Wittgenstein investigates the problem of remembering an intention in Sections 633-660 in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). This topic has not been sufficiently discussed in the literature. In this paper I explain some key sections in PI 633-660 in detail, through comparing with Wittgenstein’s treatment of understanding and thinking. I pay special attention to Wittgenstein’s use of the grammar of the expression “I was going to say …”, and show that he dissolves the problem of remembering an intention by way of a grammatical investigation.
Wittgenstein investigates the problem of remembering an intention in Sections 633-660 in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). This topic has not been sufficiently discussed in the literature. In this paper I explain some key sections in PI 633-660 in detail, through comparing with Wittgenstein’s treatment of understanding and thinking. I pay special attention to Wittgenstein’s use of the grammar of the expression “I was going to say …”, and show that he dissolves the problem of remembering an intention by way of a grammatical investigation.