social renegotiations' (Leservoisier, 2009: 24-43 quoted by Assana, 2021) underway in Cameroon. In a request dated 17th July 2016, signed by 23 traditional chiefs and addressed to the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, the Mbororo demanded the reclassification of the chieftaincy of the 3rd class chief of the Ngaoui sub-division to 2nd class (*Ibid*). The political stakes of the reclassification of the traditional chieftaincy are several fold: Firstly, this reclassification aims to consecrate the

autonomy of the chieftaincy of the Mbororo community of Ngaoui vis-à-vis the tutelage of the indigenous Gbaya chieftaincies, and therefore the fullness of *Ardo's* jurisdiction over the entire territory of this district.

Secondly, it aims to increase the possibility of the *Ardo* of Ngaoui not only to obtain an audience with the head of state, as in practice only traditional chiefs of the 1st and 2nd class are entitled to audiences granted by the head of state during regional tours, but above all to increase the possibility of eligibility for the electoral college of senators (Assana, 2014; Assana, 2021: 177-200). These demands also arise in a political context in which decentralisation will contribute to the revaluation of traditional chieftaincy through the inclusion of chieftaincies in the transferred powers and their representation in the Senate and regional councils.

Collective action is thus less and less situated at the level of a state territory, and more and more in the transnational space, as shown by the mobilisation of memoranda on the international scene¹⁰. *The memorandum of the Central African Mbororo Fulani refugees in Cameroon and Chad: communities in danger, Memorandum to the Cameroonian Government, the Chadian Government, humanitarian agencies and the international community*, addressed by Mr Waziri Bibouba Housseini, President of the AIDSPC, refugee in Ndjamena (Chad), and Mr Aladji Ousmanou Alihou, AIDSPC Communications Officer, in Bertoua (Cameroon). This project is an example of transnational mobilisation of the Mbororos against national governments in the face of violations of their rights. The aim is to request humanitarian intervention from the international community to control internal political outbursts in the sub-region. It also reads:

We, the Fulani-Mbororos (...), through our organisation, the Association for the

¹⁰ One hypothesis is currently the subject of considerable debate: that of an in-depth modification of the contemporary repertoire of action under the effect of globalisation, or if one prefers, of an increasing internationalisation of mobilisations (see Isabelle Sommier, 2003).

Integration and Social Development of the Fulani-Mbororos of Central Africa (AIDSPC), come to inform you of the situation of the Central African Fulani's, a minority community, marginalised and very often the first victims of the successive crises our country has experienced (*Ibid*).

The recipients of the memoranda are many and varied. Essentially, they are national governments, humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and human rights organisations, the United Nations Security Council, the Presidents of the Republic (the United States), the World Bank and the international community. By sending memoranda to these actors, the Mbororo entrepreneurs intend to seek international interlocution or protection. Generally, the denunciations are multidimensional. They are built around political, legal and economic dimensions. This memorandum constructs the human rights violations of the Mbororos in terms of:

We ask the UNHCR and the International Red Cross, in conjunction with our representatives, to put in place a special mechanism for the Fulani community. The international community must help identify and bring before the competent courts the perpetrators of crimes and violations of the rights of the Fulani, and give the international forces deployed in the Central African Republic the mandate to ensure the security of the Fulani Mbororos present in the camps (*Ibid*).

Based on the above, the memoranda open up the possibility for Mbororo entrepreneurs to extend the scope of their political actions to the national and even international level. It is important to point out that the inclusion of human rights in legal texts such as the Constitution and international legal instruments, as well as the intervention of the judge, are no longer sufficient to preserve human rights in contemporary societies (Lochak, 2005: 78 quoted by Assana, 2014). As can be seen, respect for human rights also results from the objective or subjective

constraints that indigenous peoples place on states and the international community. The effort to safeguard human rights by means of memoranda takes place in two major ways: on the one hand, by denouncing human rights violations in states or informing the international community; and on the other, by seeking international dialogue and protection. The Mbororos articulate their demands globally and enjoy the international support of NGOs and the UN.

However, if we can give credit to the highly relevant criteria for identifying autochthony established by the UN, the fact remains that their work is based on the mould of UN bodies, state actors and that of those that fight for the Mbororo cause. These kinds of apprehensions from the 'top' need to be irrigated by those from below. For, underneath the international or official elements of recognition of autochthony, there are local ways of understanding autochthony and the dynamics of the Mbororo community. Clearly, the debates on the definitional and identification criteria of autochthony would be better enhanced by confronting them with local imaginations.

4.1 Contestation of the UN Recognition of Autochthony by Non-Internationalised Mbororo Families

Beyond these internationalised spaces of mobilisation, it is important to study how the idea of the indigenes is perceived in the Mbororo villages. In other words, what are the local apprehensions of Mbororo identity in Cameroon? The epistemological analysis used in this section has a phenomenological and ethno-methodological dimension (Corcuff, 1995: 56-57; 62-64 quoted by Sindjoun, 1998: 16), in that by the reasons of common sense in the discourse of local actors on autochthony. By analysing popular apprehensions of the notion of Mbororo identity in Cameroon, the objective is to confront the international criteria for the appreciation of autochthony established by the United Nations with local perceptions. Since the imaginary is one of the instances that form the basis of identity (Lamizet, 2012), it is important to pay close attention to the social representations, the local

imaginary (*Ibid*) of local Mbororo populations. Beyond the international recognition of autochthony relayed in Cameroon by the public authorities, there is also the way in which these populations define themselves, perceive themselves, present themselves and rely on specificities to appear on the public scene or within their own communities. The differences or disjunctions between the criteria put forward by the public authorities in place and by the indigenous peoples to approach what autochthony is generate conflicts of perception in which each stakeholder uses or manipulates these criteria, defends its positions and develops its arguments (Sepulveda, 2020). At the analysis of popular apprehensions of the Mbororo's identity in Cameroon, we observe the local non-acceptance of the definitional criteria of autochthony established by the UN (1), due to its infringement of the Mbororo code of honour, Pulaaku (2).

4.2 The Local Non-acceptance of the UN Definitional Criteria of Autochthony

The Mbororo do not recognise themselves in the criteria of marginality and poverty established by the UN to define indigenous people. In the universe of social representations, the Mbororo do not see themselves as a disadvantaged or economically vulnerable social group. As the text fragment produced by the *Socio-cultural Association for Livestock Development and Agriculture in Cameroon* (SODELCO) shows:

Marginalization: how on earth is it possible to state that the Mbororos are marginalized in Cameroon by the government? In all humility we take exception to these false accusations. The Mbororo people are in the mainstream of activities in Cameroon. They live in the same villages with the other villagers who are Cameroonians in their own right just like the Mbororo. They share the same schools and hospitals. They get the same veterinary services. Like any other citizen, they have their full rights. They settle where they want and they and go about their grazing activities without any discrimination in spite of the recurrent farmer/grazer conflicts. they have been living in peaceful coexistence with all the

people of the North West region over the years. They have large portions of land on which they undertake livestock activities and are getting more and more into agriculture. They have fully integrated into all villages and are actually helping other people get involved in livestock activities. They are becoming the main providers of vegetables and pulses in much of our market in the North West region. In fact, they are not internally displaced persons and cannot be considered as such. They are fast abandoning the nomadic lifestyles and settling down to business like any other Cameroonian (...) (SODELCO circular letter to the Mbororos).

The idea of Mbororo autochthony is a vector of conflicts of use and perception. The Mbororo community is made up of a multitude of actors with varied life paths and interests whose unity and togetherness are not self-evident. On the basis of these considerations, it can be observed that not all Mbororo define themselves according to the terms of the international convention on indigenous people. In other words, there is a discontinuity between the criteria of marginality and poverty established by the UN and the class consciousness that animates the Mbororo. In this perspective, Canivez (2004: 35-38 quoted by Virginie, 2021: 73) emphasises the notion of 'conflict' in the constitution of nations. According to him, external and internal conflicts influence the emergence and formation of collective consciousness and an orientation towards a claim to recognition or sovereignty. In addition to the rejection of the criterion of marginality, there is the non-acceptance of the label of "the poor". They argue as follows:

Poverty index: it may please you to know that the Mbororos are not the poorest of persons as they want to make the world believe. As a matter of fact, they are the richest people in all villages where they live. The average villager where the Mbororos live is poor compared to the Mbororo man or woman. Some of the Mbororos have as many as five thousand heads of cattle. They have goats, sheep and houses. Indeed, the villager does not have that. If you were to go by statistics of the

government of Cameroon, you will appreciate the fact that an average Mbororo is richer than the richest villager. So how come they say the Mbororos are poor and useless? We do not buy this idea. The Mbororos are those helping other villagers get into livestock because local people have seen the wealth that it represents. The average villager knows that to make money you need to go into cattle business. That subsistence farming cannot pay much as livestock. If fact, many of those who work in farms owned by the Mbororos are the community members and they are paid for that by the Mbororos. And they make living through that (*SODELCO circular letter to the Mbororos*).

These extracts show the non-reception, or the rejection, of the designation of marginal population by non-internationalised Mbororo families. They attempt to highlight the existence of a dissonance between UN and local conceptions of Mbororo indigenes. It is clear that the UN discourse on marginality, vulnerability and poverty is to some extent contradicted by reality. It should be pointed out that pastoralism is not only a way of life, but also fulfils economic functions for the Mbororo people¹¹. This non-acceptance is to be correlated with the class consciousness that animates the Mbororos. Generally speaking, the Fulani is also defined by nobility. The image of the Fulani was also influenced by the racist ideologies of time: the Fulani were thus defined as almost white, and they were placed near the top of the racial hierarchy: the Whites or Europeans. Among the Fulani, nomadic groups were selected, those with the lightest skin and considered to be the stereotype of all Fulbe (see Wlilliam, 1988;

¹¹Livestock is 'by essence a complex object; the main mechanism for accumulating and transmitting wealth in pastoral and agro pastoral societies, the main savings mechanism in rural societies in the South, it is always a more or less active productive capital depending on the current needs of the household or family or social events that can generate ostentatious expenditure or external risks (climatic crisis, market speculation, etc.). The economic functions of livestock farming oscillate between cash flow (productive activity) and security (capital on the ground): realities that overlap within the same livestock farm (Alary et al, 2011: 149).

Harrison, 1983 cited by (Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 793).

It is important to note that the Fulanis are very conscious of being a community apart, fundamentally different from the other groups with which they usually cohabit. For the Fulanis in general, humanity is divided into three categories: the Whites (*Raneebe*); the Blacks (*Baleebe*)¹², and the Fulanis (Sidibe et al, 1997: 225). This division seems to go back a long way in the history of the consciousness of the Fulani groups. Nobility also has its origins in the historical opposition between the free and the captives, or nobles and slaves (Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 808). Another important element is the division of labour between nobles and non-nobles. The work of the nobles is associated with power; they deal with livestock or religious issues related to Islam (*Ibid*). The non-nobles do quite different work. They cultivate millet or sorghum, gather in the bush, make bricks, and do hard labour (*Ibid*). Similarly, the Mbororos are also perceived by the populations of other communities and the administrative authorities as being 'the lungs of the rural communes' of the Ngaoui sub-division, for example. In the state/society relationship in this sub-division, the Mbororos are the local ethnic fraction that occupies such a position in the structure that acts in its favour (Bourdieu, 2000: 238) or that benefits from asymmetries in social position and status (Messu, 2000 cited by Chazel, 1983: 369-393 cited by Assana, 2021:).

The objective of the above allows us to note that the definitional criteria of autochthony established by the UN do not seem to be as relevant when one detaches himself from transnational spaces (training at the United Nations, NGOs, etc.) or associations for the defence of the rights of the Mbororos established in Cameroon. In addition to the popular rejection of the definitional criteria of autochthony, the

¹² In addition to the noble Fulani, Pulaaku includes another category: the baleebe, etymologically 'the blacks'. However, it should be noted that this term has nothing to do with skin colour, but rather refers to cultural aspects and the division of human groups in the Fulani universe. The Baleebe are either second-class nobles or slaves (Sidibe et al, 1997: 228).

UN's fabrication of autochthony is part of a negation of the Mbororo's code of honour (the *Pulaaku*).

4.3 The UN Recognition of Autochthony as a Negation of the Mbororo's Code of Honour (*Pulaaku*)

It is striking to note that the UN factory of autochthony also goes against the Mbororo's culture: The *Pulaaku*. The Mbororos are a people who are very attached to tradition and who *pulaaku* (dignity) constitutes the civic and moral code governing human behaviour in their society (Saidou, 2021: 541). The analysis of the word *pulaaku* is closely linked to the debate on ethnicity, as this word is often used as a key word in the study of identity (of which ethnicity is a specific aspect) of the Fulani (Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 795). It should be noted that there is a consensus that the notion of *Pulaaku* has become the defining feature of Fulani identity (Dupire, 1970: 189; 1981: 169, *Ibid*). Taking interest in 'culture' makes it possible to take into account what the Mbororos say about their culture and shows that 'culture' is a marker with contents that are difficult to perceive, which they deploy in order to affirm their specificity. In fact, culture is a fundamental element that characterises a society and makes it specific, and is by definition, the instrument for affirming its personality (Labatut, 1988: 67-75 quoted by N'Gaide, 1997: 156). *Pulaaku* simply means the set of norms that the Fulani society advocates for the social behaviour of the Fulani and which represents an important part of the Fulani identity as a group distinct from others. According to these norms, a true *Pullo* should not show his physical and material needs, nor show his emotions and feelings).

From the perspective of Paul Riesma (1977; 1992, *Ibid*), *Pulaaku* involves the term *semteende* 'restraint or reserve', as the central element (emotion and ideal behaviour) of this code. According to him, the other most important elements are *hakkilo* (intelligence), *reddeengal* (respect) and *munyal* (patience). Philip Burnham (1991) also highlights the role played by this term in political and ethnic discourse. In his semantic

analysis, Labatut concludes that *pulaaku* is the set of qualities considered necessary to characterise a good Pullo. These qualities he specifies (Labatut, 1973: 184: note 157): *hakkhilo* (intelligence, including technical skill; *munyal* (acceptance, resignation) and *semtudum* (reserve) (Sidibe, Dialla and Barry, 1997: 229. As Labatut also translates the *Pulaaku* word often as 'Fulani morality', 'Fulani rules', 'rules of life', 'Fulani law', 'moral judgements' and even "Fulani justice".

Pulaaku is a fundamental part of the Fulani code of behaviour in rural areas. Those outside the *Pulaaku* do not always understand this attitude. This reserve on the part of the Fulani is attributed, rightly or wrongly, to a lack of frankness. In addition to this, among the Fulani, particular emphasis is placed on language. The Mbororo proscribe certain expressions from their language, which even disappear: for example, it is taboo to speak openly about the natural functions of the body and associated places, and about the genital apparatus. There is a whole vocabulary to cover it up. also are insults and discourteous languages forbidden. The Mbororo culture, in many of its symbolic, imaginary and even religious manifestations, shows that it is strongly influenced by the *Pulaaku*. The Mbororo are attached to the ox and the *Pulaaku*, a set of Fulani socio-cultural values. These norms also determine their political behaviour. *Pulaaku* is close to what Norbert Élias called the "mastery of affection" or the control of political emotion (see Breaud, 1996; Breaud, 2007).

From my observations, *Pulaaku* and the consciousness of nobility are deeply felt in the imagination of the Mbororos. Moreover, reaffirming the Mbororo's cultural personality was one of the objectives of the ANDCP. In this respect:

Aware of what the Mbororos are: a hard-working and noble people, the National Association for the Dignity of the Fulani Community (Mbororo) ANDCP found it urgent to draw the attention of the international community to these villainous manipulations that tarnish the image of a whole community that this tiny group

(MBOSCUDA A-CM) presents to the eyes of the world as eternally needy and better a marginalized community in Cameroon. However, this is not the case. You would do better to go down to the field to check. You will see, for example, that at the ENS in Bambili or at the Longla College in Bamenda, to mention only these schools, more than 200 (two hundred) girls are enrolled (Cf *Interpellation de la communauté internationale. Message from the National Association for the Dignity of the Fulani Community (Bororo) ANDCP*).

If one lends credence to this extract from the text, one can easily understand the ideological and cultural significance of this movement of revolt against the projection of a miserable image of the Mbororo. As is well known, *pulaaku*, in the sense of the code of behaviour, in rural areas is complex and very strict, but it is less demanding for the lower class than for the nobility (Sidibe et al, 1997: 228). The consciousness of nobility is also reflected in the demarcation of indigenous pygmy people. Thus one can read:

(...) How can one compare the Fulani to the pygmies who live in the forest without civilisation? The (Fulani) or (Mbororo) are sometimes better seen than other communities in Cameroon. So everyone needs help. That is how even the Cameroonian state is helped by other states. So help us as noble people and not as beggars (...) (*Ibid*).

By questioning the international community, the ANDCP leaders are trying to redefine their social image. In addition to the dialectic between the identification of the Mbororo with the international movement of indigenous peoples, the UN's fabrication of autochthony does not suit the dynamics of the Mbororo population, which are moving towards settlement.

4.4 *The UN Recognition of Autochthony: a Reality that is not Adapted to the Dynamics of the Mbororo Tending towards Settlement in Cameroon*

An important variable for analysing the changes affecting the Mbororo community is settlement¹³. This section analyses the changes affecting the Mbororo community as they continue their progressive integration into the modern states inherited from colonisation. Historically, pastoral mobility (*perole*) has been an identity marker for the Mbororos (Bocquene, 1986; Saidou, 2021: 528). However, the Mbororos are now tending more and more towards settlement, so that the objective elements of appreciation of autochthony can no longer be only those elements that have been established by the United Nations or those that originally characterised them. The Mbororo community, like most communities, is in a phase of transition¹⁴. Before studying the impact of the settlement of the Mbororos on rural development (B), it is important to analyse their explanatory factors (A).

4.5 *The Factors Explaining the Settlement of the Mbororos*

To speak of a factor “is to call upon a strong determinant of social change. A factor is in fact an element of a given situation which, by the mere fact of its existence or by the action it exerts,

¹³ Settlement is defined here as: 'The evolution of the practices and lifestyles of nomads who move from permanent mobility (nomadism) with all their families and livestock to their settlement in a territory where they build houses, combine livestock rearing with seasonal agricultural activities, send their children to school and diversify their activities (trade, etc.)' (Nathalie Kossoumna Libaa, 2008: 31). In other words, settlement is part of the fixing of a sociological entity on a territory that allows it to enjoy socio-educational infrastructures. It should be noted that for the Cameroonian state, settlement is a central variable in the identification of 'marginal population groups', given the imperative of control and the affirmation of the state's authority over the populations of its territory, particularly through the establishment of legal ties of nationality and the levying of taxes (Donfack Sonkeng, 2001/2002: 113).

¹⁴ If there is an original Mbororo identity, it is modified, modelled, structured and restructured through contact with others. All identities are subject to influence and sometimes follow the contours assigned to them by the official ideology of the dominant group (N'Gaide, 1997: 149).

brings about or produces a change” (Rocher, 1968: 25 cited by Assana, 2021). During the 20th century, as a result of political, economic, social and cultural changes, the settlement of nomadic societies has become an almost universal phenomenon (Sandron, 1998 cited by Kossoumna Libaa, 2008; Assana, 2021). Cameroon, like many countries in the world, is experiencing this phenomenon. The factors that explain the settlement of the Mbororos are twofold: on the one hand, a political will on the part of the colonial and state administration (1), and on the other, the quest for security (2).

4.6 *A Political Will of the Colonial and State Administration*

The settlement of nomadic pastoralists has been underway since the French colonial period. The same policy was pursued in the post-colonial period by the developmentalist policies of the Cameroonian state and its international financial partners. Thus Jean-Loup Amselle (1990) indicates that the important moment for the construction of ethnicity was the encounter between colonial officials and local populations. However, this should not be understood, in our view, in the sense that the Mbororo did not exist as an ethnic group before the arrival of the Europeans: rather, it means that their ethnic identity was modified and even reinforced under the influence of colonial policy (Robinson, 1992 cited by Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 794). In this perspective, the thesis of colonial policy as an explanatory factor of settlement is put forward by a number of authors. As Ikeya (2017 cited in Kenmoe et al, 2021: 3197) states:

"Worldwide during the modern historical era, colonial and nation state policies have encouraged nomads to settle. Some either resisted or could not change. Up to the Present, some pastoral nomads have been compelled to move according to grazing conditions, and so continue their nomadic life. Most hunter-gathered in Asia and Africa have already settled.

In the Eastern region (Cameroon), the first attempts at settlement of this nomadic group date

back to the colonial period when the Gbaya chiefs were considered by the colonial administration as the chiefs of certain areas of Adamawa in particular. During this period, the Mbororos established peaceful relations with the Gbaya in the form of product exchanges (dairy products for agricultural produce) (*Ibid*). The first disputes fuelled by agro-pastoral conflicts also date from this period. (*Ibid*) However, today in Mandjou, the Mbororos are a sedentary group whose nomadism (based on pastoral activities) is no longer an exclusive characteristic¹⁵. In the North West region Jabiru Muhammadou Amadou (2018: 45) highlights the contribution of colonial policy to the settlement dynamics of the Mbororo in the following terms:

The colonial administration, however, in order to maintain their unity forced them to set up a Fulani Native Authority (council) comprising heads of all the Fulani clans (Ardo). This council began to exist in August 1941 for the whole of the then Bamenda Division¹⁶. The Fulani Council comprised sixteen Ardo'en who were leading twelve clans (Lenyi). They were from Bafut, Bansa, Wiya, Kom, Ngemba, and Ndog. The table below indicates the members of this council.

The creation of the council was an effort to unite the Fulani and review the movement of cattle to dry season grazing. Through it the Fulanis were advised to fit themselves into all sheds of social and economic structure of the division like other citizens (*Ibid*).

Having analysed the contribution of the colonial administration to the settlement of the Mbororos, it is important to look at the contribution of the state.

Ranching is an important way in which the Cameroonian state has promoted the settlement of the Mbororos. It is a form of animal husbandry that was promoted by the Cameroonian state at the instigation of the World Bank in the early

¹⁵ In fact, cattle rearing is an activity practised by the Mbororo elites with significant financial power and locally called 'Alhadji'.

¹⁶ Ndog by this time was under Mezam. It was separated by the administrative decentralization of the 1990s.

1980s in the Adamawa Highlands (Cameroon). It consisted of granting credits for the construction of fences and the purchase of livestock intended to permanently occupy a pasture allocated "free of charge" by the public authorities. For more information on this failed project, see Albert Doufissa, 1993: 143). Similarly, the settlement of the Mbororos in Ngaoui took off in the years 1975 and 1986. These dates correspond to the development of the cross-border cattle market in Ngaoui and the establishment of administrative services in the said locality (Djida Danga, 1998-1999: 21-25 quoted by Assana, 2021). In addition to the will of the colonial and state administrations, the dynamics of the settlement of the Mbororos is motivated by the quest for security.

4.7 The Quest for Security

Some authors also put forward factors relating to the quest for security to explain the settlement dynamics of the Mbororos in Cameroon. In this perspective, Kossouma et al (2010) show that the settlement of nomadic peoples in the north region of Cameroon is the consequence of fiscal, financial, political, legal and physical insecurity. For this author, the settlement of breeders families is explained by the desire to better integrate into the socio-economic life of this region and to guarantee their supply of cereals by cultivating them (Kossouma Libaa, 2008). Sougnabe (2013) believes that the causes of the settlement of nomadic people are due to three (03) factors: structural factor (decrease in rainfall), economic factor (very small herd size) and social (physical insecurity). The development of livestock and agriculture is increasingly being undermined by climate change. They are forcing an accelerated migration of pastoral societies from the Sahelian zone to the savannah zones and their settlement around the most favourable ecological niches, such as lowlands or protected areas (Sougnabe, 2011).

In the Adamawa region (Cameroon), the factors that explain the settlement of the Mbororos are of two kinds: on the one hand, friction with the Foulbé, and on the other, cross-border crime. The conflictual relations between the Mbororos and

the Foulbé have gone through three periods: coexistence, the capture of pastoral income (1900-1930), the containment of the Mbororos on the outskirts of the lamidat (1930-1960), and the complete expulsion and repeated push back¹⁷ (Dognin, 1981: 139-157 quoted by Assana, 2021). In addition to fiscal, financial, legal and political insecurities, cross-border crime is a structuring factor in the settlement dynamics of the Mbororos in the Adamawa region of Cameroon. In fact, pastoralists are subjected to raids or the kidnapping of their children for ransom, which forces them to settle in the villages (Sougnabe, 2013). This phenomenon has had important implications on the Mbororos. It has forced this category of people to join banking structures. According to Issa Saibou (2006: 30):

When it became increasingly difficult and risky to drag herds over long distances, targeted ambushes around livestock markets replaced the raids. herdsmen were followed and expected to return; the bandits knew how much money they were bringing in from the sale of their animals. Gradually, Fulani herdsmen particularly the Mbororos learned to trust banks, hence the establishment of savings and loan cooperatives around the markets. herdsmen learned to negotiate and sell their livestock in return for a certificate of sale and a cheque so that the money could be collected in town. Sometimes, the market was no more than a stock exchange market where the herdsmen came to exhibit the characteristics of their animals, to make an appointment with potential buyers who would go to examine the goods in a safe place and conclude the sale.

The objectivity of the above allows us to observe that, the climate of insecurity has forced the Mbororos to join banking structures and to settle in the towns. (Assana, 2021). Essentially, the

¹⁷ Thus, the 1920s and 1930s were marked by a dispersion of the Djafoun, either towards the North West region in Bamenda or towards the east of the Adamawa region: Ngaoundéré and especially Meiganga in the Mbéré division. The Mbororos of the plateau therefore, had to deal with two historical constraints: the need to have a matron source and the need to benefit from protection.

Mbororos distinguish two forms of settlement: simply settling (*gasugo*) and building (*nyibugo*). However, it is the second initiative that is being generalised. By making transhumance impossible, the bandits have succeeded in doing what the public authorities have not been able to achieve through the promotion of ranching, namely forcing the Mbororos to settle. As can be seen, the first regime of “forest mobility” was followed by a second regime of 'settlement' (Sepulveda, 2020). It should also be noted that the settlement of the Mbororo population is not without implications. It has a significant impact on local development.

4.8 The impact of the settlement of the Mbororos on local development

In this sub-section, we will discuss the ways in which the sedentary Mbororos influence development in Cameroon. Indeed, settlement is symbolic in that it leads to the development of the environment in which the Mbororos find themselves. They adapt to the environment and develop strategies to develop their activities. For Georges Balandier (1971), dynamics are nothing more than the result of constant efforts of multiform practices of social actors, human beings and groups of human beings, to transform the world, which they are both agents and objects of change, and which they are driven by and set in motion. The settlement of the Mbororo population has influenced their own development (1) and has also affected the development of their locality (2).

4.8.1 Internal Development

Internal development is measured in terms of the level of transformation or change within the Mbororo community. In other words, internal development consists of the Mbororo developing their capacities and skills through the acquisition of new resources. These transformations are perceptible at the economic, political, social and habitat levels.

Economically, the Mbororos are involved in various activities such as trade and intercity transport. Economic development is also achieved

through agricultural involvement¹⁸ and openness to trade. With regard to commercial activity, the Mbororos have invested in trade to diversify their activities. Through this activity, the Mbororo traders contribute to the development of their families by sending their children to school and those of their community, and by contributing to the various development activities of the locality through financial contributions (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020). Similarly, settlement brings herdsmen closer to the places where animal products are sold: the livestock markets (Ngong, Adoumri) in the northern region (Koussoumna et al (2008; 2010).

At the socio-political level, the sedentary Mbororo population participate and take part in the political decision-making process in the management of Cameroon and in the development of their locality (Kenmoe Tchidje et al, 2021). They have been issued voter's cards that permit them to vote and be represented in local councils (rural councils etc). In the Adamawa region (Cameroon), and more specifically in the Ngaoui district, the political participation of the Mbororos is well consolidated in that they have established themselves as a dominant group (Assana, 2021:). Since the creation of the council of Ngaoui in 1996, the Mbororos have succeeded in securing control of the municipal executive of Ngaoui by retaining the position of mayor since 2002¹⁹. The Ngaoui council is composed of 25 municipal councillors²⁰. In addition to controlling the municipal executive of the Ngaoui council, the Mbororos also hold the presidency of the CPDM section in Ngaoui. This section was created after the break-up in 2008 of the large Mbéré-Est (Djohong) section. Within the local CPDM

structures of the Ngaoui District, the Mayor (Mbororo), Abdourame Labi, was elected president of the CPDM Section of Ngaoui in 2002, against the Foulbé candidate, Beladji Abdoulaye. Abdourame Labi was re-elected in 2007, 2012, and 2020 (Assana, 2017; Assana: 2021: 177-200). In the Ngaoui district, the Mbororo have the advantage of having significant economic power generated by their pastoral and commercial activities. The economic weight of the Mbororos can also be seen in their financing of political activities (Assana, 2021). This financial influence makes them real local political interlocutors with whom the central government must deal.

It is significant to note that the Mbororo society has not had a sufficiently solid socio-political organisation throughout history compared to the other sedentary Fulani fraction (the Foulbé), because they are too dynamic and constantly on the move (Assana, 2021). This situation generally led them to build their society on the basis of small social units, as shown in the ethnological and monographic sketch drawn up by A. Issa and R. Labatut, 1974; Bocquene (1986) cited by Assana, 2021). It is only recently, with what Jean Boutrais (1984: 225) has called: 'The abandonment of nomadism...being (produced) by the anchoring of the population to its wintering site and by the adoption of transhumant breeding', that the Mbororos in Cameroon have constituted much more homogeneous and united social groups. In terms of traditional command, the sedentary Mbororo population have several 3rd class chiefdoms. At the head of these chieftaincies are the chiefs (*ardo*), who are consulted when decisions are made about the functioning of their locality²¹. The Mbororos hold traditional power in the chief town of the Ngaoui District through their *ardo*. Out of a total number of seventeen (17) chieftaincies of 3rd class chiefs listed in the Ngaoui district in the Adamawa region (Cameroon), the Mbororos have seven (7) traditional chieftaincies of 3rd class (Assana, 2021). Similarly, the North-West region has 7 (seven) divisions and in

¹⁸ When they arrived in Cameroon, they did not know how to work the land or to till the soil. Nomads, the Mbororos were not familiar with land work and had only 'contempt for hoe-wielders' (Hurault, 1964, p 22-71; Issa and Labatut 1974:26; Pouget, pp.447-462, quoted by Assana, 2021).

¹⁹ The only exception comes from the very first mandate (1996 to 2002) when the Foulbé led the municipal executive of this council for one term through Abdoulaye Beiladji (Assana, 2021: 177-2000).

²⁰ To achieve such a feat, the Mbororos had to secure a sufficient majority of 13 of the 25 councillors to elect the municipal executive, with or without consensus, with or without the will of the other ethnic components (*Ibid*).

²¹ They are organised around a community leader called *Ardo* and in a plurality of pastoral villages. The village (*wuro*) is the smallest traditional administrative unit commanded by the *Ardo*, the equivalent of the village chief.

each of the divisions, there are 20 (twenty) to 30 (thirty) *Ardo* i.e. Fulani tribal chiefs (*Message to the International Community from the ANDC*). It is important to note that traditional chieftaincies continue to exert a strong influence on the course of political, economic, social and local life in Cameroon (Alawadi, 2017: 355-376). Their social organisation allows for closer ties and all this around an *Ardo*.

Settlement has also enabled the Mbororos to improve their habitat through the use of durable materials. This change in lifestyle and habitat has long been presented as the condition for all material and social progress for indigenous people (Mouiche, 2011). The habitat, which used to be made up of traditional huts using ancient architecture, is gradually being modelled on the architecture of Christian buildings (mud bricks, breeze blocks, metal sheets, windows, etc.) (Hamadou, 2014: 82-83). This settling in the territory not only allows them to acquire land and political rights, but also to integrate the socio-economic life of this district and to have a more pleasant living environment: boreholes, wells, schools within the village, health centres nearby. Some herders have also started to buy land and concessions that they rent in the villages of Djohong, Ngaoui, Meiganga, Ngaoundéré, etc. Settlement as a result of impoverishment occurs in the frequent case of nomads who have lost their herds. As Koussoumna et al, (2010) argue, they can more easily claim infrastructure (schools, dispensary, and borehole) and support from public services and projects. But, above all, herdsmen acquire land rights over the delimited territory that has been allocated to them (Tchidje Malraux et al, 2021: 3200). It is also a new form of life and well-being that is sought in herdsmen's families thanks to the presence near their village of a cheap labour force of poor farmers in search of paid work (*Ibid*). Settlement leads the authorities to officially recognise herdsmen's camps made up of "hard" dwellings by giving them the official status of villagers (Kenmoe Tchidje et al, 2021: 3200). In addition to internal development, the settlement of the Mbororos has an impact on external development.

4.8.2 External Development

External development means that the Mbororos have developed their capacities and skills by associating with the state and/or NGOs or by being impacted by other communities. This would mean that when the Mbororos settled down, they opened up to the state and to other communities. It is noticeable at the associative, economic and interurban levels.

At the associative level, the settled Mbororos have set up development and consultation committees to develop their localities through the design of the *council Development Plan*, in collaboration with the mayor's office, the National Participatory Development Programme (PNDP) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kenmoe Tchidje et al, 2021: 3197). The sedentary Mbororos, through their development committee and meetings, derive development for their locality, and the other communities benefit from the achievements made by them (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020). In the Didango district in the West Region, for example, there is a development committee that brings together all the men, so that each one can contribute to the development of his locality. They meet every month to determine the projects to be carried out to improve their living environment. In this vein, Malraux Tchidje and Ibrahim Manu (2020), speaking of the sedentary Mbororo, affirm that: '*They really contribute to the development of the locality through the local development committee*'. Furthermore, the sedentary Mbororo population participate in the construction of certain infrastructures such as school buildings, boreholes, water fountains and health centres (*Ibid*).

On the basis of these considerations, we note that the sedentary Mbororos, through the development committee, participate in the development process of their localities, as they are consulted and they contribute like all other communities. The Mbororos receive aid for the construction of certain school infrastructures through German-Cameroonian cooperation and also with the PNDP for the construction of two classrooms. NGOs support the Mbororo

community in their development at all levels. We can mention, among others, the *Ligue des Droits et des Libertés* (LDL) which provides them with legal assistance in the defence of their rights (*Ibid*).

In the North West region, Jabiru Muhammadou Amadou (2018: 49-50) noted the contribution of MBOSCUDA to the local development of the Mbororo community as follows:

MBOSCUDA created Anglo-Arabic schools in remote areas for children of all ethnic and religious background, funded the construction of classrooms for five schools in Nyang, Akweto, Chako, Ndop and Mbam. In collaboration with CAMUAUW (Cameroon Association of University Women), MBOSCUDA facilitated the award of five scholarships to Fulani girls from poor backgrounds into secondary schools (...). MBOSCUDA was in contact with government services, and the service of some international organizations such as SIRDEP, HPI, HELVETAS, Plan Cameroon, and Netherlands Centre for Indigenous Affairs Denmark, Survival International UK, Amnesty International Village AID UK and Voluntary Service Overseas (V.S.O). These development agents helped in financing development projects in Fulani communities through MBOSCUDA. These projects were mostly in the domain of education and agro-pastoral activities with the aim of improving the lifestyle of the Fulani at the local level at the village setting. The organization has also been handing adult literacy programs for Fulani and training them to be industrious and self-employed on economic activities like the production of detergents like soap, production of cheese, butter and milk. The offering of scholarships to Fulani children in schools, especially female children has been a booster in their integration process (...).

The Mbororo intellectual elite, particularly those from the *North* and *South West*, have taken up the defence of their rights to education and equality. In addition to the individual actions of Mbororo scholars, associations such as the Mbororo Social

and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) and the Society for the Development of Livestock and Commerce (SODELCO) have made the schooling of Mbororo children a priority issue for their associations. They have therefore undertaken to raise awareness among traditional authorities and religious leaders in the fight against ignorance²² (Assana, 2017; Saidou, 2021). Similarly, MBOSCUDA has also undertaken a relentless struggle against the traditional authorities of northern Cameroon who are accused of abusing the rights of these pastoralists. This action is supported by many lawyers who refer them to the judicial authorities to ensure that justice is done (Saidou, 2021: 540). This is the case for the Mbororos in the northern region, particularly in the localities of Ngong, Gouna, Tchebowa, Bibemi, Lagdo, Figuil and Rey-Bouba, where they only return during the dry season to feed their livestock (Kossoumna Libaa'a, 2008). Pelican (2008; 2012) showed that the Mbororos that settled in the Grass fields through their association called MBOSCUDA have been able to ensure that their rights are respected at national and international level, hence the birth of the term 'indigenous' or 'minority'. The psychological and legal support provided by MBOSCUDA to the Mbororo victims of injustice has considerably contributed to their legitimisation and has attracted other Mbororos to turn to it in the event of disputes with powerful men (Abdoul-Bagui, 2019: 11 cited by Saidou, 2021).

Popular, community, national and international celebrations are important for the Mbororos (Saidou, 2021: 544). These ceremonies are moments of ethnic and cultural exchange. The sedentary Mbororo population is massively involved in events such as the youth festival, the unity festival and political meetings. The presence of the Mbororos, the type of relationship between the Mbororo, the state and NGOs lead to development in each locality (*Ibid*). The Mbororo associations in Cameroon also join their brothers

²² In three decades, the results of their social actions are formidable in the sense that the schooling rate of the Mbororos is very appreciable in *North West*, *South West*, *West*, *East*, *Adamawa*, *North* and *Far North* regions of Cameroon

in other countries of the sub-region. For example, we can cite Mbororo associations in West African countries such as the Fédération Nationale des Éleveurs du Niger (FNEN) and Pastoral Resolve (PARE) in Nigeria (Bello and Sahabo, 2005: 19 cited by Saidou, 2021: 545-546). This is also the case of Mbororo associations in Central Africa such as the Association des Femmes Fulanis Autochtones du Tchad (AFPAT) and the Association pour l'Intégration et le Développement Social des Fulanis de Centrafrique (AIDSPC) (*Ibid*). These groups work to improve livestock conditions in different countries and to resolve recurrent conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. All these Mbororo associations meet regularly in the framework of the *international Tabital Pulaaku*, which is a festival for the promotion and safeguarding of Fulani cultures from around the world (*Ibid*). Furthermore, at the continental level, the *Confederation of Traditional Herdsmen in Africa* (CORET) is a genuine African network of *Herdsmen* (*Ibid*). These Mbororo groupings join with other people of the world to celebrate the International Day of the World's Indigenous People with pomp and ceremony under the banner of their respective countries (*Ibid*). Through the pooling of their national resources, the Mbororos want to preserve their cultural specificity and contribute to the development of pastoralism, their main economic activity (Abdoul-Bagui, 2019: 13 quoted by Saidou, 2021: 546).

At the economic level, the contribution of the sedentary Mbororos in Cameroon is shown by the payment of taxes on their livestock per head. All these show that the settlement of the Mbororos in Cameroon is a source of employment and a vector for the development of the said localities; it is being understood that the taxes that the *herdsmen* pay to the council make it possible to invest in making veterinary equipment available to the *herdsmen* and in the construction and development of parks and transhumance corridors (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020). Thus, the livestock farming practised by the sedentary Mbororo population is an element or an indicator that influences development in Cameroon, as it

provides meat for the market. The presence of the Mbororos through their livestock is a source of employment, as the *herdsmen* are paid either 100,000 CFA francs per month or they are entitled to one ox every six months. The Mbororos generate wealth through the livestock trade, the taxes that are issued to the Zootechnical and Veterinary Centre (CZV) and the significant revenues that they generate. After livestock rearing, agriculture is the second activity that the sedentary Mbororos carry out in order to sustain themselves and to be able to resist problems (Koussoumna, 2003: 7). Already sedentary, they have invested in agriculture as a strategy for occupying and protecting their space on the one hand, and for consuming and marketing the surplus (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020) on the other.

In terms of transport, the Mbororos also contribute to the development of the interurban transport sector. They employ young people, which reduces the unemployment rate in the locality. This activity facilitates the transport of goods and persons from one locality to another. These include Dibango Voyage and Avenir Voyage (Tchidje and Ibrahim, 2020). In short, the activities carried out by the settled Mbororo contribute to the development of rural areas and facilitate changes in the districts in which they have settled. In view of these changes affecting the Mbororo community, it is difficult not to keep some distance from the UN's concept of autochthony.

V. CONCLUSION

This study reveals that the international criteria for assessing autochthony established by the UN and the World Bank and relayed in Cameroon by the public authorities and internationalised Mbororo families do not reflect the realities as thought, felt and experienced by the Mbororo community in Cameroon. In the light of this fact, the UN recognition of autochthony is not adapted to the local perception of non-internationalised Mbororo families on the one hand, and to the dynamics of the Mbororo population which are tending towards settlement on the other.

It is worth noting that, in the universe of local perception of the Mbororo people, they do not perceive themselves as vulnerable, marginal and poor social groups. In other words, there is a discontinuity between the definitional and identification criteria such as (socio-cultural singularity, non-dominance, economic and political marginalisation, low participation in development and inability to defend their rights) established by the UN and the World Bank and relayed by the State in Cameroon, and the local imagination. The unsuitability of the UN's autochthony factor is shown by the dialectic between the identification with the international movement on indigenous people by the internationalised Mbororo families and its non-acceptance by the non-internationalised Mbororo families. It is a lever for political action and a source of financial gain for the Mbororo cause entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the UN's fabrication of autochthony is a negation of the Mbororo culture: the *Pulaaku*.

The UN recognition of autochthony does not also suit the dynamics of the Mbororo populations, who are increasingly tending towards settlement, at a time when they are continuing their progressive integration into the modern states inherited from colonisation. Various factors that may be linked to colonial policy and cross-border crime explain this tendency towards settlement. Today, the Mbororos are turning more and more towards settlement in such a way that the objective elements of appreciation of autochthony can no longer be only the elements that were originally defined by the UN or what originally characterised them.

In this way, the conceptualisation of perception is an epistemological issue that contributes to broadening the definitional and identification criteria in the international understanding of autochthony. Indeed, the definition of autochthony must incorporate the contemporary perceptions and dynamics that affect the indigenous people enshrined by the UN. A temporal negation should be sought to describe that this inadequacy occurred in a progressive manner. This progressiveness could allow us to envisage an obsolescence of the UN criteria. This

could eventually lead to the idea of the indigenisation of the Mbororo peoples. autochthony today must be assessed in the light of certain realities that are both original and dynamic. We need to rethink the methodology for studying socio-political realities today, taking into account a certain number of static considerations. But today, with the dynamic prism of change, the methodological frame of reference cannot be the original or static elements alone. This analysis makes it possible to refute the idea of an autochthony rooted in the past and to show that indigenous identities are resolutely contemporary, constantly negotiated in the light of contemporary realities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Alary (Veronique), Duteurtre (Guillaume), Faye (Bernard), « Elevages et sociétés : les rôles multiples de l'élevage dans les pays tropicaux », *INRA prod. Anim*, 24 (1), 2011, pp.145-156.
2. Amselle Jean-Loup, *Logiques métisses. Anthropologie de l'identité en Afrique et ailleurs*, Paris, Editions Payot, 1990.
3. ANDC's Message to the International Community.
4. Assana (A), 'La démocratisation et les memoranda dans l'Adamawa(Cameroon) : recomposition des modes de participation politique classiques ou entreprise d'instrumentality ?', *Revue Droit et culture*, 68, 2014, pp. 213-246.
5. Assana, *Democratisation, ethnicity and local hegemonic research in Cameroon: the case of the Adamawa region*, Thesis written and publicly defended for the award of the Doctorate/Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Yaoundé, September, 2017.
6. Assana, 'Indigenous Peoples and the Singular Socio-political Trajectory of the Mbororo in Ngaoui Subdivision', *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, Vol 11, N°1, 2021, pp.177-200.
7. Balandier Georges, *Le détour/ Pouvoir et modernité*, Paris, Fayard, 1985.

8. Barnes (Samuel H.), Kaase (Max), *Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979.
9. Bayart Jean-François, Peter Geschiere, "I was there before". Political problematics of autochthony". *Critique internationale*, n° 5, 2001, pp.97-120. <https://doi.org/10.3917/crit.010.0126>.
10. Bellier (Irène), Gonzales-Gonzales (Véronique), "Peuples autochtones. La fabrique onusienne d'une identité symbolique", *Mots. Les langages du politique*, 108, 2015, pp.131-150.
11. Bellier (Irène), Legros (D.), "Mondialisation et redéploiement des pratiques politiques autochtones: esquisses théoriques", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol: XXXI, n°3, 2001, pp.3-11.
12. Bellier Irène, "Le projet de déclaration des droits des peuples autochtones et les états américains, avancées et clivage", in C. Gros and M. C. Stiegler, *Being Indian in the Americas Today*, Paris, Institut des Amériques, 2006.
13. Bellier Irène, "Usages et déclinaisons internationales de l'autochtonie dans le contexte des Nations Unies" in Natacha Gagné, Thibault Martin and Marie Salatin. *Autochtonie, vues de France et du Québec*, les Presses de l'université Laval, Dialog-le réseau de recherche et de connaissance relatives aux peuples autochtones, 2009, pp.75-92, 2009, *Mondes autochtones*. Halshs-00665548.
14. Bellier Irène, 'Identité globalisée et droits collectifs: les enjeux des peuples autochtones dans la constellation onusienne', *Autrepart*, n°38, 2006, pp.9-118.
15. Bellier Irène, *Introduction : la reconnaissance des peuples autochtones dans le monde : les enjeux de la reconnaissance*, L'Harmattan, 2013.
16. Bellier Irène, 'The declaration of the rights of indigeneous peoples and the world indigeneous movmen', *Griffith law Review*, vol.14, n°12, 2005, pp.227-246.
17. Bonnacase Vincent, « L'État, les étrangers, et la terre en Côte d'ivoire sous la colonisation : la construction d'une autochtonie a échelle variable », in John Tolan , Hassen El Annabi Leb dai and Franck Laurent (Dir), *Enjeux identitaires en mutation*, 2014, pp.61-96. Paris Lang. <https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-03-52-0241-0>.
18. Boudon (Raymond), *Les effets pervers et ordre social*, PUF, 1977.
19. Bourdieu Pierre, *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique générale* (1972), Paris, Seuil, 2000.
20. Bourdieu Pierre, *Les structures sociales de l'économie*, Paris, Seuil, 2000.
21. Breaud Philippe, *L'émotion en politique*, Paris, Presses de Fondation Nationale de science politique, 1996.
22. Breaud Philippe, *Petit traité des émotions, des sentiments et passions politiques*, Paris, Armand-Colin, 2007.
23. Breedveld Anneke, De Bruijn, "L'image des Fulbe. Analyse critique de la construction du concept de pulaaku", *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 144, xxxvi-4, 1996, pp.791-821.
24. Burnham Philip, *The Politics of Cultural Difference in Northern*, International African Library, Edinburgh University Press, London, 1996.
25. *Cameroon's response to the urgent appeal of the previous mandate holder, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen*.
26. Capucine (Boidin), Fatima Hurtado (Lopez), 'La philosophie de la libération et le courant decolonial', *Cahiers des Amériques latines*, 62, 2009, pp.17-22.
27. Chetima (Melchisedek), 'Ethno-regional grievances and (my political uses of) memoranda in Cameroon. Chronique d'une mort annoncée?', *Afrique contemporaine*, 2018/3-4, N°267-268, pp.253-268.
28. Claire Médard, "Il existe un droit ancestral à la terre des communautés dites autochtones" in Georges Courade, *L'Afrique des idées reçues*, Paris, 2006, pp.
29. Douffissa (Albert), *L'élevage bovin dans le Mbéré(Adamawa)*, Paris, ORSTOM, 1993.
30. Durkheim Émile, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris, Puf, éd. Quadrige, 1987.
31. Elela (Desire Nkoy.), *Les migrations transfrontalières des Mbororo au Nord-Est de la République démocratique du Congo: étude de cas au Haut UELE et BAS UELE. Research report on Mbororo migration in*

- North-Eastern DRC. Great Lakes Programme IKV-PAX CHRISTI. The Netherlands.* 2007.
32. Fernandez (B.), "Le temps de l'individualisation sociale", *Revue du MAUSS*, 2(38), pp.339-348.
 33. *Indigenous Peoples in Cameroon. A guide for media professionals*, International Labour Organization, 2015.
 34. Jabiru Muhammadou (Amadou), 'The Mbororo Problem in North West Cameroon a historical Investigation', *American Scientific Journal for Engineering, Technology and Science (ASRJETS)*, 2017, pp.37-48.
 35. Kossoumna Libaa (Nathali), *De la mobilité à la sédentarisation : gestion des ressources naturelles et des territoires par les éleveurs Mbororo au nord du Cameroun*, Géographie, Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier, 2008.
 36. Koussoumna Libaa (Nathali., Dugue (Patrick), Torquebiau (Emmanuel), Sédentarisation des éleveurs Mbororo et évolution de leurs pratiques au Nord-Cameroun. *Cahagric*, Vol 19, N°1, January-February 2010.
 37. Lamizat (Bernard), *L'imaginaire politique*, Paris, Hermes-Science Lavoisier, Coll. "Formes et sens", 2012.
 38. Le Bart (Christian), "L'analyse du discours politique : de la théorie des champs à la sociologie de la grandeur", *Mots. Les langages du politique* (Online), published on 23 April 2008, accessed on 03 December 2019. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/mots/6323>.
 39. Lochak (Danièle), *Les droits de l'homme*, Paris, Edition la Découverte, 2005.
 40. Mbebi Ndema (Raymond Marcien), *Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux et Intégration Sociopolitique des minorités ethniques au Cameroun*, Thesis presented and publicly defended for the award of the PhD/PhD in Political Science, 2015.
 41. Medou Ngoa (Fred Jérémie), *Représentation politique et intégration nationale au Cameroun*, Ph.D thesis in political science, University of Yaoundé II, 2012, p.174.
 42. Merton (Robert K.), *Éléments de théorie et de méthode sociologique*, Paris, Plon, 1968.
 43. Mimche (Honoré), Pelican (Michaela), « Quand les immigrants se font autochtones : dynamiques d'insertion des Mbororo et insécurité foncière à l'Ouest Cameroun », in Pierre Kamdem, Martin Kuete (dir), *L'insécurité au Cameroun. Mythes ou réalités*, IRESMA, 2012, pp : 145-167.
 44. Minfegue Assouga (Calvin), 'Le conflit entre Gbaya et Mbororo à Mandjou (Est Cameroun): entre une autochtonie "virtuelle" et des revendications aux relents socio-économiques',
 45. Morin (Françoise), « Vers une déclaration universelle des droits des peuples autochtones », in H. Giordan (ed.), *Les minorités en Europe. Droits linguistiques et Droits de l'Homme*, Paris, Kime, 1992, pp.493-507.
 46. Motaze Akam (André), *Le social et le développement en Afrique*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2009.
 47. Mouangue Kobil James, *La protection des Minorités et des peuples autochtones au Cameroun. Entre reconnaissance interne contrastée et consécration universelle réaffirmée*, Éditions Dianioia, 2009.
 48. Mouiche (Ibrahim), 2011, "Democratization and Political Participation of Mbororo in Western Cameroon", *Africa Spectrum*, 46, 2, 71-97.
 49. Mouiche (Ibrahim), 'Contemporary migration, local politics and the construction of autochthony in Cameroon: the case of the Pouakam of the Bamoun kingdom', *Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee. Law and Politics in Africa/Asia/ Latin America*, 2013, pp.: 285-302.
 50. N'Gaide Abdarahmane, « Domination politique et influences socio-culturelles des Madingues sur les Fulanis du Fuladu (Kolda-Senegal)' », in Mirjam de Bruijn, Han Van Dijk -eds), *Fulanis et Madingues. Dialectique des construction identitaire*, Paris, Karthala, 1997.
 51. Ngando sandje (Rodrigue), 'Le droit des minorités et des peuples autochtones au Cameroun : une lecture actuelle et éventuelle', *Espaces des politiques mémorielles. Enjeux de mémoire, Droit et culture, Revue internationale interdisciplinaire*, 66, 2013/2, pp.149-178.

52. Ngando Sandje (Rodrigueà, « Politiques foncières et autochtonie au Cameroun », *Canadian Journal of Law and Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Société*, Vol 28, 2013/3. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2013.30>.
53. Passeron (Jean-Claude), *Le raisonnement sociologique. L'espace non-poppérien du raisonnement naturel*, Paris, Nathan, 1991.
54. Pelican (Michaela), 'Mbororo Claims to Regional Citizenship and Minority Status in North-West Cameroon', *African Affairs*, 78, 4, 2008, pp.540-560.
55. Pelican (Michaela), Mbororo claims to Regional Citizenship and Minority Statuts in Nort-West Cameroon, *Article in Africa*, 2008, pp.
56. Pelican (Michaela), Mbororo Pastoralist in Cameroon: Tranformation in identity and political representation, *Afro-Eurasianlner Dry Land Civilization -voil 1 March 2012*.
57. Polillard (Marine), *Baka Pygmies and neighbours in the turmoil of environmental policies in Central Africa*, thesis to obtain the degree of doctor of the Museum National d'Histoire naturelle. Doctoral school "Science of nature and man" ED 227, October 01, 2010.
58. *Removal of the Chief of the Mbororo of the North West, Joint urgent appeal by the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the situation of human rights defenders. Cameroon's response.*
59. *Report of the Working Group of Experts of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on Indigenous Populations/Communities*, submitted pursuant to the "Resolution on the Rights of Populations/Communities in Africa", adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights at its 25th Ordinary Session, 2005.
60. Saidou (Nana), "Du nomadisme a l'autochtonie : l'apport des Mbororo à l'édification de la nation camerounaise", in Mamoudou Bouba (Dir), *Le Cameroun d'hier a aujourd'hui. Etats des lieux d'une nation en construction*, Les Editions Dinimber et Larimber, 2021, pp.525-547.
61. Savonnet-Guyot (Claudette), "Le dedans" et le "dehors", le "haut" et le "bas". Réflexions sur les sites d'observation du "politique" africain", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 31-4, 1981, pp.799-804.
62. Schulte-Tenckhoff, *La question des peuples autochtones*, coll. Axes Savoirs, Bruylant, Brussels, LGDJ, 1997.
63. Sepulveda (Bastien), Glon (Eric), Dumont (Frédéric), « Identification, visibilité et reconnaissance des populations autochtones : quels enjeux géographiques ? », *Espaces populations sociétés* (En ligne), 2020/1-2, 2020, online 15 June 2020, accessed 02/03/2020.
64. Sidibe (Hallasy), Diallo (Mamadou) and Barry (Coubel), "Pulaaku and identity crisis: the case of the Fulbe wodeebe (Red Fulbe) of the Issa-Ber lake region in Mali", in Mirjam de Bruijn, Han Van Dijk (eds), *Fulanis et Mandingues. Dialectique des construction identitaire*, Paris, Karthala, 1997, pp.223-241.
65. Sindjoun (Luc), *La politique d'affection en Afrique Noire Société de parenté, " Société D'état " et libéralisation politique au Cameroun*, GRAPS/Université de Yaoundé II, Number 1, Volume 2, 1998.
66. Sommier (Isabelle), *Le renouveau des mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation*, Paris, Flammarion, 2003.
67. Sougnabe (Pabame), "Settlement as a means of adapting to declining rainfall among Fulani herders in the Chadian savannah", Volume 13, Number 1, April 2013n. <https://journals.open-edition.org/vertigo/13468>.
68. Sougnabe (Pabame), *Pastoralism without rangeland in the Chadian savannah. Des Fulanis autour de la forêt classée de Yamba Berté*, Editions Universitaires Européennes, 2011.
69. Talcott (Parsons), *The structure of social action*, 1973.
70. Tchidje (Malraux), Ibrahim (Manu), "La sédentarisation des populations Mbororo et la problématique du développement rural dans les grassfields au Cameroun: éléments influencant le développement dans les

influençant le développement dans les Grassfields par les populations Mbororo sédentarisées et leur dynamique", 2020 <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02996024>.

71. The circular letter from the Socio-cultural Association for Livestock Development and Agriculture in Cameroon (SODELCO to the Mbororo) and the message to the international community, these international aids do not really benefit the Mbororo community.
72. The circular letter of the Socio-cultural Association for Livestock Development and Agriculture in Cameroon (SODELCO in Mbororo).
73. The circular letter of the Socio-cultural Association for Livestock Development and Agriculture in Cameroon (SODELCO to the Mbororo), p.6; see also Message to the international community from ANDC.
74. *The Report of the Working Group of Experts of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on Indigenous Populations and Communities.*
75. Virginie (Bernard), "D'un espace territorial a un espace économique et politique. Les revendications des Aborigènes Noogars du Sud-Ouest australien", *Cahiers du CIERA*, 18, 2021, pp.60-85.