



IMAGE: A MAP OF THE STARS OF THE ORION CONSTELLATION

Print ISSN: 2515-5784 Online ISSN: 2515-5792

# JournalPreview

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences  
Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



# JournalPreview

LONDON JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

This document is a pre-published view of London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences Volume 22, Issue 20 and Compilation 1.0. For any minor changes and updations kindly follow your paper's live editing URL given in sent email or get in touch with our support team at [support@journalspress.com](mailto:support@journalspress.com) or visit our website to use live chat support. This is a beta document thus order, content or existence of papers may alter in the published eJournal. You are requested to kindly acknowledge and approve your research paper in this JournalPreview within three days.



- i. Journal introduction and copyrights
  - ii. Featured blogs and online content
  - iii. Journal content
  - iv. Editorial Board Members
- 

1. **The Six Sustainability Boundaries. 1-14**
  2. **Ethnic Federalism and Inter-Regional Conflicts in Ethiopia. The Case of the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional States. 15-31**
  3. **The Deficiency of Professionalizing Work in the Prisons of the State of Pará: A Negative Feedback to the Structural Violence. 33-51**
  4. **Saving the Future of Cameroon. 53-56**
  5. **A Psychoanalytic Study of the Mother Figure in August Strindberg's "The Father". 57-60**
  6. **The Ahom Mughal Conflicts with Special Reference to the Battle of Saraighat. 61-66**
- 

- v. London Journals Press Memberships



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# The Six Sustainability Boundaries

*Filipe Duarte Santos, Tim O'Riordan, Miguel Rocha de Sousa  
& Jiesper Tristan Strandsbjerg Pedersen*

## ABSTRACT

In spite of the multilateral advances on human development and environment of the last 50 years, since the Stockholm Conference, and the much greater global awareness of the need for sustainability humankind is challenged by a triple planetary crisis of biodiversity degradation and loss, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution and climate change, together with considerable geopolitical strife. Here we present a set of six boundaries that we believe impede the transition to full sustainability.

*Keywords:* NA

*Classification:* DDC Code: 320.12 LCC Code: JC319

*Language:* English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333  
Print ISSN: 2515-5784  
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



© 2022 Filipe Duarte Santos, Tim O'Riordan, Miguel Rocha de Sousa & Jiesper Tristan Strandsbjerg Pedersen. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>, permitting all noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

# The Six Sustainability Boundaries

Filipe Duarte Santos<sup>α</sup>, Tim O'Riordan<sup>σ</sup>, Miguel Rocha de Sousa<sup>ρ</sup>,  
& Jiesper Tristan Strandsbjerg Pedersen<sup>ω</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*In spite of the multilateral advances on human development and environment of the last 50 years, since the Stockholm Conference, and the much greater global awareness of the need for sustainability humankind is challenged by a triple planetary crisis of biodiversity degradation and loss, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution and climate change, together with considerable geopolitical strife. Here we present a set of six boundaries that we believe impede the transition to full sustainability. They are deeply rooted in human individual and collective behavioural characteristics, like selfishness and immediate gratification, developed during the mammalian and Homo sapiens phylogeny and later through civilization advancements leading to scientific, technological, economic and social developments. In turn, they influence restricted approaches to dealing with future consequences, curtailing social cooperation, limiting the common good, protecting personal gain, increasing inequality, fracturing international relations, and fragmenting the connection between human conditions and the role of the natural world. Identifying and analysing these boundaries are essential to finding possible ways to soften them so that progressive sustainability may be achieved.*

**Author α** : Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Modelling (CCIAM), Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Environmental Changes (cE3c), Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa (Faculty of Science, University of Lisbon), Portugal.

**σ**: School of Environmental Sciences Member, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), University of East Anglia, United Kingdom.

**ρ**: Department of Economics, CICP Research Center in Political Science, and CEFAGE-UE - Center for

Advanced Studies in Management and Economics at University of Évora, Portugal.

## I. MAIN

The Stockholm Conference of 1972, was the starting point of a multilateral process on environmental diplomacy and action. Later the focus on environment and human development evolved into the three dimensions of sustainable development – social and economic development and environmental protection – in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), adopted in 2015. In the SDG, sustainable development is interpreted as a global policy focused mainly on human well-being and the associated environmental issues. Here we use the broader concept of sustainability, which is also related to the three dimensions of sustainable development. 1972 was also the year Limits to Growth was published, which modelled for the first time the unsustainability of unlimited economic growth.

In spite of the developments of the last 50 years and the much greater global awareness of the need for sustainability, food crises and extreme poverty persist in some of the least developed and fragile countries, social and economic inequalities persist or increase almost everywhere in the world, both within and between countries, and humankind is challenged by a triple planetary crisis of biodiversity degradation and loss, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution and climate change, together with considerable geopolitical strife. This paper does not deal directly with the sustainability issues or the sustainability goals and the successes and difficulties to reach them. Instead it addresses the more fundamental question of why humans have been broadly failing in their quest to reach sustainability in the last 50 years, although some progress has been achieved.

Examining planetary boundaries that constitute a risk for achieving sustainability has long been in vogue. The Stockholm Resilience Centre has championed nine boundaries that define the safe space for humanity concerning the Earth system associated with the planet's biophysical subsystems or processes<sup>1</sup>. The Centre claims there is good evidence that three boundaries have been crossed, and humanity is in a region of high risk beyond the zone of uncertainty<sup>2</sup>. Kate Raworth<sup>3</sup> introduced a social floor of basic life support, which created a doughnut shape of irreducible boundaries for the new economics of sustainability.

Here we look at a different set of six boundaries that we believe underpin and comprehensively shape the Rockström and Raworth boundaries. This is because they are rooted in the deep causes of human individual and collective behavioural characteristics, such as selfishness and immediate gratification. They were developed during the mammalian and *Homo sapiens* phylogeny and later through the agricultural and industrial revolutions and the civilization advancements, leading to the scientific, technological, economic and social developments and to the cultural norms and values transmitted in the last three centuries. These causes, in turn, influence restricted approaches to dealing with future consequences, with curtailing social cooperation, with limiting the notion of the common good, with protecting personal gain even in the face of increasing inequality, with fracturing international relations, and fissuring the very indeterminate social connection between the human condition and the role of the natural world in enhancing the betterment of that condition.


Sustainability implies sustaining or being capable of maintaining the natural world at a steady state without exhausting natural resources or causing severe ecological damage, without changing the global climate and providing equal, inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable cooperation, settlement, and human wellbeing as envisioned in the SDG<sup>4-6</sup>. We believe that these six sustainability boundaries influence the circumstances of the doughnut squeeze and offer a considerable challenge to

achieving sustainability without rocking humanity on its self-gratification heels.

The identification of sustainability boundaries is an exercise in self-knowledge aligned with the principle of "know thyself" that was extensively used in Western and Indian philosophy. Socrates' "Know thyself", the first of three Delphic maxims inscribed in the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, indicates that humans must stand and live knowing their own nature<sup>7</sup>. Aristotle developed the same idea by saying that "knowing ourselves is the beginning of all wisdom". We argue that identifying, analysing, and knowing the sustainability boundaries is essential to find possible ways to soften them so that some form of sustainability may be achieved. Therefore, we aim to support us all come to our senses before the decade is out.

## II. SIX SUSTAINABILITY BOUNDARIES

We identify six sustainability boundaries, the first two at the individual level and the other four at the collective level.



**Figure 1:** The six sustainability boundaries diagram. The Vitruvian Man by Leonardo Da Vinci symbolizes the centrality of humans as a reference and measure for all civilization advancements. The Yalta Chessboard exemplifies world geostategic competition and cooperation.

The first sustainability boundary is the *dopaminergic reward process*. This process is located in the mammalian part of our brain that fosters basic human motivations for specific actions. Such actions concern necessities (e.g., eating, reproducing, avoiding pain, and providing pleasure) and endurance (e.g., acquiring social status, minimizing effort, and gleaning information). These actions, essential for individual survival in the most diverse life situations, are designed to assure the reproductive success of our species. Hence, they implicitly assume the principle that the species may enjoy unlimited growth. This successful growth will eventually become unsustainable in a finite planet<sup>8,9</sup> and in a situation where, up to now, we only know about one planetary system with just one Earth-like planet<sup>10</sup>.

The second sustainability boundary is related to *intertemporal decisions* involving decisions with consequences that have repercussions in the future. The simplest form is delayed gratification practiced by primates and other non-primate animals. Some of the current sustainability challenges, particularly those regarding the environment, natural resources, and climate change, have a relatively slow evolution compared with the duration of a social generation. Addressing such challenges depends crucially on the ability to project the future using science-based scenarios and to make the right decisions now to avoid the more grievous scenarios in the future as advised by “longtermism”<sup>11</sup>. The human rate of time discounting leads to the incommensurability between the operative social time of a social

The Six Sustainability Boundaries

generation and the time scale of most global change challenges<sup>12</sup>.

The third sustainability boundary and the first at the collective level regards the *cultural evolution of human-nature interconnectedness*. This follows from the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Most people no longer depend directly on the natural environment and its resources for survival and wellbeing. The fact that nature, biodiversity, and ecosystem services became abstract concepts for most of the human population constitutes a profound barrier to achieving sustainability.

*Unrestrained self-interest, normative egoism, and utility maximisation* constitute the fourth sustainability boundary. The identification and apology of psychological egoism since the middle of the 17th century set the scene for the development of utilitarianism and the economic theories of Adam Smith, leading later to the success of mainstream economics. H. A. Simon<sup>13</sup> considers utility maximisation the best-developed formal theory of rationality, which forms the core of neoclassical economics. The higher a consumer's total utility, the greater that consumer's level of satisfaction, giving them a sense of happiness and fulfilment through material possession. For the increasingly wealthy, it advances a desire for unlimited growth in the form of unrestrained consumerism. It is well established that global income and wealth inequalities are tightly connected to ecological imbalances and inequalities contributing to climate change<sup>14</sup>. Recent developments in behavioural economics suggest some bias might emerge on "pure" economic decisions<sup>15-20</sup>. These sustainability concerns related to consumer's total utility and inequality are aggravated if the consumer society runs a linear economy that transforms natural resources into waste, rather than deploying a circular economy.

The fifth sustainability boundary applies to the *voluntary and conditional cooperation and free riders* when humans seek to gather for the common good, particularly for the provision of public goods. The process of encephalisation in the *Homo* genus lineage responded to the need to

create functional, cohesive, bonded social groups that were able to develop protection and cooperation within group strategies but highly competitive and aggressive behaviours towards other groups. Cultural evolution led to new concepts, such as altruism, self-interest, selfishness, and egoism, which was highly developed by Thomas Hobbes<sup>21</sup>.

Among humans dealing with public goods, one finds voluntary co-operators, conditional co-operators, free-riders, defectors, or rational egoists that exploit the benefits that result from the contribution of co-operators to the common good<sup>22</sup>. Many people worldwide are well informed about the risks of environmental unsustainability and contribute voluntarily with their initiatives, action, and resources to reduce them. However, others take for granted the benefits of a healthy environment, where it still exists, of ecosystem services, natural resources availability, and of a current global climate, which is still relatively stable. They are tempted to free ride because they write off the personal cost of environmental unsustainability.

The sixth sustainability boundary is *geostrategic non-cooperation* between major powers and their allies, resulting from colliding sovereign geostrategic interests that prevails over all other individual or collective interests. For instance, the globally disruptive impacts of unabated climate change may either promote geostrategic cooperation or be used as an instrument to foster geostrategic competition. The latter possibility is particularly relevant in the case of climate change geoengineering<sup>12,23</sup>. The complexity of these bi-directional interactions creates considerable uncertainty about the future evolution of the interplay between geostrategy and sustainability. It includes the likelihood of war, especially between the world's major powers and their allies. War is pure evidence of unsustainability.

### III. DEEPENING THE ARGUMENT

Here we present and explore the connections between the sustainability boundaries and the broader concept of sustainability, which extends the three dimensions of sustainable development

- environmental, economic, and social<sup>24</sup> - into much more potent themes of justice, respect, human rights, and redistribution. Furthermore, we analyse the mutual reinforcement, and relative intensity of the role played by the six sustainability boundaries in the various sustainability dimensions.

#### IV. SUSTAINABILITY BOUNDARIES AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

##### 4.1 Basic Human Motivations Associated with the Dopaminergic Reward Process

Mammals evolved from therapsid ancestors more than 200 million years BP and developed a six-layer neocortex and a compartmentalization of the striatum. This arrangement allowed for enhanced cortico-striatal connectivity that contributed to the emergence of more complex brain functions, decision-making, and enhanced behavioural flexibility<sup>25</sup>. The striatum is a key component of the basal ganglia in all mammals and plays a key role in action selection. These ganglia involve normal motor, cognitive, and emotional functions, motivation, and reward processing. They are incapable of reasoning, a capacity in humans and other mammals that is essentially provided by more recent cortical structures, notably the frontal and prefrontal cortex.

The most likely explanation for the strong encephalisation in the *Homo* genus is the social brain hypothesis that attributes it to the need to create functional, cohesive, bonded social groups to confront ecological dangers and ensure social survival<sup>26–28</sup>. The big brain was needed to allow for the required level of sociality in the changing and somewhat unwelcoming Pleistocene climate when the *Homo* species lived and evolved<sup>12</sup>.

During the period of encephalisation up to the present time, the basic ganglia sustained the dopaminergic reward process associated with basic human motivations for specific actions. These included the necessities of eating<sup>29,30</sup>, reproducing<sup>31</sup>, avoiding pain, and providing pleasure. It also supported resilient endurance, such as acquiring social status<sup>32</sup>, minimizing effort<sup>33</sup>, and gleaning information<sup>34</sup>. Meanwhile,

the complexity of the connectivity of the basic ganglia with the neocortex increased.

Increasing the doses is the only way to lead the nerve cells to give more dopamine. While in the pre-historic past, survival/pleasure-connected growth in population and natural resource use could be accommodated by environmental provisioning at the local and regional levels, the pace of current growth at the global level is more difficult to adjust<sup>35</sup>. The dopamine reward system of the mammalian brain is common to all humans, but stimuli are highly diverse. They range from the satisfaction of the basic needs of those living in extreme poverty to the most sophisticated and exclusive goods and services accessible to the much wealthier. Nowadays, the activity of the dopamine reward system is fostered by the application of the principle of utilitarianism<sup>36,37</sup> that is foundational in mainstream economics. As referred by behaviouralist economists<sup>15–20</sup>, they are trying to expand neoclassical economics towards the biased world decision. In development microeconomics, the Nobel laureates Bannerjee, Duflo, and Kramer<sup>38,39</sup> introduced the importance of a span, or “poverty-band fatigue”, to commit and bind rational decisions. When this is exceeded, namely in poverty conditions, this creates a poverty trap. The most pressing demands of dopamine survival (poverty-trap) risk that in the short run- thus reinforcing our dopamine survival analysis.

##### 4.2 Intertemporal Decisions and Time Discounting

The dopamine reward system has no built-in time dimension since it provides instant gratification<sup>40</sup>. Species show a large variation in their willingness to wait for delayed rewards. This is likely caused by the diversity of adaptation responses to the selective pressures they face in their natural environment<sup>41,42</sup>. In humans, delayed gratification is influenced by strengths in patience, willpower, and self-control. It is well known that repeated exposure to instant gratification may lead to impulsive decisions and contribute to human disorders such as obesity, gambling, and various other forms of addiction<sup>43</sup>. Consumers expect to find and benefit from services, goods, and information that they want easily and as rapidly

as possible. The “power of now” became a powerful and successful marketing trend. Politicians tend to adopt this perspective and often struggle to consider future generations' wellbeing in setting their priorities over decision making.

Adam Smith<sup>44</sup> considered that our behaviour is determined by a struggle between two processes that he associated with “passions” and the “impartial spectator” who plays the role of an imaginary moral guardian. Most analyses of intertemporal choice in the context of economics are based on the model of discounted utility<sup>45</sup>, where people weigh up the costs and benefits at different times in accordance with an exponential time discounting function (constant time discounting rate) as in financial markets<sup>46</sup>.

However, the rate at which people discount future rewards decreases with the length of the delay, meaning that the personal time discounting function, instead of being exponential, is closer to a hyperbolic function<sup>47-50</sup>. Climate change mitigation provides a good example where the choice of the time discount rate value that determines the social price of carbon is critical. The low value advocated by the Stern Report favours a rapid energy transition and addresses intergenerational concerns<sup>51-53</sup>, in contrast with the higher values proposed by William Nordhaus.

## V. SUSTAINABILITY BOUNDARIES AT THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL

### 5.1 *The Evolution of the Human-Nature Interconnectedness and the Emergence of the Nature/Human Conundrum*

We know that the relationship between humans and nature has been changing since at least the first early modern humans that settled in Europe developed the Upper Palaeolithic culture of the Aurignacian between 40000-25000 years BP. In the cave paintings that they produced, one finds an abundant and realistic depiction of various animals, while people are not widely represented. When they appear, they are primarily human fragments or human-animal hybrids<sup>12,54</sup>. The agricultural revolution was essentially driven by

the advantage of the fertility increase that led to the Neolithic demographic transition. However, it also produced several negative impacts, such as agricultural collapses due to droughts, floods, or plagues. Specialised food-crop cultivation, irrigation, deforestation, and domestication of animals modified the natural environment and separated further human relations with nature. The shift from an environment in which humans were closer to nature was enhanced by the industrial revolution and the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation<sup>55-57</sup>.

The distinctive feature of this process is that now most people, especially in the industrialised countries, do not depend directly on the natural environment for their survival as they did in the past and as some indigenous people still do in both remote and barely populated areas.

The conquest of nature and the unlimited exploitation of natural resources promoted the ideology of the sacredness of nature and the need to create refuges of pristine land in protected areas<sup>57</sup>. One of the main causes of biodiversity loss in terrestrial ecosystems is the degradation or destruction of natural habitats due to the expansion of agricultural lands and other land use changes such as deforestation and mining. Other causes are the overexploitation of resources through fishing and hunting that depletes the stocks of some species while driving others to extinction, the proliferation of invasive species, the pollution of the ocean, water resources, and soils, and climate change.

This third sustainability boundary of nature/human separateness is not an innate boundary that surged from our biological evolution. It is a collective boundary since it resulted from the *Homo sapiens*' cultural evolution, mainly as a result of the success of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Various institutions relating to monitoring, managing, and measuring ecosystem disruption were imperfect in their compass. So, the boundary was allowed to flourish. We cry out for nature but turn our backs on her.

## 5.2 Cooperation, Self-Interest, Normative Egoism, and Utility Maximisation.

The evolutionary processes that led to the appearance of *Homo sapiens* very likely produced selection mechanisms at two levels of biological social organization. At the upper level, groups competed, favouring cooperative behaviour and social characteristics of a cooperative nature among the group members. At the lower level, members of the same group compete to gain personal benefit and ascendancy. D. S. Wilson and E.O. Wilson observe<sup>58</sup>: “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.”

Human cultural evolution became more distinctive and faster around 40 000 years BP, although complex cultural behaviour, like abstract thought and syntactical language, appeared earlier<sup>59–62</sup>. It was through the interdependent processes of genetic and cultural evolution that *Homo sapiens* became the champion of cooperation, surpassing other species in the complexity of its cooperation and defection.

Concepts related to cooperation, such as altruism, self-interest, selfishness, and egoism, had a remarkable evolution in historical civilizations. Before altruism was coined by Auguste Comte, the moral principles of beneficence and benevolence were developed, supported, and practiced by Christianity and by other religions<sup>63</sup>. Helping others, particularly the poor, the hungry, the sick, and the abandoned, is considered a redeeming virtue, and the Christian Bible frequently insists on the duty to help the poor and to share our wealth with them.

Western thinkers also valued explicitly emerging forms of self-interest. These include, for example, Thomas Aquinas, who stressed that it is legitimate for humans to seek the greatest possible happiness for themselves, in the sense of eudaimonia, and Niccolò Machiavelli observed that human beings are governed by their own self-interest:

“For men are less concerned with hurting someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared because love is held by a

link of obligation which, since men are wretched creatures, is broken every time their own interests are at stake”.

Baruch Spinoza<sup>64</sup> argued that each person should seek what is truly useful for himself and desire that which will lead him to a state of greater perfection. In the 17th century, one finds the first records of the use of the word selfishness in the English language. Presbyterians introduced the word selfish, also meaning selfishness, to qualify morally reprehensible behaviour before God and society<sup>65</sup>.

Nowadays, the benefits of altruism are recognized, but hurtful aspects have also been identified<sup>66</sup>, while selfishness is not considered as necessarily bad<sup>67</sup>. Egoism can be either descriptive or normative. In the first case, we have the Hobbesian thesis of psychological egoism suggesting that all human behaviours are motivated by self-interest. Thomas Hobbes claimed that “of all voluntary acts, the object to every man is his own pleasure”<sup>21</sup>. When writing the Latin expression *nosce teipsum*, which he translated as “read thyself”, Hobbes concluded that by knowing oneself, one could understand others. In fact he states in the *Leviathan*: “but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth, when he does ‘think,’ ‘opine,’ ‘reason,’ ‘hope,’ ‘fear,’ etc., and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions”<sup>21</sup>.

In the second case of normative egoism, one finds ethical egoism or rational egoism. Ethical egoism is a normative thesis in which the necessary and sufficient condition for a human action to be morally right is to maximise self-interest<sup>68</sup>. The definition of rational egoism is obtained by replacing morally right with rational in the previous definition.

The critical question that separates utilitarian morality and normative egoism is to what extent maximising an agent’s self-interest is compatible with maximising the self-interest of other agents,

especially those of the various social groups to which the first agent belongs. This question has been partially solved in the context of economics by the core of Adam Smith's thesis on capitalism, that humans' natural tendency for self-interest results in economic prosperity for all<sup>69</sup>. According to the metaphor of the "invisible hand," if each person selfishly and freely seeks to satisfy his personal interest, he will contribute to society's wealth and the overall common good. Market failures of neoclassical economics can be fixed by correcting sources of failure. But corrections are becoming increasingly difficult since the failure's harmful impacts tend to increase with economic scale and, therefore, with global GDP growth<sup>70-72</sup>.

Furthermore, corrections have been unable to strengthen the tendency to efficiently allocate the resources that provide higher levels of human wellbeing and to distribute wealth in a more equitable way within and between countries.

A more complex difficulty in the way mainstream economics deals with sustainability, results from the asynchronous evolution of civilizations since the beginning of the Holocene. The world currently shares the same economic paradigm but regions and countries exhibit a deep diversity as regards their religion, cultural, political and social background and their economic, industrial, scientific and technological level of development. Furthermore these differences are in part a consequence of world history, in particular the history of the former colonial powers and their colonies. The question is how to accommodate the quest for global sustainability with the natural wish of low and middle-income countries to reach a level of socioeconomic development similar to the more advanced economies of the Western World, allowing them to benefit from comparable levels of well-being and economic prosperity through the application of the principle of utility maximisation.

We find that the fourth sustainability boundary hinders all dimensions of the broader concept of sustainability, including justice, respect, human rights, and redistribution. Moreover, the fourth sustainability boundary creates opportunities to

enhance the power of the two individual sustainability boundaries. Much of the current strength and importance of the fourth boundary results from the ability of mainstream economics to exploit the dopaminergic reward system and the high human-time discounting rate to its advantage by reaching the highest consumer's total utility. A possible way to weaken this boundary is to promote restrained forms of self-interest, normative egoism, and utility compatible with the sustainability goals.

### *5.3 Voluntary and conditional cooperation and free riders*

Public goods are created or maintained as the result of successful concerted cooperative action. The maximisation of short-term individual self-interest would cause sooner or later their ruin to the detriment of all<sup>73</sup>. However, the observed level at which people are willing to cooperate voluntarily to provide public goods is incompatible with the strict self-interest hypothesis derived from rationality and selfishness.

Economic experiments have been performed to improve cooperation in real-world situations since the pioneering work on free-riding by Bohm<sup>74</sup>, where people in small groups are given some money to play public-good games<sup>75,76</sup>. The main conclusion from these experiments is that around half of the people turn out to be conditional co-operators, who approximately match the contributions of their groupmates. About 30% are free riders that do not cooperate, while the remaining have other more complex behavioural patterns<sup>13,77</sup>.

Experiments also show that voluntary cooperation is fragile and tends to decline in repeatedly played public goods experiments, apparently because reciprocally cooperative subjects become selfish during the experiment<sup>75,78</sup>. Although the experimental methods have been criticized given that subjects' choices may not reveal their motivations<sup>22</sup>, empirical research on the public goods games can be used to understand how to promote cooperation and curb free riding. Ostrom<sup>79</sup> presented cooperation, and conditional

cooperation on common resources, but only in small numbers of club members, and traditionally climate club members are from a higher number. Caleiro, de Sousa, and Andrade<sup>80</sup> present cooperative and non-cooperative climate scenarios based on evolutionary game theory<sup>81</sup>. These describe <sup>81</sup> business-as-usual ecocides where whole ecosystems are wiped out.

One variable that is known to increase the level of cooperation strongly is the opportunity to communicate<sup>82-84</sup>. Unidirectional communication, as in newspapers or digital media communication systems, via TV, laptops, and smartphones, are less successful than face-to-face communication, either physical or through a virtual setting. Long-term cooperation between the members of large groups is likely to be more challenging to achieve if they rely mainly or almost exclusively on unidirectional communication technologies. There are indications that the increasing reliance on unidirectional communication has a negative impact on cooperation for sustainability. An example of this situation is provided by the rise of online “echo chambers” leading to misperceptions about the scale of public support for climate change mitigation in the US<sup>83</sup>. Supporters of climate action outnumber opponents two to one, but people falsely perceive the opposite is true, which reveals the deficit in bidirectional communication. This situation creates a false social reality that hinders voluntary cooperation and therefore contributes to prevent or delay strong climate mitigation policies in the US. The solution would be for people with different opinions to be available and willing to talk more to each other. The fifth sustainability boundary acts in all three sustainability components since public goods include all of them. It is likely that this boundary can be significantly softened through processes that promote voluntary cooperation for sustainability.

#### 5.4 *Geostrategic Non-Cooperation*

Politically, sovereignty designates the state's supreme legitimate authority. Internationally, it supports the exercise of power and cooperation between states. The promotion and defence of the state's interests are mainly directed by its broader

geostrategy, which involves military, economic, ideological, political, energy, and other strategic natural resources interests.

Progress in global sustainability issues, such as environmental protection, biodiversity loss, energy and water resources availability, natural resources sustainable use, climate change, justice and human rights depend to a large extent on international cooperation. Cooperation between China, the US, EU, and India, the world's four highest emitters of greenhouse gases with a share of 59% of global emissions in 2020, on global mitigation and adaptation efforts is essential to stop the progress of the climate crisis<sup>85</sup>. US-China cooperation should lead by example since they are the two largest world economies and the two largest emitters. Both benefit from high scientific and technological development, a high potential to advance research, technologies, and commercial ventures on renewable energies, critical materials, develop negative emission innovative technologies, and other low carbon energy technologies. These advantages can be turned into areas of great power competition if geostrategic cooperation is weakened or breaks down. The sixth sustainability boundary is an obstacle to all sustainability components in its broader meaning resulting from the disruption or collapse of geostrategic cooperation, including the possibility of war, especially between the World's major powers and their allies.

The overwhelming importance of the geostrategic interests rises a further obstacle in the way to reach global sustainability. Such a goal would necessarily involve the whole of mankind and require the maximization of the long term well-being and prosperity of the one-tribe-on-the-planet social group, which is a process for which humans are not naturally prepared<sup>12</sup>. Forming social groups is the foundation of human sociality, which implies that the one-tribe-on-the-planet social group is an impracticable theoretical fiction, except may be, if a very unlikely encounter with unfriendly beings from an extra-solar planetary system could awaken the one-tribe drive. Otherwise, human society is fractured by a structure of independent sovereign states with geostrategic interests that

are unavoidable and unsurpassable. Reaching the goals of the three components of sustainability is bounded by the ever-changing dynamics of the geostrategic interests and objectives, especially those of the major powers and their allies.

## VI. SOFTENING THE BOUNDARIES

“Knowing ourselves” is a first step to charter sagely our pathway. We identified six sustainability boundaries that hinder progress toward sustainability. The two at the individual level have their origin in our deep motivations that ensure survival and in our concept of time that gives high priority to the short-term. The remaining sustainability boundaries manifest themselves at the collective level and result mainly from our cultural evolution.

Having identified the boundaries, we can explore ways to overcome them and facilitate the journey to sustainability. These aspects will be addressed in future papers, focusing on the following:

1. How to learn to control and moderate ourselves in order to make the dopaminergic reward system more compatible with our sustainability goals.
2. How to be more engaged in intertemporal decisions regarding medium- and long-term sustainability issues.
3. How to change our collective behaviour and value systems so that the essential role of the human-nature relation for our wellbeing and prosperity is recognised and considered in our decisions and actions.
4. How to restrain self-interest, normative egoism, and utility maximisation, so that the economic system at the national and global levels is enabled to promote all the dimensions of sustainability, including equity, human rights, and justice systematically.
5. How to engage more people to cooperate unconditionally for the provision of public goods that ensures the progress of human civilization now and in the future (e.g., a continuation of wellbeing, human rights, justice, and diverse forms of prosperity)

6. How to cultivate the cooperation between people of different nations and their sovereign countries and governments so that the goal of a sustainable global society reaches the highest priority.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

M. de Sousa from Research Center in Political Science (UID/CPO/00758/2020), University of Minho and University of Évora was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology and the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science through national funds. J. Pedersen would like to acknowledge the financial support from EEA-Financial Mechanism 2014-2021 and the Portuguese Environment Agency through the Pre-defined Project-2 National Roadmap for Adaptation XXI (PDP-2).

### *Conflict of Interest*

The authors have declared no conflicts of interest in this article.

### *Data Availability*

Data analyses, literature review, and figures generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

### *Code Availability*

No codes were used for the study and analyses.

### *Ethical Statement*

The Faculty of Science, University of Lisbon (FC-UL) approved the study protocol. More detail about the different stages of the research is available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

## REFERENCES

1. Rockström, J. *et al.* A safe operating space for humanity. *Nature* 461, 472–475 (2009).
2. Steffen, W. *et al.* Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. *Science* (1979) 347, (2015).
3. Raworth, K. *A Safe and Just Space for Humanity: Can we live within the doughnut?* (Oxfarm, 2012).

4. Fritz, S. *et al.* Citizen science and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. *Nature Sustainability* 2019 2:10 2, 922–930 (2019).
5. UN. Sustainable development goals: 17 Goals to Transform our World. *United Nations* <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (2015).
6. WCED. *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*. <http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf> (1987).
7. Plato & Jowett, B. *The Dialogues of Plato: Translated Into English with Analyses and Introductions*. (Bigelow, Smith, 1990).
8. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J. & Behrens III, W. W. *The Limits to Growth: A Report for The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. (Potomac Associates, 1972).
9. Meadows, D. & Randers, J. *The Limits to Growth: The 30-year Update*. (2012) doi:10.4324/9781849775861.
10. Unterborn, C. T. *et al.* Mantle Degassing Lifetimes through Galactic Time and the Maximum Age Stagnant-lid Rocky Exoplanets Can Support Temperate Climates. *Astrophys J Lett* 930, L6 (2022).
11. MacAskill, W. *What we owe the future*. (Basic Books, 2022).
12. Duarte Santos, F. *Time, Progress, Growth and Technology: How Humans and the Earth are Responding*. (Springer International Publishing, 2021). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-55334-0.
13. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. & Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. *Econ Lett* 71, 397–404 (2001).
14. Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E. & Zucman, G. *World inequality report 2022*. <http://hdl.handle.net/11520/27510> (2021).
15. Simon, H. A. Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow. *Mind & Society* 2000 1:1 1, 25–39 (2000).
16. Sunstein, C. R. *Nudging: A Very Short Guide*. *Journal of Consumer Policy* 2014 37:4 37, 583–588 (2014).
17. Shiller, R. J. *Irrational Exuberance*. (Princeton University Press, 2016). doi:10.1515/9781400865536.
18. Sargent & J., T. *Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics: The Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures*. *OUP Catalogue* (1993).
19. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. *Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk*. in 99–127 (2013). doi:10.1142/9789814417358\_0006.
20. De Grauwe, P. *Lectures on behavioral macroeconomics*. (Princeton University Press, 2012).
21. Hobbes T. *Leviathan*. (Oxford University Press, 1651).
22. Burton-Chellew, M. N., el Mouden, C. & West, S. A. Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113, 1291–1296 (2016).
23. O'Lear, S. *et al.* Environmental Geopolitics of Climate Engineering Proposals in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. *Frontiers in Climate* 3, 100 (2021).
24. Purvis, B., Mao, Y. & Robinson, D. Three pillars of sustainability: in search of conceptual origins. *Sustain Sci* 14, 681–695 (2019).
25. Hamasaki & Goto. Parallel Emergence of a Compartmentalized Striatum with the Phylogenetic Development of the Cerebral Cortex. *Brain Sci* 9, 90 (2019).
26. Dunbar, R. I. M. The Social Brain Hypothesis. *Evol Anthropol* 6, (1998).
27. Shultz, S. & Dunbar, R. I. M. The evolution of the social brain: anthropoid primates contrast with other vertebrates. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 274, 2429–2436 (2007).
28. Shultz, S. & Dunbar, R. Encephalization is not a universal macroevolutionary phenomenon in mammals but is associated with sociality. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107, 21582–21586 (2010).
29. Douglass, A. M. *et al.* Central amygdala circuits modulate food consumption through a positive-valence mechanism. *Nat Neurosci* 20, 1384–1394 (2017).

30. Farr, O. M., Li, C. R. & Mantzoros, C. S. Central nervous system regulation of eating: Insights from human brain imaging. *Metabolism* 65, 699–713 (2016).
31. Baird, A. D., Wilson, S. J., Bladin, P. F., Saling, M. M. & Reutens, D. C. Neurological control of human sexual behaviour: insights from lesion studies. *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry* 78, 1042–1049 (2007).
32. Utevsy, A. v. & Platt, M. L. Status and the Brain. *PLoS Biol* 12, e1001941 (2014).
33. Salamone, J. D., Correa, M., Yang, J.-H., Rotolo, R. & Presby, R. Dopamine, Effort-Based Choice, and Behavioral Economics: Basic and Translational Research. *Front Behav Neurosci* 12, (2018).
34. Bohler, S. *Human psycho: comment l'humanité est devenue l'espèce la plus dangereuse de la planète.* (Bouquins, 2022).
35. Ripoll, T. *Pourquoi détruit-on la planète? Le cerveau d'Homo Sapiens est-il capable de préserver la Terre?* (Le Bord De L'eau, 2022).
36. Mill, J. S. *Utilitarianism, liberty, representative government.* (Dent, 1848).
37. Bentham, J. *An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation.* (New York: Hafner (1948), 1789).
38. Olken, B. A. Banerjee, Duflo, Kremer, and the Rise of Modern Development Economics\*. *Scand J Econ* 122, 853–878 (2020).
39. Duflo, E. & Banerjee, A. *Poor economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty.* (Public Affairs, 2011).
40. Miller, R. *et al.* Delayed gratification in New Caledonian crows and young children: influence of reward type and visibility. *Anim Cogn* 23, 71–85 (2020).
41. Stevens, J. R. Evolutionary pressures on primate intertemporal choice. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 281, 20140499 (2014).
42. Latzman, R. D., Tagliabue, J. P. & Hopkins, W. D. Delay of gratification is associated with white matter connectivity in the dorsal prefrontal cortex: a diffusion tensor imaging study in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 282, 20150764 (2015).
43. Gao, Z. *et al.* The neural basis of delayed gratification. *Sci Adv* 7, (2021).
44. Smith, A. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* (Liberty Fund (1984), 1759).
45. Samuelson, P. A. A Note on Measurement of Utility. *Rev Econ Stud* 4, 155 (1937).
46. Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. & O'Donoghue, T. Time discounting and time preference: A critical review. in *Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice* 13–86 (Russell Sage Foundation, 2003). doi:10.1257/002205102320161311.
47. Ainslie, G. Derivation of 'Rational' Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount Curves. *The American Economic Review* 334–340 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006881#meta\\_data\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006881#meta_data_info_tab_contents) (1991).
48. Doyle, J. R. Survey of Time Preference, Delay Discounting Models. *Judgm Decis Mak* 8, 116–135 (2012).
49. Ainslie, G. The Cardinal Anomalies that Led to Behavioral Economics: Cognitive or Motivational? *Managerial and Decision Economics* 37, 261–273 (2016).
50. Ainslie, G. & Haslam, N. Hyperbolic discounting. in *Choice over time* (eds. Loewenstein, G. & Elster, J.) 57–92 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1992).
51. Stern, N. *Stern review: the economics of climate change.* (2006).
52. Nordhaus, W. D. Revisiting the social cost of carbon. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114, 1518–1523 (2017).
53. Goulder, L. H. & Williams, R. C. The Choice of Discount Rate for Climate Change Policy Evaluation. *Clim Chang Econ (Singap)* 03, 1250024 (2012).
54. Testart, A. *Art et religion de Chauvet à Lascaux.* (Gallimard, 2016).
55. Franklin, Adrian. Animals and Modern Cultures: A Sociology of Human-Animal Relations in Modernity. *Animals and Modern Cultures* 1–224 (1999).
56. Schultz, P. W. New Environmental Theories: Empathizing With Nature: The Effects of Perspective Taking on Concern for

- Environmental Issues. *Journal of Social Issues* 56, 391–406 (2000).
57. Vining, J., Merrick, M. S. & Price, E. A. The Distinction between Humans and Nature: Human Perceptions of Connectedness to Nature and Elements of the Natural and Unnatural. *Human Ecology Review* 15, 1–11 (2008).
  58. Wilson, D. S. & Wilson, E. O. Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology. <https://doi.org/10.1086/522809> 82, 327–348 (2007).
  59. Huybregts, M. A. C. (Riny). Phonemic clicks and the mapping asymmetry: How language emerged and speech developed. *Neurosci Biobehav Rev* 81, 279–294 (2017).
  60. McBrearty, S. & Brooks, A. S. The revolution that wasn't: a new interpretation of the origin of modern human behavior. *J Hum Evol* 39, 453–563 (2000).
  61. Henshilwood, C. S. *et al.* Emergence of Modern Human Behavior: Middle Stone Age Engravings from South Africa. *Science* (1979) 295, 1278–1280 (2002).
  62. Wynn, T. Hafted spears and the archaeology of mind. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106, 9544–9545 (2009).
  63. Neusner, J. & Chilton, B. *Altruism in world religions*. (Georgetown University Press, 2005).
  64. Spinoza, B. *The Ethics*. (Hackett Publishing Company (1982), 1677).
  65. Layne, L. L. Introduction. Self, selfish, selfless. in *Selfishness and selflessness: New approaches to understand morality* (ed. Layne, L. L.) (Berghahn Books, 2020).
  66. Oakley, B. A. Concepts and implications of altruism bias and pathological altruism. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110, 10408–10415 (2013).
  67. Kaufman, S. B. & Jauk, E. Healthy Selfishness and Pathological Altruism: Measuring Two Paradoxical Forms of Selfishness. *Front Psychol* 11, (2020).
  68. Shaver, R. Egoism. in *Stanford Encycl. Philos* (ed. Edward N.) (2015).
  69. Smith, A. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations*. (Liberty Fund, 1776).
  70. Røpke, I. The early history of modern ecological economics. *Ecological Economics* 50, 293–314 (2004).
  71. Brand-Correa, L. *et al.* Economics for people and planet—moving beyond the neoclassical paradigm. *Lancet Planet Health* 6, e371–e379 (2022).
  72. Francis, P. *Laudato Si' - On the Care of Our Common Home*. (Vatican Press, 2015).
  73. Siegal, G., Siegal, N. & Bonnie, R. J. An Account of Collective Actions in Public Health. *Am J Public Health* 99, 1583–1587 (2009).
  74. Böhm, P. Estimating demand for public goods: An experiment. *Eur Econ Rev* 3, 111–130 (1972).
  75. Ledyard, J. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. in *Handbook of Experimental Economics* 111–194 (Princeton University Press, 1995).
  76. Gächter, S. Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications. (2006).
  77. Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments. *American Economic Review* 100, 541–56 (2010).
  78. Andreozzi, L., Ploner, M. & Saral, A. S. The Stability of Conditional Cooperation: Egoism Trumps Reciprocity in Social Dilemmas. *Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods* (2019).
  79. Ostrom, E. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press 271 (1990) doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763.
  80. Caleiro, A. B., de Sousa, M. R. & de Oliveira, I. A. Global development and climate change: A game theory approach. *Contributions to Economics* 17–35 (2019) doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02662-2\_2/COVER.
  81. Weibull, J. W. *Evolutionary Game Theory*. (The MIT Press, 1997).

82. Brosig, J. & Weimann, J. The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation. *Ger Econ Rev* 4, 217–241 (2003).
83. Sparkman, G., Geiger, N. & Weber, E. U. Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half. *Nat Commun* 13, 4779 (2022).
84. Sally, D. Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463195007001004> 7, 58–92 (2016).
85. Pedersen, J. S. T. *et al.* The effect of the four major emitters in reaching the Paris Agreement may take the World on a 2°C pathway. *Preprint (Nature Communications)* (2022).



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# Ethnic Federalism and Inter-Regional Conflicts in Ethiopia. The Case of the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional States

*Sibuh Gebeyaw Tareke*

*Bahir Dar University*

## ABSTRACT

After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia established a democratic federal state that gave full recognition to ethnic autonomy within a unitary state. Its new Constitution created ethnic-based territorial units as a reaction to some long-standing historical conflicts. Thus, it provides all the constitutional and democratic principles to each ethnic group that had not before. However, it's a socialist federation that grants the right of secession for each ethnic group. In common with other countries where such federations were introduced, it has created new inter-regional conflicts, aggravated existing conflicts, and endangered state unity.

*Keywords:* multicultural–federalism; interregional; conflict; EPRDF; ethiopia.

*Classification:* DDC Code: 320.54 LCC Code: JC311

*Language:* English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333

Print ISSN: 2515-5784

Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



© 2022 Sibuh Gebeyaw Tareke. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 Unported License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>), permitting all noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

# Ethnic Federalism and Inter-Regional Conflicts in Ethiopia. The Case of the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional States

Sibuh Gebeyaw Tareke

## ABSTRACT

*After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia established a democratic federal state that gave full recognition to ethnic autonomy within a unitary state. Its new Constitution created ethnic-based territorial units as a reaction to some long-standing historical conflicts. Thus, it provides all the constitutional and democratic principles to each ethnic group that had not before. However, it's a socialist federation that grants the right of secession for each ethnic group. In common with other countries where such federations were introduced, it has created new inter-regional conflicts, aggravated existing conflicts, and endangered state unity. Thus, following this federal experiment, Ethiopia has faced enormous challenges. Therefore, through deploying empirical and qualitative case methods, this study investigated and critically examined the causes, trends, impacts of federalism's design in Ethiopia in general and particularly in the Amhara regional state. In the end, it provides mechanisms of inter-ethnic conflicts.*

**Keywords:** multicultural–federalism; interregional; conflict; EPRDF; ethiopia.

**Author:** Department of Political Science and International Studies Bahir Dar University, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The period 1991 was when the Soviet Union federation and the Derg Socialist regime failed internationally and domestically. However, following this dead Marxist-Leninist socialist ideological perspective, EPRDF took power in

Ethiopia (Adejumobi, 2007:138). Subsequently, TPLF/EPRDF established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia/ FDRE's Constitution in 1995 (Abebaw, 2013:22). Alongside, the Ethiopian federation is an ethnic groups' federation, in which the regional states' boundaries are demarcated along ethnic lines (Zemelak, 2014:93). Accordingly, Article 8 of the FDRE Constitution gives the sovereign power to "nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia (Aalen, 2002:54-55).

Under Article (39) of the FDRE Constitution, the sovereign power states that "Every Nation, Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession". This right is recognized to maintain unity in diversity in such a way through the respect for ethnic diversity along with Ethiopian national identity (Alexander, 2019:18-19). Furthermore, article 39 (3) also allows each ethnic group to have the right of self-administration and equitable representation at both the regional and federal levels of government (Siraw, 2015:50).

Such a federal political community is set up to establish lasting peace, security, and democracy; to respond to the long-standing national question's; to promote equal rights and benefits of ethnic groups; and to respond to the challenge of ethnonational conflicts that stressed the old Ethiopian state or to serve as a panacea for the old and emerging inter and intra-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia's future (Tsegaye, 2010b:53).

However, the Ethiopian federal arrangement has generated new localized conflicts instead of solving the old problems. It forces citizens to

favour their identity rather than get united (Assefa, 2009:19). The existing difficulties reinforce undemocratic political mobilization based on ethnic group protection, leading to discrimination based on identity and ethnicity. Thus, it has generated inter-regional ethnic conflicts and produced conflicting-induced displacement and deaths. In doing so, the implication of such behaviors has led to the politics of intolerance and fear, the politics of resentment and the politics of hate as seen in today's Ethiopia (Asnake, 2009:6).

This study seeks to investigate the theoretical frameworks of federalism in managing ethnic conflicts. Then, it described the causes and impacts of federalism on inter-regional disputes in the country. Next, it critically examined the causes, consequences, and managing aspects of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Amhara regional state. In the end, conclusions and recommendations for prospects.

The research method of this study used both discourse analyses and qualitative case studies. The discourse analysis includes various scientific publications (research papers and articles) and books. The qualitative case study was collected using key informant interviews and focus group discussions/FGDs based on semi-structured and open-ended questions. Therefore, the study will select a limited number of informants strategically, whose in-depth information will offer an insight into the impacts of ethnic federalism in inter-regional ethnic conflicts and mechanisms to resolve disputes in the study region. The sample respondents were selected from the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions local civilian population, government and party officials. The discussion was made with 23 individual interviews and Six FGDs based upon the informants' interests—the data analysis used a narrative case study and thematic analysis conducted to analyze and interpret the data.

## II. FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT

Federalism is a valuable mechanism for understanding the causes of ethnic conflict,

managing aspects, and the way how to accommodate diversity in multicultural states (Obi, 2019:17). Accordingly, Olumide (2017:66) categorized theories of federalism into three: Legal-institutional or Legal-constitutional theory, Sociological theory of federalism, and Political/Ideological theory of federalism.

First, the Legal-constitutional theory of federalism recognized the courts' role as an essential aspect of federalism for handling ethnic conflicts. Significantly, this type of federalism is advantageous in many respects to resolve ethnic disputes as it is practiced in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland (Obi, 2019:17; Auclair, 2005:3). Therefore, the legal-constitutional theory focuses more on the legal and jurisdictional aspects to accommodate diversity and resolve conflicts, in which powers are divided between the federal and regional governments (Wheare, 1963:10).

Others argued that judicial federalism had attracted less close attention. For example, the United States Supreme Court has been actively engaged in adjudicating federalism disputes during various American history periods. Still, today, it has been suggested that the primary determinants of the federal balance lie in the political process and that courts play the role of enforcing constitutional baselines (Tariq, Khan, and Rizwan, 2018:403).

Second, the Sociological theory of federalism has given more attention to the essence of social forces underlying the pressures for diversity in federations. The pivotal interactions of social forces with political organizations have given a chance to establish and create a federal political structure to maintain peace and security (Watts, 2008:21). However, this theory lacks clear guidelines, principles, and norms to show a demarcation line between a federal and non-federal society (Burgess, 2006:142-44). It focuses on diversity alone without distinguishing the factors that accommodate various ethnic groups' diverse interests in the existing federal system. Therefore, the sociological approach did not always lead to federalism; instead, it may

create a unitary government of the U.K. and France (Tariq, Khan and Rizwan, 2018:406).

The last theory of federalism is the Political/Ideological theory. Now a day, it has become a solution to a political problem. Hence, it is significant to recognize political motives as a critical instrument to solve federal political systems (Ibid.2018:407). In the first place, such federations exist in Marxist and non-Marxist liberal democratic states (Burges, 2006:144). In Marxist/socialist states, federations established upon ethnic-based territorial arrangement known as multi-ethnic/multi-national federalism. It recognized all the democratic rights and the constitutional principles of separations of powers and the rule of law (Sakwa, 1998:107-117). But it was superficial; actually, there was no formal separation of powers between the three government branches. Real political and policy decisions are made at the party and central government level networks (Ibid. 1998:107-117).

On the other hand, it also grants each ethnic group the right of self-administration, including secession over the cultural, linguistic, and religious matters for the federation's constituent unities (Horowitz, 1985: 601-652). In this view, some argued that the socialist federation was assumed as a cause of conflicts. Such a federation granted the rights of secession to each ethnic group to create their homelands and governed by their ethnic political parties/elites (Yonas, 2013:26-27; Raffas, 2012:144). Thus, ethno-cultural diversity translates into political fragmentation in a diverse society: political claims are refracted through the lens of primordial ethnic identity, and political conflict is synonymous with conflict among ethnocultural groups (Smith, 1995:9). The duplication of national identities within federations pushed political parties into a political conflict between the center and the regions. Therefore, ethnicities are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends (Mohammadzadeh, 2016:159; Roeder, 2009:209). Following this approach, the Soviet and East European communist regimes collapsed in the 1990s (Burges, 2006:144).

In contrast, liberal democratic, multicultural federalism constitutionally recognized ethnic and linguistic diversity and promotes self-rule and shared-rule between the two government forms as fundamental principles (McGarry and O'Leary 2007:180-211). It was established based on a consociational democratic system. It also acknowledges the demand for self-determination and self-government. It stops the idea of secession without fragmenting the state into different segments (Choudhry and Hume, 2010:366). These government forms are applied in the United States, Switzerland, India, and Nigeria (Simon, 2009:245). Then the duality ensuing from unity and diversity is the driving principle for polities that consider federations as institutions forging the two together (Assefa, 2009:118).

Moreover, Kymlicka (2006:97) elucidates that a federation should be arranged upon consociational democratic federalism and mixed-based boundary demarcation to compete with multicultural interests and resolve ethnic conflicts. It accommodates the diverse interests of ethnic groups and the nation-building process. It involves introducing in successful states such as Switzerland. Every citizen defines themselves as Swiss first and expresses their ethnic group as a secondary group identity. The post-Soviet Russia and India are moving towards this form, too (Juhász, 2005:247). Below the study discussed the Ethiopian ethnic federalism's role in managing inter-regional conflicts in the study region.

### III. THE DESIGN OF ETHIOPIA'S ETHNIC FEDERALISM: ACCURACIES AND UNCERTAINTIES

After EPRDF came to power in 1991, it established a new FDRE Constitution in 1995. Then the Constitution adopted ethnic-based state formation based on ethno-territorial units and grants for each ethnic group to have the right of self-determination, including secession (Salih, 2018:19; Temesgen 2019:18). The establishment of this ethnic-based federalism design and Constitution was a reaction to the long-standing national question and strong centralized Ethiopia's monarchical governments in the past. As a response, it established a highly

decentralized federal state and ethnic identity as an organizing principle of the state (Semahegn, 2012:170; Vaughan, 2003:169-170). Hence, EPRDF seemed moral enough to treat all ethnic groups as equals; build a democratic society; and construct effective, efficient, and uncorrupt governance systems (Keller, 2002:32).

In contrast, others see the unlimited rights to self-determination and secession as a sign of disintegration for Ethiopia's multi-ethnic society, who have lived together for three millennia (Abebaw, 2013:22). Emetically the NNPs have not sovereign power, the minority groups' rights are not protected, and the Constitution does not allow veto power for the minority representatives within or across political parties. Thus, Ethiopian ethnic federalism's constitutional problem promotes TPLF/EPRDF to follow the undemocratic party's ideological principles and act beyond the Constitution recognized as the land law (Siraw, 2015:52).

Legese expressed that the ethnic federalism by itself divided Ethiopian society through granting constitutional authors for the NNPs of Ethiopia and not we the people of Ethiopia, whereas the U.S. and Germany federal Constitutions that authorize the sovereign power for undivided society, like 'We the People of the United States and the 'German People'. In this circumstance, the socialist federations were trying for a short period but ended when the USSR federations expired (2015:445-46).

Moreover, the 1995 FDRE Constitution makes the nine regions that constitute the federal state based on ethnic groups' territorial autonomy to resolve the old and emerging conflicts (Asnake, 2009:66). This regional arrangement more or less links with the primordial and instrumentalism approach of ethnic groups. Henceforward, both the primordial and instrumentalism aspect of ethnicity has become a cause for current Ethiopia's ethnic group conflicts (Alemu, 2018:43; Aalen, 2006:247; Asnake, 2010:616).

Alexander (2019:18-19) expressed this constitutional classification of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia' into nine

regional states and divided Ethiopians along ethnic lines by facilitating their divisions instead of maintaining their unity. Even the so-called regional ethnic-based boundary demarcations are not fixed somewhat changed across time. Such "ethnic boundary transformation might take different forms like expansion, contraction, fragmentation, elevation, and dissolution" (Alemu, 2018:44).

Since the formation of ethnic federalism's design, Ethiopia's most challenging aspects of the conflict are the emergence of new localized ethnic identity conflicts involving several ethnically constituted regions, unlike the previous contests (Gebremichael, 2011:34; Abbink, 2006:26). Therefore, Ethiopia's ethnic federalism design and implementation is a problematic, ineffective, breakable, and terrifying experiment that introduces a big challenge for the country's unity (Alem, 2004:91).

Second, proponents argue that Ethiopian ethnic federalism has recognized the separation of powers between the federal and regional governments. Marginalized minority ethnic groups have veto power and are empirically endowed with the right of representation at both the federal and regional levels (Aklilu, 2006:92; Alexander, 2019:18). They emphasized establishing ethnic-based federal arrangements as a novel decision that would reduce intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia (Asnake, 2010:618; Alexander, 2019:18).

Empirically, it is a socialist-oriented centralized system that boycotting the balance between self-rule and shared-rule coupled with the politicization of tribal identity results in ethnic conflicts (Alexander, 2019:17). Moreover, ethnonational federalism promotes the uniqueness of a particular ethnic group to have the right to self-rule in their homeland, which worsens public clashes into clashes of tribalism (Siraw, 2015:50).

Lastly, advocates argued that the Ethiopian federal Constitution adopted principles of democracy such as competitive elections and multi-party systems. It recognizes ethnic-based

party politics adopted to respond to the past unitary state by recognizing freedom political participation among different ethnic groups (EPRDF, 2017:3-27; Bekalu, 2017:52-54).

Nevertheless, several multicultural federations' constitutions outlaw discrimination based on ethnic lines and rigorously ban ethnic-based political party structure (Alemante, 2003:73). For example, the Switzerland and Canada multi-linguistic federations discard establishment of ethnic-based political parties because the ethnic-based political arrangement resulted in political mobilization (Alexander, 2019:19). In African countries, such as "Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged. The Ghanaian Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or ethnic-based political parties. It clearly states 'Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions'" (Ibid.2019:19).

In principle, Ethiopian federalism recognizes competitive elections and multi-party systems. Notably it was a socialist TPLF/EPRDF one-party system that controlled every aspect of the government levels. Though it is detrimental to ethnic peace, national unity, and ethnic diversity, it ostensibly encourages ethnonationalism and deteriorating Ethiopian nationalism (Alemu, 2018:43). This ethnic-based party or TPLF's divide and rule strategy has weakened the united opposition against the government at the center; instead, "Ethiopian ethnic parties are rivals with each other" (Legese, 2015:465). Therefore, in "Ethiopia a multi-party democracy operating as a restricted dominant one-party state controlled by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), since 1991" (Salih, 2007:677).

Hence, over the past decade, the country has faced several ethnic violence and anti-government protests. Nevertheless, both the federal and regional governments did not manage those flaring conflicts due to this reason; in the end, EPRDF was distorted. In such views, the existing ethnic federal political system will disintegrate the country (Abrham, 2019:47-50).

### 3.1 Ethnic Federalism's Design: Inter-regional Conflicts in Ethiopia

Since the Ethiopian political process is organized along with ethnicity, the relationship between ethnicity and conflict in describing the inter-regional conflicts has trapped scholars' attention on federalism and conflict management (Legesse, 2015:466). Because it has transformed the old national conflicts into newborn subnational and local-level conflicts, such disputes emanate out of the ethnic-federal arrangement and ethnic party organization (Bekalu, 2017:52-55; Dagnachew, 2018:75).

One of the root causes of Ethiopian inter-regional ethnic conflict is the ethnic-federal model that recognizes ethnic-based administrative structures and ethnic-based boundary lines, which create disagreements between inter-regional states (Temesgen, 2019:19). Furthermore, the boundary demarcation between regional states based on ethnic lines has uninterruptedly intensified disputes between ethnic groups that have transformed into disputes between regional states (Ibid.2019:20).

Among others, such ethno-boundary inter-regional ethnic conflicts have been witnessed between the Oromia and Somali regional states (Borana vs. Gerri); in the Afar and Somali regional states (between Afar vs. Issa); in the Oromia and the SNNPR States between (Guji vs. Gedeo and Guji vs. Burji; and the Oromo-Amhara conflict (Abduselam, 2018:42; Dagnachew, 2018:75; Abraham, 2019:42). It has become a common challenge between the Amhara and Tigray over welkayit, Oromo, and the Somali ethnic groups; Oromo and Harari, Amhara and Tigray; Oromo and Southern nations (Wondwosen and Záhorský, 2008:21-22).

The second category of inter-regional ethnic conflict is derived from ethnic-based party structure, identity politics, and ethnic autonomous issues. The constitutional recognition of self-determinism, including the right to secession itself, can invite conflicts (Bekalu, 2017:53). The ethnopolitical arrangement was purposefully designed due to the influence of the TPLF and OLF. That is why

the OLF and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are currently involved in armed struggle envisioned to realize the asserted aim of seceding from Ethiopia (Alemante, 2003:84; Temesgen, 2019:19).

Noticeably, evidence shows that "in ethnically polarized countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote for their ethnic party, increasing ethnic grievance and the probability of civil war." Moreover, where ethnic differences are politicized, and the bargaining process is dysfunctional, the recognition of self-administration intensifies ethnic manipulation. It then leads to secession, like the former socialist federations. The same is true that currently the TPLF and OLF have been trying for secession (Alexander, 2019:18).

The third category of inter-regional conflicts is the nexus between ethnonational identity and pan-Ethiopian national identity conflict. From ancient history to 1991, Ethiopians had a common national identity. Even the essential requirement to get the central resources was an 'All- Ethiopian' identity. It implies that Ethiopians had had a more robust common identity under the idea of Ethiopian citizenship. That was why; this common identity was granted for Ethiopian existence. It had also become the only country in the African continent that was not colonized by foreign powers (Temesgen, 2019:23).

However, after EPRDF came to power in 1991, Ethiopian politics fluctuated between the pan Ethiopian and ethnic identity forces. Then the 1995 constitutional establishment of ethnic federal structure shifted the common Ethiopian identity to a distinct ethnic identity. This ethnic identity politics have created conflicts and animosity among Ethiopians. Hence, in all regional states, the ethnic minorities who live outside their state of origin have no right to political representation, live, work, and be internally displaced (Ibid. 2019:23).

For example, in BGRS, 'non-indigenous peoples live entirely in some specified kebele or woreda or zonal administration. Particularly, in Bambasi, Kamashi, Bullen, Pawi, and Wombera woredas,

most residents are from the Amhara ethnic group. Thus, these Woredas were dominated by the Amharas' non-indigenous peoples, which are informally referred to as the 'Amhara woreda.' Though they have a territorially reliant settlement, they are not politically empowered and do not act as citizens of the region (Gizachew, 2019:196-7; Sara, 2021:3).

These have been raised due to the lack of all-embracing and inclusive pan-national identity and the establishment of ethnic-based boundary lines that exclude people based on their identity. The non-titular ethnic groups who live in different regions outside their ethnic groups' region act as the second citizen and exclude in socioeconomic and political participation (Temesgen, 2019:19).

Particularly, till recently, the Amhara ethnic group emphasized an Ethiopian identity than an Amhara identity. The Amhara ethnic group has a common ancestry, territory, religion, and shared experience, except the language, but has no common claims to common ancestry. Instead, the Amhara people identified themselves by regional cleavage identities; Gondere, Gojjame, Shewe, and Wollo (Tegegne, 1998:120-21). However, the Amhara ethnic identity has disturbingly developed because of discrimination and harassment from other ethnic groups. Such identity clashes have been creating violent ethnic conflict among groups and deaths (Dagnachew, 2018:73).

Since the introduction of ethnic federalism has impacted Ethiopians' lives, Ethiopia has become a land of conflicts and animosity. Mainly, since 2017 up to now, Most of the attacks have focused on ethnic cleansing directed against the minority ethnic groups of (Amhara), especially those who live in the Oromia and Benshangul-Gumuz regions. Besides this ethnic cleansing, there has been the total burned down of hotels, schools, business centers, and residential homes of the Amhara's ethnic group (Abduselam, 2018:42; Nikodimos 2004:58).

In light of the absence of a legal conflict resolution mechanism, inter-regional conflicts are synonymous and become an endless Ethiopian

ethnic-federal system (Abrham, 2019:48). Most multicultural federations have constitutional dispute settlement organs between the federal government and any of the regional states. For example, the federal constitutions of Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa have clear dispute settlement organs, like Supreme Court, High Court, and Constitutional Court, respectively, to resolve differences between the federal government and the regional states (Habtamu and Zelalem, 2019:1388).

However, in the Ethiopian case, the power to interpret the Constitution and conflict management is given to the HoF. Nevertheless, in practice, the division of power is artificial, imperfect, a generalized skeletal thing. The key powers reside on political executives (Nikodimos, 2004:17-27).

In light of such problems, most scholars highlighted that the government should avoid constitutional discrimination based on ethnicity and ban ethnic politics or parties from resolving ethnic conflicts. Instead, Ethiopia should establish an effective consociational democratic and geographic federation system. It also should develop the idea of equal and common citizenship that certifies the coexistence between these divided societies, uniting each other for their mutual well-being, and reducing ethnic conflicts (Siraw, 2015:53, Alemante, 2003:73).

### *3.2 Ethnic Federalism's Design and Inter-regional Conflicts: Case Study of the Metekel Zone*

Following the 1991 ethnic-federal arrangement, the Amhara region was established as per the 1995 ANRS Constitution. Accordingly, the territorial boundaries of the Amhara region are bounded with the Tigray Region in the North, the Afar Region in the East, the Oromiya Region in the South, and the Benshangul-Gumuz Region in the West (Article 2 of the 2001 ANRS constitution). Nevertheless, before the EPRDF government came to the throne in 1991, the Amhara territorial administrative included the Wolkayte and Humera areas under Begemder provinces in the North and the current Metekel Zone the Benshangul-Gumuz Region under

Gojjam provinces in the west<sup>1</sup>. Since Ethiopia introduced ethnic federalism in 1991, the Benishangul-Gumuz region has been established along the Blue Nile margins. However, it was organized by taking parts of the Amhara and Oromia territorial places previously administered as part of the Gojjam and Wellaga provinces (cited in Gebremichael, 2011:173).

The pre-Gojjam province of Metekel Awraja has now become one zone of the current Benishangul-Gumuz region. It has been the land of diverse linguistic groups for an extended period, including the Amhara, Agew, Shinasha, and Gumuz ethnic groups. These communities have long lived peacefully and bonded by solid socioeconomic activities than the rest of the current Benishangul-Gumuz region's inhabitants<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, the relationship between the Amhara and the Benishangul-Gumuz region worsened after adopting the 1995 FDRE constitution<sup>3</sup>. Given this, the cooperative and inter-ethnic relationship between the two people has shifted into inter-regional hostility. Therefore, one of the causes of the conflict between the Benishangul-Gumuz and the Amhara region is structural. That is the constitutional-driven principles of the Ethiopian ethnic-federal design<sup>4</sup>. Thus, its design is copied from the socialist non-democratic, and ethnolinguistic federalism leading to the slaughter among Ethiopians. It promotes ethnic groups to work only for their benefit at the expense of others. This has formed the confusing foundation of federalism that has led us to conflict<sup>5</sup>.

The means and ends of the Constitution that we follow are rooted in the tyrant and exploitation

<sup>1</sup> Personal Interview: Head of the Amhara Prosperity party, 10 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>2</sup> Personal Interview: Chief Administrator of the Awi special zone, 27 June 2021, Kosober city Administration.

<sup>3</sup> Personal Interview: A Journalist and Activist who displaced from B-G region, 13 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>4</sup> Personal Interview: Head of the Awi Special Zone prosperity party office, 27 June 2021, Kosober city Administration.

<sup>5</sup> Personal Interview: Chief speaker of the Amhara regional council and Member of the House of Federation, 15 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

nature. The substance on which it was built is a revolutionary democracy. Thus, the main problem is the idea of the Constitution and federalism, which is shaped as the goal of separation rather than solidarity. When the Constitution and the federal government were organized for the first time in Ethiopia were orchestrated on the Marxist-Leninist idea of TPLF<sup>6</sup>.

Article 39 is a politician's penitentiaries, a corrupting issue; a compromised constitution in the absence of honesty. That is why it has damaged good relations between Amhara and other people. On the other extreme, the right to self-determination up to secession will lead the country into disintegration in the former Soviet Union's case (cited in Abduselam 2018:41).

The document of the Constitution, generally its thoughts are inclined to anti-Amhara precipitations. And the foundation is hatred, the transgressor and the wrongdoer, the oppressor and the oppressed. Before the 1995 constitutional formulation, one ethnicity perceived the other nation as his jewelry. The previously-established conflicts were not based on ethnic lines but were between regional leadership due to power rivalry. However, the current racial and public conflicts came from this secession list constitutional document<sup>7</sup>.

For example, the revised Constitution of the Benishangul-Gumuz region Article 2(1) states that the region's founders and indigenous ethnic groups are the '*Gumuz, Shinash, Mao, Berta, and Komo.*' It grants sovereign power to these ethnic groups in a region. At the same time, it isolated Amhara, Agew, and Oromo<sup>8</sup>. They were residents in an area for an extended period. They made up 60 percent of the total population of a region. Therefore, outside the five ethnic groups who are recognized as the owner of the region, the other majority population become stateless. Because of this ignorance, the people of Amhara and Agew

have been displaced and massacred in the Metekel zone<sup>9</sup>.

That was why all death and life were lost in the last three years between the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz ethnicities. Because people who have lost their identity are more likely to turn into barbarians, we are more likely to do so. And the Western countries were not paved when all Amhara was slaughtered and killed in the Benishangul-Gumuz region because it had the agenda of destroying Amhara ethnic groups, not just the bandanas, but also involve the hands of the whites<sup>10</sup>.

The Gumuz community cannot hire non-indigenous workers without the region's consent because of the constitutional orientation. They only thought that their country was not Ethiopia but the Benishangul Gumuz region. Thus, they didn't need to work outside their region. The Amhara community has a desire and political interest to work everywhere knap of the country. However, the Gumuz are saying that we are not coming to your region to work, and we don't need you (Amhara) to go and work. This is their attitude towards the Amhara people<sup>11</sup>.

Then the regional boundary demarcation has also become the cause of conflict between the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. From the beginning, the political philosophy of the Ethiopian ethnic federation was organized from a socialist bloc that recognized ethnic-based boundary demarcation as the only way to defend the rights of ethnic groups<sup>12</sup>. Accordingly, Article 46 (2) of the FDRE constitution states that regional boundary lines are determined by language, geographic proximity, identity, and community willingness. However, in practice, it is based solely on language, which is why it is the primary cause of conflict. Mainly, the source of

<sup>9</sup> Supra note 3, p 11

<sup>10</sup> Supra note 7, p 12

<sup>11</sup> Focus Group Discussion: Gumuz Ethnic groups in the Benshangul-Gumuz Region-Mandurah District-28 June 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>12</sup> Personal Interview: Head of Prosperity Party of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, 12 August 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>6</sup> Supra note 1, p 11

<sup>7</sup> Personal Interview: The All Ethiopian Unity Organization/AEUO Polite Bureau member, 04 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>8</sup> Personal Interview: Head of Prosperity party office of the Chagne City Administration, 28 June 2021, Chagne City Administration.

our differences is TPLF's ethnic boundary demarcation<sup>13</sup>.

Nevertheless, the Ethiopian regional boundary demarcation was established before the adoption of the 1995 FDRE constitution. It was organized during forming regional government structure by the national, regional transitional governments proclamation no, 7/1992. It recognized the nation's nationality and the people to have the right to self-determination, including secession. In such a view, first, a transitional government is not elected by the people; instead, it was made by the TPLF. The second is that many people did not discuss the regional boundary structure. The Marxist picture of TPLF forcefully demarcated it after it had won the power of the armed conflict and came to power in 1991. Since the armed struggle, TPLF has hosted the Amhara ethnic group as an enemy, with a fiery furnace everywhere. Then after it controlled the country's political authority, the government's authority deteriorated, harassed, isolated the Amhara ethnic group in each region. That is why, currently, the Amhara has been displaced and killed by Gumuz militants in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, the Metekel zone. Besides, Yalelet expressed that the Benishangul Gumuz region's Constitution was designed by Dr. Barnabas, a Tigray native and a senior adviser of TPLF. This individual was made the region's Constitution alone, planning to base the great Tigray republic. Because before the region's Constitution was amended in 2002, the Benishangul-Gumuz region was thought to be demarcated with the Tigray in the Northwestern part. This means that the Amhara region (West Gondor, Quara, and Metema) areas were mapped to be part of the Tigray region and used as a direct link to the Benishangul-Gumuz region be taken as one cause of the conflict between two people until the 2002<sup>14</sup>.

Thus, the ethnic-federal boundary demarcation that made the Metekel zone into the Benishangul-Gumuz region became a conflict source between the two people. This, TPLF's handlined boundary

<sup>13</sup> Personal Interview: The security adviser of the Prime Minister, 14 June 2021, Addis Ababa.

<sup>14</sup> Supra note 1, p 11

creates territorial and identity claim issues that result from the existing conflicts<sup>15</sup>.

For the past 29 years, TPLF has overseen the region's natural resources and graces, including the political wreaths of the area. For the past two years, the region's top leadership has left us sharing their thoughts with various media about what TPLF made in part. Of course, one of the most critical regions of TPLF was the Benishangul-Gumuz region, which has been focused on achieving its plundering needs. And also, to marginalize the original Amhara residents in the Metekel zone, the area still became a cause of conflict. Moreover, since 2010, racial and color-based massacred, mass murders, and displacements continued to flourish, worse than in the past years<sup>16</sup>.

Furthermore, any conflicts have structural roots and state sponsorship associated with weak ethnic-based regional shield and federal structure. Because the boundary makes the Amhara subordination and the dominance of Shinasha and Gumuz<sup>17</sup>, others argue that the boundary is not entirely prudent of language since it is different from the southern region. Nonetheless, the border of Amhara was deliberately designed to destroy and besieged Amhara by TPLF's conspiracy. When the TPLF arose, their propaganda was shaped on the very dew of the Amhara, and this is how the Constitution was inscribed. Thus, the boundary is designed to disperse and weaken Amhara, which was generally intended to destroy Amhara when the system was adopted<sup>18</sup>.

At the beginning of boundary demarcation, the people of Amhara expressed their feelings, like I am Amhara, there is no need to be hauled into the Benishangul-Gumuz. However, TPLF has persuasively used it for its long-term dream of

<sup>15</sup> Personal Interview: Lecturer of federalism at Addis Ababa University, 14 June 2021, Addis Ababa.

<sup>16</sup> Supra note 3, p 11

<sup>17</sup> Focus Group Discussion: The Agew IDPs from the Benshangul-Gumuz Region- Metekel zone and a section of society that took refuge in the Awe Zon-Guangua District, 26 June 2021, Chagne city Administration.

<sup>18</sup> Personal Interview: The former chairman and the current central committee of NaMA, 06 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

territorial expansion and secession. In addition, the Constitution of the Benishangul-Gumuz made five ethnic groups as a region's owners. However, the second-largest number of people in a region-Amhara is not politically involved, is not represented by local government or territory, rather kidnapped, isolated. So the roots of this are the bounds of the embroidered ethno-territorial boundary lines<sup>19</sup>.

Accordingly, the Shinasha Ethnic group informants in Mandurah District expressed that the boundary demarcation could create a conducive environment for a conflict between Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. This means a tribe or ethnicity could group itself in a particular area. The other tribes also did as such. At a country level, an ethnic-based boundary structure is resulting in displacement and mass atrocities of citizens. The Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz conflict is one of them. Ethnic-based border demarcation has created a sense of selfishness<sup>20</sup>. Pragmatically, the Ethiopian border demarcation is almost cancer for the People of Amhara because the people of Amhara are being ensnared from all the areas where they have lived for centuries. For example, since the introduction of ethno-territorial lines, in Oromia, South, and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, thousands of Amharas' have been isolated and displaced. They are still dying and being displaced<sup>21</sup>.

The other cause of the problem is ethnic parties that emanate from the origin of the Constitution. Thus, it is generally made up of highlighting differences rather than unity because the primary source of racial parties is the Constitution, so these ethnic political parties are causing significant problems on communities' way of life<sup>22</sup>. Thus, all the ethnic parties were hatched by the TPLF that they were intended to destroy

<sup>19</sup> Personal Interview: The law adviser of the Amhara Regional Council chief speaker, 04 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>20</sup> Focus Group Discussion: The Shinasha Ethnic groups in the Benshangul-Gumuz Region- Mandurah District, 18 June 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>21</sup> Personal Interview: The head of the Peace and Security Department of the Amhara Leadership Academy, 28 June 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>22</sup> Personal Interview: Chairman of Boro Democratic Party /BDP, 14 August 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

Ethiopia, and these are the primary sources of conflict in our country. They do not have any role rather than destroying Ethiopia through aggravating ethnic disputes<sup>23</sup>.

Following this conflict-prone strategy, over 100 ethnic-based political parties have existed in Ethiopia and become the source of all these problems by depriving one ethnic group of the other. So they have created an incarcerable crisis and turmoil in the country. It is evident from the TPLF-junta that racial-based political organization ultimately leads to its failure and then trying to destroy the country as it happened today<sup>24</sup>.

As a result, the political party organized based on TPLF's falsely tying rhetoric, they draw the Amhara as an oppressive tyrant's circle. This unjust and oppressed TPLF bombast has led the Benishagnul-Gumuz People Democratic Unity Front /BGPDUF and the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement / BPLM to attack directly or indirectly Amhara people who live in the Benishangul-Gumuz region-Metekel Zone. On the other hand, the ethnic party is an organization or a movement for ethnonational interests or supremacy instead of national unity and state sovereignty. Thus, it leads to the current violent conflict in the Metekel zone between the Amhara and Gumuz people<sup>25</sup>.

Moreover, these TPLF/EPRDF anti-Amhara policies could create a conducive environment for Ethiopian ethnic-based political parties in aggravating ethnic conflicts. These are the Benishangul North West Ethiopia People Democratic Unity Party /BNWEPDUP and other ethnic parties. Through manipulating their ethnic group, they have been killed and displaced Amhara from the Metekel zone. Even when the Amhara people have become party membership in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, they impact

<sup>23</sup> Personal Interview: Deputy president of the Amhara Regional State and the head of Peace and Security Bureau, 02 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>24</sup> Personal Interview: Deputy chief of the Ethiopian National Armed Force, 16 June 2021, Addis Ababa.

<sup>25</sup> Personal Interview: Head of Peace and Security department of Awi Special Zone Administration, 27 June 2021, Kosober city Administration.

resigning their work, punishing, and cutting their salary<sup>26</sup>.

Thus, ethnic parties aggravate conflicts among ethnic groups by inflaming wounds rather than competing and winning races. Generally, the ethnic parties' policy agenda is focused on the past and old history. They have no choice; their agenda is to talk about the past miscalculated TPLF's oppressor and oppressed rhetoric. Thus, they are not ideological oriented, but Benzenes' for ethnic conflicts<sup>27</sup>.

Since 2010 ethnic conflicts have been aggravating between the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz people in the Metekel zone. First, the insurgent groups and the Benishangul-Gumuz zonal and district administrators supported by the TPLF have killed, displaced, and murdered the Amhara natives in the Metekel zone. Second, the TPLF keeps public support in a region by forming opposition political parties and supporting budgets with agendas inviting conflicts. Such as the Gumuz People's Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Boro-Shinasha Democratic Party (BDP). This TPLF's anti-human and development agenda has contributed significantly to the region's instability, especially for the Metekel zone<sup>28</sup>. In such a view, the system is anti-Amhara, and all conflicts are focused on the Amhara. Therefore, all disputes are not natural-natured but artificial or TPLF. Then we become in trouble by exaggerating the differences<sup>29</sup>.

After TPLF withdrawal from the P.P. party, its principal agenda has oriented dehumanizing the Amhara people from the Benishangul-Gumuz through its hostile propaganda. It says that for the past 28 years, federal democratic ceremonies have created the blessings that have given you all the existing freedoms and rights. But the Prosperity party is a unitary state, and they have been called you as a slave. They have blurred your identity

and marginalized your political, social, and economic benefits. Moreover, P. P. is a category of the ruler of Amhara who sold you and asked you to understand that these are your enemies for the same age. The planting of prosperity is a work that has divided the Metekel zone into the Amara region. To make sure that Amharas' are your enemies as old as they are. But we advocate the bail of the nation nationality if TPLF alive you will be live, if TPLF fails you also will fail, for survival you must incorporate with us and struggle together with our enemies. And by giving them agendas like that, the tasks of persuading their community to hate, displace and kill the Amhara and Agew people, so as they have been done as it is<sup>30</sup>. Hence, in the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, the leading causes of conflict are the ethnic or racial political parties, such as TPLF and OLF. All ethnic parties are naturally problematic because their Manifesto is similar but not united due to the sake of their benefits and political power<sup>31</sup>.

Above all, as the starting point, any party founded on ethnic sentiment is challenging. A political party established based on Ethiopianism works to bring peace and security for all communities because it does not work for one nation and maintains an Ethiopian identity. However, a party based on ethnic identity has created ethnic conflicts because they are not working in the interest of all Ethiopian people, but only for their ethnicity. That is, through breaking up Ethiopian identity, they are promoting ethnic identity<sup>32</sup>.

On the other hand, one of the founders of EPRDF argued that it would be incorrect to search the wrongs on this or that type of political organization. As organizational forms, all the packaging material for any political conflict. Hence, rather than exploring the ills of one society on the organizational form, it would be more appropriate to look into the political contents of both organizational structures. Thus, leaving aside

<sup>26</sup> FGDs, Supra note 20, p 15

<sup>27</sup> Personal Interview: The chairman of Amhara Democratic Peoples Movement/ ADPM, 18 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>28</sup> Supra note 3, p 11

<sup>29</sup> Personal Interview: A journalist and activist, 12 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>30</sup> Personal Interview: Deputy mayor of the Chagne City Administration, 28 June 2021, Chagne City Administration.

<sup>31</sup> Personal Interview: The central committee of Ethiopian Citizen for Social Justice Party/ EZMA, and chief coordinator of the Bahir Dar Electoral district, 19 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>32</sup> Supra note 12, p 12

the context and giving much and underserving weight to organizational forms would only reflect worshipping the same organizational structure<sup>33</sup>.

In contrast, both the national and ethnic opposition party leaders argued that the ethnic parties are sources of conflict in Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Amhara Democratic Peoples Movement chairman expressed that our party always says ethnic parties are sources of conflict. If so, the researcher asked him, why was your party organized in line with ethnic-based than a pan-Ethiopian party? For this reason, he responded that the people of Amhara had been affected, killed, and persecuted, being they are reflecting the Ethiopian identity than their Amhara ethnic identity. Therefore, to save the people of Amhara who live everywhere, the only alternative route is organized by ethnic groups. That is why we established ADPM though we are not interested in it. However, if there is to be an actual order, the constitutional arrangement of the ethnic party should be destroyed and replaced by the National Parties. If so, our interests are inexpensive. But if the Constitution is not changed, we want our people to be organized and mobilized in line with the Amhara nationalism<sup>34</sup>.

Moreover, the former chairman of NaMA remarks that the Pan Ethiopian organization is unknown to the Constitution. Therefore, it is impossible to manage a leap from Ethiopianism, so we managed NaMA in the name of the Amhara ethnic group. As Amhara, we tried to work in the sense of Ethiopian identity but were not accepted and seen as wrong by others; that's what we organized in this way. By the way, all this ethnic animosity and ethnic parties drive from the Constitution because its design has brought a problem. If the Constitution bans the ethnic party system, we have no problem changing our party<sup>35</sup>.

Others argued that both party organizations are benefit-oriented than to serve the people. For example, the Ethiopian national-based parties, such as EZMA and AEUO, have no political

differences but are not united for political power and benefit. In our country, the establishment of a political party is an alternative to employment opportunities<sup>36</sup>.

Over the past decades, ethnic parties have become the principal problem diversifying between the Amhara and the Oromo; Amhara and Tigray; and the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. Therefore, instead of ethnic parties, if only national parties were organized; it was possible to build a better country; because when the ethnic parties are organized, their primary objective is to meet the interests of their ethnic group only at the expense of the other ethnic groups<sup>37</sup>.

The last cause of the conflict is the nexus between Ethiopian and ethnic identity. Ethiopia is a country of many nations and nationalities. So that there are many identities, many beliefs, and more than 80 different ethnolinguistic societies. We have common identities (values and beliefs) and unique identities (values and beliefs). However, after introducing ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, the standard denominations are blurred instead of strengthening the commons values because of its particular attention to ethnic identities<sup>38</sup>.

Therefore, the relationship between Ethiopianism/Ethiopian national identities and ethnic, national identities has become paradoxical. Some of them are shown to give Ethiopia first/ Ethiopian citizenship 100% in a competitive way and provide for idioms, such as the language, religion, municipality, birthplace, etc. 0 /zero%. Others give 100% to ethnonationalism and 0 /zero to Ethiopian nationalism or Ethiopian citizenship. Yet, these are two extreme manifestations of who they are. In contrast, as shown in Switzerland, Canada, and India's growing federal systems, there is no zero-sum link between the broad state nationalism and narrower ethnonationalism. In other words, one is not seen giving zero%, another 100%. However, Ethiopia's federal system did not

<sup>33</sup> Personal Interview: One of the former EPRDF's executive committee member, 17 July 2021, Bahir Dar.

<sup>34</sup> Supra note 27, p 16

<sup>35</sup> Supra note 18, p 15

<sup>36</sup> Supra note 31, p 17

<sup>37</sup> Supra note 22, p 15

<sup>38</sup> Personal Interview: Head of Peace and Security Bureau of Benishangul-Gumuz region, 11 August 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

maintain the two nationalisms; instead, it promoted narrower ethnonationalism and deteriorated the broad Ethiopian nationalism<sup>39</sup>. Regarding the issue of the two regions [Amhara and Benshangul-Gumuz], the division of the ethnonational and Ethiopian national identity complicates the conflict that led to an ending and insoluble violations, massacres, and displacement<sup>40</sup>.

In the Amhara region, for example, an Ethiopian living in the Benishangul-Gumuz region is not considered a citizen except the five ethnic groups. Because, according to article 39, sub-article 3 of the Constitution's protocol is defiance and limited to provide a balance of representation and right of citizenship. For example, in a city where 95 percent of the Agew, and Amhara people reside, in are not represented. However, it is controlled by the minority of titular groups, namely Shinasha and Gumuz<sup>41</sup>. Similarly, more than 90 percent of residents of the Pawi woreda were the Amhara ethnic group; that was why it was a special woreda. But in 2002, the Benishangul-Gumuz region improved its Constitution and practice and included the Pawi woreda with its sphere of administration. Following this, others have no rights, no good proxies, raising the question of survival. The indigenous Amharas' have been marginalized, abused, executed, and displaced from a region<sup>42</sup>. For these problems, the cadres are the principal actors in the kidnapping. For example, the deputy president of the Benishangul-Gumuz region had a hand in displacing the Amharas; that is why the federal government arrested him<sup>43</sup>.

All nations are equally benefiting and receiving services. And when we come to Benishangul, we are also being denied the right to live, let alone

equal service between immigrants and non-immigrants; we have not been suitable to live through farming. After graduating, even our brothers have been denied the right to live and work in government institutions. We don't have equal service. If the Gumuz accidentally crashed by car, they would chase and kill the Amhara, who was found to have been involved in a car accident. When they claim the issue for the government, they don't protect them at all. There is an excellent protection for them only if we are even in numbers in the Benshangul-Gumuz. Even when we are organized to defend ourselves, they tell us to go to the region where we came from<sup>44</sup>.

Thus, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia promotes all ethnic groups to build their sub-government and plant their form. It also enhances not to respect the universal rights and interests of other ethnic groups rather than their subordinates. Hence, this ideology is a paradox from Ethiopianism because ethnic federalism has resulted in tangible murders, displaces, and deaths, as shown in Benishangul-Gumuz, Welega, and other areas in the country<sup>45</sup>. Others argued that though Ethiopianism can be utterly blurred, the Amhara still reflects the Ethiopian sentiments and identities<sup>46</sup>.

Moreover, in the last 30 years, the laws established after EPRDF entered Addis Ababa highlighted differences by distorting the long period of Ethiopian nationalism and values that had bonded the Ethiopian unity. For example, the boundary is demarcated onto ethnic lines; the car number plate has been separated on the ethnic border; the individual citizenship identity is planted in the ethnic fence; the name of ethnicity has identified the bank, and the flag is placed on ethnic lines. Thus, these bountiful ones have become a negative identity that separates one another from another. Therefore, all things are racially motivated, so humanity and individuality have been lost<sup>47</sup>. Hence, since the coming of this

<sup>39</sup> Supra note 19, p 11

<sup>40</sup> Personal Interview: Deputy administrator of the Metekel Zone of the Benshangul-Gumuz Region, 03 August 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>41</sup> Focus Group Discussion: Amhara Ethnic groups resides in Mandurah District-27 June 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>42</sup> Focus Group Discussion: Amhara IDPs from the Benshangul-Gumuz Region-Metekel zone, Guangua District, 26 June 2021, Chagne city Administration.

<sup>43</sup> Supra note 18, p 15

<sup>44</sup> Focus Group Discussion: Agew Ethnic groups resides in the Benshangul-Gumuz Region-Mandurah District-27 June 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>45</sup> Supra note 3, p 11

<sup>46</sup> Supra note 31, p 17

<sup>47</sup> Supra note 24, p 16

federal system, ethnic and racial patterns have been serving as the principal legs for movements and breathing longs for all Ethiopians<sup>48</sup>.

Therefore, the impacts that happened in Metekel are devastative because of this tribal political structure. As evidence, political representation, political participation, and other rights are limited to the non-titular groups<sup>49</sup>. Moreover, in the area where the Amhara and other people live, like the Benishangul-Gumuz region, there are complaints that they are not equally used in their language, learning, developing their culture, health, and other social services<sup>50</sup>. Second, this system of federalism is more focused on ethnic identity than national identity. Thus, it has blurred Ethiopian identity because it is federalism fenced by an ethnolinguistic identity. Accordingly, it has diminished a national love and bloused the common Ethiopian sense of identity<sup>51</sup>.

The other negative impact of the competition has deprived citizens of their right to live. They are being displaced from the leers they live in, and they are being subjected to the most devastating of their lives<sup>52</sup>. Over 70 thousand Amharas and Agew people have been displaced from the Metekel zone at the end of 2020 and early 2021. Now they take refuge in the Awi Zone-Guangua woreda<sup>53</sup>. There are the deep-rooted problems of inequality, maladministration, and inequitable access to resources in the area. Fake information and rumors on social media; Due to lack of education, the people of Gumuz ethnic were being exploited and displaced by the crisis forces, the competition of dominance over the region, etc<sup>54</sup>.

The last impacts of the conflict are killings and life distraction. A "wave of genocidal massacres has swept Metekel in the Benishangul-Gumuz

region of Ethiopia, creating a humanitarian catastrophe that has left hundreds of thousands displaced, thousands killed and injured and many more left destitute with their homes and livelihoods burned to ashes" (Sara,2021:3). For example, from 2010 to February 2013, in Metekel zone in various districts and Kebeles, over 1535 Amhara and Agew ethnicity have been massacred and exposed for mass genocide by the deadly gangs of Gumuz trained TPLF<sup>55</sup>.

Overall, the problem that is now happening in our country is due to the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism. Though the House of Federation, under Article 62 of the Constitution, is empowered to resolve the regional states' problems and assumed to be a principal institution, it is a toothless dog and has no solution to the problem<sup>56</sup>. The only explanations for the existing conflicts are federalism, ethnic parties, and Article 39 of the Constitution. Then consociational democratic federalism that underpins geography must be applied<sup>57</sup>.

#### IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Federalism has often been preferred as a conflict management tool in multi-ethnic ethnic, linguistic, religious, and historical societies. It also ensures equality, autonomy, and security by providing self-rule for each community to protect and nurture its identity. It can also strengthen community cooperation in its shared visions. However, federalism can only operate as conflict management in different societies if it can provide a structural and political answer that puts a joint government, a democratically binding one.

Taking these facts, after the military regime was overthrown in 1991, the EPRDF came up with total equality through the new Constitution and ethnic federal system in 1995. It aimed to maintain unity and diversity and resolve conflicts. However, this ethnolinguistic and ethnic-based boundary line became a source of conflicts in

<sup>48</sup> Supra note 31, p 17

<sup>49</sup> FGDs, Supra note 44, p 20

<sup>50</sup> Personal Interview notes: Head of the peace and security office of Chagne City Administration, 28 June 2021, Chagne City Administration;

<sup>51</sup> Personal Interview: Head of Peace and Security Department of Metekel zone of the Benshangul-Gumuz Region-, 08 August 2021, Gilgelebeles city Administration.

<sup>52</sup> Supra note 19, p 15

<sup>53</sup> Supra note 23, p 16

<sup>54</sup> Supra note 50, p 21

<sup>55</sup> Supra note 3, p 11

<sup>56</sup> Supra note 38, p 19

<sup>57</sup> Supra note (13, p,13 ; 31, p 17; 21, P,16; 7, p,12; and 21, p,15)

Ethiopia, particularly between the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions. First, the Ethiopian federal Constitution was framed similarly to the ex-Soviet socialist federation that grants a self-administration, including secession rights, to its constituent units. Accordingly, the cause the conflict between the Amhara and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions is the Constitution's design and article 39. This article has brought a new political interest among the two people in the Metekel zone. Because the Benishangul-Gumuz Constitution grants a sovereign power for only the five ethnic groups, while the other ethnic groups are considered second citizens, that is why the Amhara ethnicity has always been marginalized, displaced, and killed.

Second, the boundaries have become a significant cause of problems in Ethiopia. For example, the Amhara, Agew, Gumuz, Oromo, and Tigray are integrated and mixed; they cannot separate one another. However, these diverse people being surrounded by ethnic-boundary lines has exacerbated the problems. It escalates and flares up the conflict to a more significant extent in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Recently, the regional conflicts deepened into more intra-ethnic battles, increasing the tension as the motif changes into a greater border expansion level.

The third factor of the conflict is the slight thought of ethnic identity. There was only Ethiopian nationalism and no racial discrimination. However, now, different ethnic groups can reflect their ethnic identity than Ethiopian identity. Thus, the Amhara people (Ethiopianism) is marginalized from socioeconomic and political aspects in the Benishangul region, Metekel Zone.

The other factor is ethno-political parties. As ethnic federalism is shaped by ethnic fundamentalism, political gamblers protect their own political and economic interests while swearing to live together in a region. However, they cause hatred, distrust, and harm to the Amhara people, who have lived together peacefully for centuries in BGNRS. To make matters worse, these factors have dehumanized the Amhara people who live in the Benishangul

region-Metekel Zone. Hence, they are displaced, assassinated, and brutally killed, being they are non-indigenous residents. Therefore, to resolve Ethiopia's current multiple problems, this study recommended that Ethiopia's government establish a consociational democratic federal system with mixed boundary demarcation and a non-ethnic, non-tribal, multi-party democracy as applied in Switzerland and India.

## REFERENCES CITED

1. Aalen, L. (2002) *Ethnic federalism in a dominant party state: The Ethiopian experience 1991-2000*. Chr. Michelsen Institute *Development Studies and Human Rights*, Bergen, Norway.
2. Abbink, J. (2006) "Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 24(3), 389-413.
3. Abduselam, A.M. (2018) "Assessment of conflict dynamics in Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia". *Journal of Public Policy and Administration*. 2(4), 42. Available from: doi:10.11648/j.jppa.20180204.11.
4. Abebaw, Y.A. (2013) "Diversity in Ethiopia: A historical overview of political challenges". *The International Journal of Community Diversity*. 12(3), 22.
5. Abrham, A. (2019) "Revisiting ethnic politics and the federal system's conflict management capacity in Post-1995 Ethiopia". *African Journal of Governance and Development*. 8 (1), 42-50.
6. Adejumobi, S.A. (2007) *The history of Ethiopia*. London, Greenwood Press.
7. Aklilu, A. (2006) "Ethnicity and dilemmas of state making: Ethnic federalism and institutional reforms in Ethiopia". *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*. 2 (1/2), 92.
8. Alem, H. (2004) "Ethnic pluralism as an organizing principle of the Ethiopian federation". *Dialectical Anthropology*. 28(2), 91.
9. Alemante G.S. (2003) "Ethnic federalism: Its promise and pitfalls for Africa". *Faculty*

- Publications*. 88. [https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/fac\\_pubs/88](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/fac_pubs/88).
10. Alemu, A.N. (2018) "An integrated approach to the study of ethnicity and its relevance to Ethiopia". *International Journal of Social Science Studies*. 6(12), 43-44.
  11. Alexander, H.A. (2019) "Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia". *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*. 9(13), 17-19.
  12. Ameha, W. (2014) "An overview of the Ethiopian-legal system". *CLJP/JDCP journals*. 20(1), 175.
  13. Amhara Prosperity Party. (June, 2013) A discussion report that held with the people of Wollo/ Alemata-Korem/ and Gonder/ Wolkayt-Humera/ which were previously administered and freed from the TPLF oppression.
  14. Asnake, K. (2009) *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions*, (PhD Dissertation, Lidein University, Netherlands).
  15. Asnake, K. (2010) "Federal restructuring in Ethiopia: Renegotiating identity and borders along the Oromo–Somali Ethnic Frontiers". *Development and Change*. 41(4), 616–618.
  16. Assefa, F. (2009) *Federalism teaching material*. Prepared under the Sponsorship of the Justice and Legal System Research Institute of Ethiopia, Addis Abeba.
  17. Auclair, C. (2005) "Federalism: Its principles, flexibility and limitations". *Federations*. 5 (A-1), 3-4.
  18. Bekalu, A.T. (2017) "Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia". *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. 17 (2), 42-55.
  19. Burgess, M. (2006) *Comparative federalism: Theory and practice*. London and New York, Routledge.
  20. Dagnachew, A.Y. (2018) "Transactive approach: Explaining dynamics of ethnicity and inter ethnic conflicts in Post 1991 Ethiopia". *International Journal of Education, Culture and Society*. 3, (4), pp. 68-77. doi: 10.11648/j.ijecs.20180304.11.
  21. EPRDF.(2017) The Ethiopian federal system features, the democratic unity building process, success and future directions, (Amharic Version).
  22. FDRE. (1995) *the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*.
  23. Gebremichael, M. (2011) *Federalism and conflict management in Ethiopia: Case study of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state*, (PhD Dissertation, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford).
  24. Gizachew, G.W. (2019) "Minority and federalism: an assessment of the right to political participation of 'non-indigenous' peoples in Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State, Ethiop"". *Int. J. Human Rights and Constitutional Studies*. 6 (3), 196–197.
  25. Habtamu, B and Zelalem, K. (2019)"Inter-federal-regional conflict resolution mechanisms in Ethiopian federacy: A comparative appraisal on the legal and institutional framewo"". *Beijing Law Review*. 10(1), 1388.
  26. Horowitz, D. (2005). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  27. Keller, E.J. (2002)"Ethnic federalism, Fiscal reform, development and democracy in Ethiop". *Afr.j.polit.sci*.7(1),32.
  28. Kymlicka, W. (2006) Emerging Western Models of Multi-national Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa?. In: D. Turton. (eds.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford, Athens, Addis Ababa, James Currey, Ohio University Press, Addis Ababa University Press, pp. 36-47.
  29. Legesse, T.M (2015) "Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia: What lessons can other jurisdictions dr"? *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*. 23(3), 445–475.
  30. McGarry, J O'Leary, B. (2007) *Federations and Managing Nations*. In: M. Burgess and J. Pinder. (eds.) *Multinational Federations*. London, New York, Routledge, pp.180-203.
  31. Mohammadzadeh, H. (2016) "The causes of ethnic conflict in Multi-ethnic societi". *World Scientific News*. 42(1), 159.
  32. Nikodimos, A. (2004) *Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and opportunities*. Lund, University of Lund.

33. Obi, E.A. (2019) "The theory, practice and current trends in federalism". *Journal of Social Service and Welfare*. 1(1), 11-19.
34. Olumide, O.A. (2017) "Federalism as a political ideology and system of government: The theoretical perspective". *International Journal of Advanced Academic Research*. 3 (9), 54-71.
35. Raffass, T. (2012) *The Soviet Union: Federation or Empire*. London and New York, Routledge.
36. Roeder, P.G. (2009) "Ethno-federalism and the mismanagement of conflicting nationalisms". *Regional & Federal Studies*. 19(1), 209.
37. Sakwa, R. (1998) *Soviet politics in perspective*. London, Routledge,
38. Salih, M.A. (2007) "African liberation movement government and democracy". *Democratization*. 14 (4), 669-685.
39. Salih, M.A. (2018) Varieties of African liberation movement governments. In: Redie, B. (eds.) *National Liberation Movements as Government in Africa*. New York, Routledge, pp.24.
40. Sara, Kifle. (2021) Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia. *Harvard Political Review*, 68(9).
41. Semahagn, G.A. (2012) "The dilemma of adopting ethnic federal system in Africa in light of the perspectives from Ethiopian experience". *Journal of African Studies and Development*. 4 (7), 169.
42. Simeon, R. (2009) "Constitutional design and change in federal systems: Issues and questions". *The Journal of Federalism*. 39 (2), 243-246.
43. Siraw, M.T. (2015) "Weaknesses of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia". *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*. 4(11), 49-54.
44. Smith, G. (1995) *Federalism: The multi-ethnic challenge*. London, Longman.
45. Tariq, M., Khan, A., & Rizwan, M. (2018) "An Analysis of major theories of federalism". *Global Social Science Review*. 3(4), 400-412.
46. Tegegne, T. (1998). Amhara Ethnicity in the Making. In: Mohammed, Salih and Markakis, J (eds.), *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa*. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute.
47. Temesgen, T.H. (2019) "The politics of ethnic identity and conflicts under ethnic federal system in Ethiopia". *Journal of International Politics*. 1 (2), 17-19.
48. Tsegaye, R. (2010b) "Learning to live with conflicts: Federalism as a tool of conflict management in Ethiopia - an Overview". *Mizan Law Review*. 4(1), 53-99.
49. Vaughan, S. (2003) *Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia*, (PhD Dissertation, the University of Edinburgh).
50. Watts, R.L. (2008) *Comparing federal systems* (3rd eds.). Kingston, Can, Institute of International Relations Queen's University.
51. Wheare, K.C. (4th ed.). (1963) *Federal government*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
52. Wondwosen, T.B. and Záhořík, J. (2008) "Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia". *International Journal of Human Sciences*. 5(2), 21-22.
53. Yonas, G. (2013) *Implication of Ethiopian federalism on the right to freedom of movement and residence: Critical analysis of the law and the practice*, (M. A. Theses, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia).
54. Zemelak, A. (2014) "The politics of sub-national constitutions and local government in Ethiopia". *Perspectives on Federalism*. 6 (2), 92-93.

*This page is intentionally left blank*



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# The Deficiency of Professionalizing Work in the Prisons of the State of Pará: A Negative Feedback to the Structural Violence

*Suzy Elizabeth Cavalcante Koury & Juliana Oliveira Eiró do Nascimento*

## ABSTRACT

This article aims at discussing the relationship between the deficiency of professionalizing activities in the prison system of the state of Pará and the multidimensional violence suffered by its former prisoners. The objective is to analyze how the work management in prisons can be a negative factor to the structural violence perpetrated against inmates and ex-convicts. In order to do so, the article examines the question of the right/duty to work in the Brazilian prison system; besides, it explores the National Surveys of Prison Information carried out between July and December 2021; and, finally, it investigates data of the structural violence towards ex-prisoners of Pará, caused by, among other factors, the deficiency of professionalizing activities in prison.

**Keywords:** professionalizing activities in prison; state of Pará (BR); deficiency of public policies; structural violence.

**Classification:** FOR Code: 220107

**Language:** English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333  
Print ISSN: 2515-5784  
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



© 2022 Suzy Elizabeth Cavalcante Koury & Juliana Oliveira Eiró do Nascimento. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>, permitting all noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

# The Deficiency of Professionalizing Work in the Prisons of the State of Pará: A Negative Feedback to the Structural Violence

A Carência de Trabalho Profissionalizante No Cárcere No Estado do Pará - Brasil: Um Vetor de Retroalimentação da Violência Estrutural

Suzy Elizabeth Cavalcante Koury<sup>α</sup> & Juliana Oliveira Eiró do Nascimento<sup>σ</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*This article aims at discussing the relationship between the deficiency of professionalizing activities in the prison system of the state of Pará and the multidimensional violence suffered by its former prisoners. The objective is to analyze how the work management in prisons can be a negative factor to the structural violence perpetrated against inmates and ex-convicts. In order to do so, the article examines the question of the right/duty to work in the Brazilian prison system; besides, it explores the National Surveys of Prison Information carried out between July and December 2021; and, finally, it investigates data of the structural violence towards ex-prisoners of Pará, caused by, among other factors, the deficiency of professionalizing activities in prison. The research uses the deductive method with a documental and bibliographic analysis, and a qualitative approach to these themes.*

**Keywords:** professionalizing activities in prison; state of Pará (BR); deficiency of public policies; structural violence.

## RESUMO

*O presente artigo discute a relação entre a carência de trabalho profissionalizante no sistema prisional do estado do Pará e a violência multidimensional, em especial, contra os egressos das prisões do Estado. O objetivo é analisar de que maneira a gestão da profissionalização dos presos no estado do Pará está impactando no ciclo de violência estrutural enfrentado pelos presos e pelos egressos do*

*sistema prisional paraense. Para tanto, examina a questão do direito/dever de trabalho no sistema carcerário brasileiro, além disso, explora os Levantamentos Nacionais de Informações Penitenciárias, realizado entre julho e dezembro de 2021 e, por fim, investiga a retroalimentação da violência estrutural dos egressos do sistema prisional paraense, tendo como um dos fatores a carência de labor profissionalizante no cárcere. Na pesquisa, utiliza-se o método dedutivo, com uma análise documental e bibliográfica, e uma abordagem qualitativa dos temas.*

**Palavras-chave:** trabalho prisional; estado do Pará (BR); políticas públicas; retroalimentação da violência estrutural.

## I. INTRODUÇÃO

Nos dias atuais, as proporções alarmantes do crescimento dos índices de criminalidade têm incrementado as discussões sobre violência, que, de um modo geral, apontam o recurso ao direito penal, com o aumento das penas, dentre outras medidas repressivas, para a solução da problemática, relegando a um segundo plano, ou sequer cogitando, a busca por políticas públicas que visem a resguardar direitos fundamentais e reduzir desigualdades (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, p. 25017-25018).

Isso se deve ao fato de que poucos possuem a noção de que a violência não se restringe à criminalidade, mas envolve um fenômeno estrutural, extremamente complexo e profundo, relativo à violação diária de inúmeros direitos fundamentais (SCHERER; NUNES; DOS SANTOS, 2017, p. 3).

A ideia da existência de uma violência sistêmica permite que a análise do delito tome uma proporção mais abrangente. Apesar de o crime ser uma das manifestações da violência, igualmente existe uma espécie de violência estrutural, praticada contra indivíduos em geral, detentos e egressos do sistema prisional, capaz de aumentar a criminalidade.

Com efeito, o fenômeno criminal é limitado à criação da norma, à análise de sua violação e à consequente resposta social. Todavia, se é certo que a prática de um crime requer respostas sociais, é igualmente verdadeiro que respostas incorretas podem levar ao cometimento de novos crimes, tendo em vista o fracasso na reinserção social do apenado, fruto do preconceito enraizado na sociedade (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 141-142).

A violência sistêmica é aquela perpetrada tanto pelo Estado contra os indivíduos –que se classifica como vertical –, como pelos indivíduos ou grupos contra outros, via de regra, os mais vulneráveis – tida por horizontal. Como consequência, tem-se exclusão e desigualdade social, o que enfraquece as escolhas racionais e estimula iniciativas constrangidas, a exemplo do crime.

No Brasil, o infrator condenado é encaminhado para o sistema prisional, onde, de acordo com os princípios e as limitações constitucionais, deve ter protegida a sua dignidade. Além disso, o encarceramento não pode ter apenas o propósito de reprimir e prevenir o crime. A pena deve, também, reabilitar o infrator, possibilitando a (re) integração social após o seu cumprimento, por intermédio da introdução de meios de ressocialização (GRECO, 2015, *passim*).

Nesse cenário, a oportunidade de trabalhar no sistema prisional torna-se um direito/dever social dos infratores, por ser eficaz na educação e no treinamento vocacional dos presos, revelando potencial para diminuir as barreiras à reintegração no mercado de trabalho e elevar a autossuficiência, reduzindo as chances de reincidência. Na prática, o que se verifica é que os sistemas prisionais são, na maioria das vezes, sistemas fracassados, visto que fundados na

própria violência que, em tese, teriam que solucionar. Desse modo, o insucesso das prisões, somado à violência estrutural velada, contribuem para as diversas problemáticas que permeiam o sistema penal brasileiro (RODRIGUES, 2016, p. 5).

Com isso, a noção que existe hoje no meio social é a de que os egressos do sistema prisional absorvem, durante o período de cumprimento de pena, os piores padrões de comportamento, pois não dispõem de qualquer meio ressocializador, além de sofrerem com carência de educação e de qualificação profissional.

Nesse cenário, os egressos do sistema prisional são vítimas de preconceito, de modo que acabam por não terem reconhecidas todas as garantias e as alternativas a que fazem jus os demais sujeitos de direito. A situação é ainda pior no mercado de trabalho, o que os afasta de atividades essenciais à manutenção de sua sobrevivência (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, *passim*), restando, muitas vezes, a mais comum opção constrangida: a reincidência e o retorno ao sistema prisional. E, assim, o ciclo de violência estrutural, vertical e horizontal, perpetua-se.

Nesse contexto, considerando o fim de promover o desenvolvimento regional, objetivo do Programa de Pós-Graduação *stricto sensu* do Centro Universitário do Pará - CESUPA, na presente pesquisa, optou-se por realizar a análise dos dados relativos a atividades profissionalizantes nas unidades carcerárias do Estado do Pará, coletados entre julho e dezembro de 2021, com a finalidade de responder ao seguinte problema de pesquisa: de que maneira a gestão da profissionalização dos presos no estado do Pará está impactando no ciclo de violência estrutural suportada pelos presos e egressos do sistema prisional paraense?

O presente estudo justifica-se pela necessidade de pesquisas que analisem dados do 11º Ciclo de Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias, referentes aos meses de julho a dezembro de 2021, disponíveis no banco de dados do SISDEPEN, ferramenta de coleta de dados do

sistema penitenciário brasileiro<sup>1</sup>, como o oferecimento de vagas em módulos de oficina e laborterapia, a fim de verificar como tais dados influenciam no ciclo de violência estrutural sofrida pelos presos e egressos do sistema prisional paraense.

Constata-se, na atualidade, uma carência de reflexões sobre a relação entre qualificação profissional nos presídios do Pará e a violência estrutural sofrida pelos presos e egressos das prisões do Estado, o que explica a incipiente produção acadêmica sobre o tema. Ao se fazer uma busca no catálogo de Teses e Dissertações da CAPES e na Biblioteca Digital Brasileira de Teses e Dissertações, pelas palavras-chaves “Cárcere e Trabalho”, “Egressos e Violência Estrutural”, “Trabalho do Cárcere e Violência Estrutural”, verificou-se que ainda não se encontram artigos, dissertações ou teses que proponham tal análise e investigação.

Desse modo, o presente estudo apresenta relevância teórica pela produção de conteúdo que investiga de que maneira o não oferecimento de vagas de módulos de oficina e laborterapia impacta na retroalimentação da violência estrutural vertical e horizontal perpetrada contra os presos e egressos do sistema carcerário.

O trabalho tem como objetivo geral investigar de que forma a gestão da profissionalização dos presos no estado do Pará está impactando no ciclo de violência estrutural sofrida pelos presos e egressos do sistema prisional paraense.

Para atingir o fim almejado, o presente artigo é estruturado em cinco itens, sendo o primeiro esta introdução; o segundo aborda a questão do direito/dever de trabalho no sistema carcerário brasileiro; o terceiro analisa os dados relacionados a atividades profissionalizantes ofertadas aos detentos do Pará, extraídos do 11º Ciclo de Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias, realizado de julho a dezembro de 2021; o quarto investiga a retroalimentação da violência estrutural dos egressos do sistema

prisional paraense pela ausência de acesso a atividades profissionalizantes. Por fim, o quinto e último item apresenta as considerações finais deste estudo.

A pesquisa é substancialmente exploratória, em que se analisam os dados coletados no 11º Ciclo de Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias, referente aos meses de julho a dezembro de 2021, disponíveis no banco de dados do SISDEPEN. A escolha do período justifica-se pelo fato de se tratar da mais completa e recente análise realizada pelo órgão. Além disso, a fim de garantir a exequibilidade da pesquisa, tornou-se necessário delimitar o campo de investigação. Para tanto, optou-se por realizar a análise apenas dos dados relativos ao trabalho desempenhado nas unidades carcerárias no estado do Pará.

A pesquisa é do tipo empírica e, quanto aos métodos de procedimento, utilizam-se o documental e bibliográfico, bem como a dogmática jurídica e legislativa. Além disso, o método que garantiu as bases lógicas da investigação foi o dedutivo, conforme o qual será realizada análise qualitativa dos dados, em cotejo com dados bibliográficos.

Quanto às técnicas de pesquisa, utiliza-se a análise de documento de fontes primárias, como normas nacionais e internacionais, bem como secundárias, procedendo-se ao exame pormenorizado de dados publicados em meio eletrônico.

## II. A QUESTÃO DO DIREITO/DEVER DE TRABALHO NO SISTEMA CARCERÁRIO BRASILEIRO

Aquele que pratica um crime está sujeito ao *jus puniendi* estatal. Tal poder, no entanto, deve ser exercido com a observância dos princípios consagrados pela Constituição da República Federativa Brasileira de 1988 (CRFB/88), a exemplo do da vedação às penas cruéis e degradantes. Essas diretrizes servem, de imediato, para preservar a integridade física e mental do preso, de modo que as ações estatais sejam sempre balizadas pelo princípio fundante do

<sup>1</sup>Disponíveis no endereço eletrônico: <https://www.gov.br/depen/pt-br/servicos/sisdepen/mais-informacoes/bases-de-dados>

estado brasileiro: a dignidade da pessoa humana (GRECO, 2105, p. 533).

Conforme se depreende da leitura do artigo 1º, inciso III, da CRFB/88, a dignidade da pessoa humana constitui um dos fundamentos da República Federativa do Brasil (BRASIL, 1988). Nas lições de Sarlet (2006, p. 52-54), a dignidade é um dado preexistente, pois independe de ser reconhecida objetivamente pelo Direito posto.

Historicamente, a sociedade e o Estado não viam os criminosos como sujeitos merecedores de respeito à dignidade. Até o final do século XVIII, era comum que os sujeitos sofressem penas de suplício, as quais tinham caráter cruel e degradante, violadoras de suas integridades físicas, até mesmo, levando-os à morte. No entanto, ideais iluministas fizeram nascer discursos humanísticos, os quais postulavam penas que tivessem por objetivo restaurar o delinquente (FOUCAULT, 2014, *passim*).

Com o surgimento das sociedades disciplinares no final do século XVIII, os suplícios chegaram ao fim. Nessa época, a justiça penal passou a ser regulada por códigos explícitos, que regulamentavam punições. Emergiram daí penas que não mais violavam diretamente a integridade física e mental do condenado, a exemplo da pena privativa de liberdade e da de interdição de domicílios (FOUCAULT, 2014, p. 13-14).

Foi nesse período também que surgiu o trabalho no cárcere, que funcionava como uma verdadeira espécie de pena, o que permitiu que não fosse visto como atividade a ser exercida com respeito à dignidade da pessoa humana. Executava-se sob uma disciplina rígida, de natureza forçada (FOUCAULT, 2014, *passim*).

No início do século XX, surgem, no entanto, direitos humanos de segunda dimensão, segundo os quais cabe ao Estado realizar atividades que garantam aos indivíduos, sem distinções, direitos fundamentais, como a educação, a saúde e o trabalho. Todavia, os encarcerados, inicialmente, não eram vistos como sujeitos de direitos. Desse modo, somente nos dias atuais, o labor do apenado passou, de fato, a funcionar como uma ferramenta de reinserção social do criminoso após

o cumprimento da pena (OLIVEIRA, 2019, p. 90-91).

No Brasil, o artigo 59 do Decreto-Lei nº 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 – Código Penal (CP) (BRASIL, 1940), estabelece que, quando o juiz for fixar a pena, deverá levar em consideração, dentre outros parâmetros, o necessário para reprovar e prevenir o crime cometido.

Greco explica que o CP brasileiro adotou a teoria mista, segundo a qual a pena até dispõe de um objetivo retributivo, mas também deve ser apta a prevenir novos crimes, o que gera reflexos não somente no indivíduo, mas também na sociedade em geral (GRECO, 2015, p. 539).

Nesse sentido, a Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984 – Lei de Execuções Penais (LEP), em seu artigo 1º, estabelece que a execução da pena deve resultar em condições para a reintegração social do apenado. O artigo 10, por sua vez, dispõe que é dever do Estado garantir assistência aos presos, de modo a orientar o retorno ao convívio social, evitando, dessa forma, a reincidência (BRASIL, 1984).

Essas preocupações também são observadas no âmbito internacional. Citam-se, como exemplo, as Regras Mínimas das Nações Unidas para o Tratamento de Reclusos (CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 2016). A Regra de nº 4, por exemplo, dispõe que a pena de prisão ou qualquer outra medida restritiva de liberdade deve buscar, de forma prioritária, a proteção da sociedade contra o cometimento de novos crimes e a diminuição da reincidência. Assim, estabelece o dispositivo que, durante o período de cumprimento da pena, o sujeito deve ter à sua disposição meios capazes de reinseri-lo na vida em sociedade.

O diploma prevê, ainda, que a capacitação do apenado é indispensável para que, após o cumprimento da pena, ele possa levar uma vida autossuficiente, além de ser estimulado a obedecer às leis. Assim, por todo o período em que estiver cumprindo pena, sob a custódia do Estado, o preso deve ter a oportunidade de estudar e trabalhar, de modo a garantir que a sua

vida após o cumprimento da pena seja autossuficiente.

É por estas razões que é possível identificar que o trabalho no cárcere tem, como um de seus objetivos, proporcionar educação e formação profissional ao apenado, constituindo-se em um meio capaz de garantir a redução e, quiçá, a eliminação dos fatores que afastam o preso de sua reinserção social (GRECO, 2015, p. 574-575).

Greco ensina que o trabalho é um dos meios que mais concretizam a ressocialização, além de conferir inúmeros benefícios de natureza psicossocial aos detentos. Para o autor, “a experiência demonstra que nas penitenciárias onde os presos não exercem qualquer atividade laborativa o índice de tentativas de fuga é muito superior ao daqueles em que os detentos atuam de forma produtiva, aprendendo e trabalhando em determinado ofício” (2015, p. 574).

Conforme exposto alhures, a CRFB/88 tem como um de seus fundamentos o respeito à dignidade da pessoa humana, a qual deve ser observada, inclusive, no ambiente laboral carcerário (BRASIL, 1988). Para conquistar esse desiderato, tanto o artigo 38 do CP quanto o art. 3º da LEP preveem que o preso conserva todos os direitos não atingidos pela pena privativa de liberdade, pelo que deve ter sua integridade física e mental garantida (BRASIL, 1940; BRASIL, 1984).

O artigo 28 da LEP dispõe, por sua vez, que o trabalho é um dever social do preso e uma condição de dignidade, devendo ter por finalidade mais do que um viés produtivo; deve buscar a educação e a formação profissional do apenado, tendo como finalidade a sua ressocialização (BRASIL, 1984).

Como forma de incentivo, tais diplomas concedem benefícios ao preso que labora. O artigo 36 do CP, por exemplo, prescreve que uma das condições para que a pena possa ser cumprida em regime aberto é o exercício de atividade laboral do apenado, ou a frequência em cursos, ou, ainda, o exercício de atividade fora do estabelecimento prisional, desde que, neste último caso, seja expressamente autorizado (BRASIL, 1940).

A LEP, por seu turno, estabelece, no artigo 114, que somente progredirá para o regime aberto, o preso que exercer atividades laborativas ou que comprovar a possibilidade de trabalhar de forma imediata. Além disso, o artigo 126, §1º, inciso II, garante a remição de 1 (um) dia de pena para cada 3 (três) dias de trabalho (BRASIL, 1984).

Conforme se observa até aqui, ainda que o indivíduo esteja privado de sua liberdade, não é possível que Estado esteja alheio à sua necessidade de trabalho, e, mais ainda, de um trabalho em condições dignas.

Entretanto, embora as disposições legais devam ser lidas pelo viés axiológico da Constituição Federal, de modo que o trabalho do preso seja realizado com todas as condições e características que lhe permitam o seu exercício com dignidade, na prática, o cenário é bem diferente.

Primeiramente, verifica-se que a enorme maioria das prisões não possuem instrumentos para qualificar profissionalmente os encarcerados. Além disso, as que abrigam essas atividades, ofertam uma quantidade extremamente baixa de vagas, deixando de fora um elevado número de encarcerados, que passam o período de cumprimento de pena ociosos.

Outrossim, a LEP pouco dispõe sobre os direitos mínimos do preso que labora. O artigo 28, §2º, por exemplo, estabelece que os presos que laboram não se submetem à Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), pois seu vínculo seria de natureza estatutária (BRASIL, 1984).

Relembre-se, no entanto, que a dignidade é um valor absoluto e universal. Por isso, mesmo a atividade laboral exercida dentro do cárcere não pode perder de vista o objetivo maior de proteção à dignidade humana do apenado (SARLET, 2006, p. 53).

Conclui-se, com isso, que o Estado, tem o dever constitucional de redução ou mesmo de eliminação das dificuldades que impedem o exercício de um trabalho digno, mesmo para pessoas que cumprem pena privativa de liberdade.

Não se olvide, por fim, que o exercício de atividades em condições indignas de trabalho pode resultar em uma ressignificação do trabalho escravo, o que jamais pode ser relativizado, mesmo para criminosos condenados pelos delitos mais graves.

Uma vez exposto o panorama geral sobre o trabalho no sistema carcerário, far-se-á uma análise dos dados extraídos no Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias, realizado de julho a dezembro de 2021, mais especificamente os que se relacionam com as atividades que guardem relação com a qualificação profissional dos presos nas unidades prisionais paraenses.

### III. DADOS RELACIONADOS AO TRABALHO DOS PRESOS NO PARÁ: UMA ANÁLISE DO 11º CICLO DE LEVANTAMENTO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES PENITENCIÁRIAS, REALIZADO DE JULHO A DEZEMBRO 2021

De acordo com o Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública<sup>2</sup>, o banco de dados do SISDEPEN é elaborado com base nas informações de todos os estabelecimentos prisionais do Brasil. Atualmente denominado de Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciária, o banco é de responsabilidade do Departamento Penitenciário Nacional (DEPEN) e tem como objetivo a elaboração de um diagnóstico da realidade prisional brasileira.

Os dados colhidos revelam o censo dos estabelecimentos prisionais e da população prisional. O método usado no levantamento consiste em um formulário *on-line* preenchido pelos responsáveis das unidades, de acordo com as orientações do DEPEN.

As informações relativas às unidades prisionais vêm sendo disponibilizadas no *site* oficial do Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública, de forma anual, em 2014 e 2015, por meio da base de

dados do INFOPEN (Sistema de informações estatísticas do sistema penitenciário brasileiro).

A partir de 2016, os dados passaram a ser atualizados de forma semestral e, até o primeiro semestre desse ano, continuaram sendo disponibilizados pelo INFOPEN. A partir do segundo semestre de 2016 até o segundo semestre de 2021, as informações passaram a compor a base de dados do SISDEPEN, passando cada semestre a ser considerado um ciclo. As informações relativas aos meses de janeiro a junho de 2022, ou seja, do 12º ciclo, ainda não foram disponibilizadas.

A partir dessa investigação, buscou-se identificar de que maneira a carência no oferecimento de vagas de trabalho profissionalizante aos presos no Pará pode ser um vetor de retroalimentação de violência estrutural contra os egressos do sistema prisional paraense.

### IV. METODOLOGIA

Para realizar a análise e a reflexão propostas, foi realizada uma busca, no dia 20 de junho de 2022, no endereço eletrônico do Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública, por meio da qual foram encontrados catorze Levantamentos Nacionais de Informações Penitenciárias.

Em vista de garantir que a base de dados utilizada para extrair as conclusões da pesquisa fosse a mais atual possível, optou-se por examinar os dados constantes no último levantamento disponibilizado, isto é, o realizado entre os meses de julho a dezembro de 2021, considerado o 11º ciclo.

As informações foram disponibilizadas em formato de planilha, com um total de 1.582 linhas, que representam os estabelecimentos prisionais do Brasil, e 1.331 colunas, que contêm variadas informações relativas a cada um desses estabelecimentos.

Com o objetivo de assegurar a exequibilidade da pesquisa, foi fundamental reduzir o campo de investigação. Para tanto, considerando o objetivo do Programa de Pós-Graduação *stricto sensu* do Centro Universitário do Pará - CESUPA de promover o desenvolvimento regional, realizou-se

<sup>2</sup>Disponível no endereço eletrônico: <https://www.gov.br/depen/pt-br/servicos/sisdepen/mais-informacoes/bases-de-dados>

o exame apenas dos dados relativos ao trabalho desempenhado no estado do Pará.

Após a aplicação do filtro na coluna relativa à Unidade Federativa, obteve-se, como resultado, um total de 53 unidades prisionais no Pará, a respeito das quais há dados importantes, que merecem ser discutidos.

No entanto, algumas informações levantadas não possuem relevância para os fins da presente investigação. Em razão disso, apenas alguns dados precisaram ser examinados. Para tanto, recorreu-se ao Formulário de Coleta de Informações Prisionais<sup>3</sup>, a fim de perquirir o detalhamento de cada dado coletado dos estabelecimentos apresentados nas colunas da tabela.

Após esse exame, optou-se, com a finalidade de atender aos objetivos da pesquisa, por analisar os dados que mantenham relação com a qualificação profissional do encarcerado, quais sejam: No item 1 (Dados do estabelecimento), o subitem “1.3. Capacidade do estabelecimento”; no item 2 (Seções internas), estuda-se o subitem “2.6. Módulo de oficinas”; no item 4 (População prisional e movimentação), examina-se o subitem “4.1 População prisional”, mais especificamente, a quantidade total; no item 6 (Ações de reintegração social/ Assistências), optou-se por estudar o subitem “6.1. Quantidade de pessoas privadas de liberdade em programas de laborterapia”.

Os achados de pesquisa foram sistematizados apenas por seu conteúdo. Assim, analisam-se as categorias: A) Capacidade total dos estabelecimentos x Quantidade total da população prisional; B) Módulo de oficina, B.1) Infraestrutura; B.2) Módulo de oficinas (vagas), B.2.1) Artefatos de concreto (vagas); B.2.2) Blocos e tijolos (vagas); B.2.3) Padaria e panificação (vagas); B.2.4) Corte e costura industrial (vagas); B.2.5) Artesanato (vagas); B.2.6) Marcenaria (vagas); B.2.7) Serralheria (vagas); B.2.8) Módulo de oficina – espaços complementares (vagas); C) Quantidade de pessoas privadas de liberdade em

programa de laborterapia; C.1) Quantidade de pessoas em vagas obtidas por meios próprios e/ou sem intervenção do sistema prisional; C.2) Quantidade de pessoas em vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional como apoio ao próprio estabelecimento; C.3) Quantidade de pessoas em vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com a iniciativa privada; C.4) Quantidade de pessoas em vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com outros órgãos públicos; C.5) Quantidade de pessoas em vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com entidade ou organizações não governamentais sem fins lucrativos.

## V. RESULTADOS: CONTEÚDO DOS DADOS

Neste item, analisa-se, em números, a questão relacionada com as atividades de qualificação profissional dos encarcerados no sistema prisional paraense. O exame servirá de base para perquirir, no próximo item, de que maneira a gestão da profissionalização dos presos no estado do Pará está impactando no ciclo de violência estrutural sofrida pelos presos e egressos do sistema prisional do estado do Pará.

### 5.1 Capacidade Total dos Estabelecimentos X Quantidade Total da População Prisional

Conforme o levantamento realizado no período de julho a dezembro de 2021, a capacidade total de vagas dos estabelecimentos localizados no Estado do Pará era de 15.339. Por outro lado, era possível constatar um total de 18.478 sujeitos presos na região. Ou seja, havia 3.139 pessoas detidas a mais do que a capacidade total dos estabelecimentos (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2 Módulo de Oficina

Segundo o formulário sobre informações prisionais, os módulos de oficina são compreendidos como cursos de capacitação para os encarcerados se profissionalizarem e desenvolverem competências para o trabalho remunerado, dentro e fora do cárcere.

<sup>3</sup>Disponível no endereço eletrônico: <https://www.gov.br/depen/pt-br/servicos/sisdepen/mais-informacoes/bases-de-dados>

### 5.2.1 Infraestrutura

Em relação à infraestrutura presente nos módulos, no Pará, apenas 6 dos 53 estabelecimentos possuem sala de produção e, apenas 1 dos 53, disponibiliza sanitário nas oficinas. No que se refere à sala de controle/supervisão, estoque e área de carga e descarga, observa-se que inexistem estabelecimentos que apresentem tais estruturas (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.2 Módulo de Oficina (vagas)

Conforme o formulário sobre informações prisionais, existem diversos tipos de oficinas, especificadas na tabela de acordo com a espécie de profissionalização que proporciona e quantas vagas são ofertadas (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.3 Artefatos de Concreto (vagas)

No período examinado, constatou-se que não havia qualquer penitenciária no Pará que abrigasse módulos de oficina com a finalidade de lecionar aos detentos sobre a produção de artefatos de concreto, não existindo vagas dessa espécie (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.4 Blocos e Tijolos (vagas)

Durante o período, observou-se que tampouco havia presídio no Pará que possuísse módulos de oficina com a finalidade de instruir os encarcerados a produzirem blocos e tijolos. Assim, não havia vaga para essa espécie de oficina (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.5 Padaria e Panificação (vagas)

No que se refere à oficina de padaria e panificação, examinou-se que somente 2 dos 54 presídios possuíam oficina de padaria e panificação (DEPEN, 2021).

Um dos estabelecimentos é o Centro de Reeducação Feminino, localizado no município de Ananindeua, que disponibiliza um total de 10 vagas. O cárcere possui capacidade para 480 presas e, no período, havia 429 detentas no lugar (DEPEN, 2021).

O segundo estabelecimento, a Colônia Penal Agrícola de Santa Isabel, possui, igualmente, 10 vagas para o módulo, capacidade para 840 encarcerados, e, no período examinado, acolhia 1.956. Isto é, mais que o dobro do seu limite (DEPEN, 2021).

Com isso, conclui-se que, no Pará, havia um total de 20 vagas para oficinas de padaria e panificação (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.6 Corte e Costura Industrial (vagas)

Durante o período de coleta de dados, havia 2 estabelecimentos no Pará que abrigavam oficina de corte e costura industrial (DEPEN, 2021).

Um dos estabelecimentos é a Cadeia Pública de Redenção, que disponibiliza um total de 15 vagas. O cárcere possui capacidade para 460 presos e, no período, havia 393 detentos (DEPEN, 2021).

Em relação ao segundo estabelecimento, denominado Centro de Reeducação Feminino, localizado no município de Ananindeua, observou-se que possui 20 vagas para o módulo, capacidade para 480 encarceradas, e, no período examinado, acolhia 429 (DEPEN, 2021).

Outro presídio que abriga o módulo é o Centro de Recuperação Agrícola Sílvio Hall de Moura, localizado em Santarém, com capacidade para 821 presos e que abrigava, no período, um total de 806. O estabelecimento possuía 5 vagas para o módulo (DEPEN, 2021).

O terceiro presídio que possui a oficina é o Presídio Estadual Metropolitano I, em Marituba. Com capacidade para 404 detentos, e com uma população prisional de 663, o local ofertava 4 vagas para o módulo (DEPEN, 2021).

Por fim, o quinto é o Centro de Reeducação Feminino de Marabá, que possui capacidade para 86 presas e abriga um total de 66 detentas. O presídio possui 5 vagas para essa oficina (DEPEN, 2021).

Com isso, conclui-se que, no Pará, havia um total de 49 vagas para oficinas de corte e costura industrial (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.7 Artesanato (vagas)

O levantamento aponta apenas três unidades que oferecem oficina de artesanato. Uma delas era a Cadeia Pública de Redenção, com capacidade para 460 presos e com 393 detentos de fato, disponibilizando um total de 15 vagas (DEPEN, 2021).

O segundo estabelecimento era o Centro de Reeducação Feminino, com 50 vagas para o módulo, capacidade para 480 encarceradas, e que acolhia 429 (DEPEN, 2021).

O outro estabelecimento era o Centro de Reeducação Feminino de Marabá, que possui capacidade para 86 presas e abriga um total de 66 detentas. O presídio possui 5 vagas para essa oficina (DEPEN, 2021).

Com isso, conclui-se que, no Pará, havia um total de 70 vagas para oficinas de artesanato (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.8 Marcenaria (vagas)

Apenas três unidades prisionais, no Pará, possuíam módulo de oficina marcenaria. Uma era a Central de Triagem Metropolitana II, em Ananindeua, com capacidade para 144 detentos, que abrigava 340, ou seja, quase o triplo do seu limite, e oferecia 12 vagas para a oficina (DEPEN, 2021).

Outra unidade era o Centro de Recuperação do Coqueiro, localizada em Belém, com capacidade para 169 presos, que abrigava um total de 419 e disponibilizava 12 vagas no módulo (DEPEN, 2021).

Com isso, conclui-se que, no Pará, havia um total de 24 vagas para oficinas de corte e costura industrial (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.9 Serralheria (vagas)

Verificou-se que duas unidades prisionais, no Pará, possuíam o módulo de oficina de serralheria durante o período do levantamento. Uma delas era o Presídio Estadual Metropolitano III, localizado em Marituba, com capacidade para 288

presos, que abrigava um total de 233, e oferta 10 vagas para a oficina (DEPEN, 2021).

Outra unidade era o Presídio Estadual Metropolitano II, localizado em Marituba, com capacidade para 304 presos, que abrigava um total de 383 e disponibilizava 3 vagas no módulo (DEPEN, 2021).

Com isso, conclui-se que, no Pará, havia um total de 13 vagas para oficinas de serralheria (DEPEN, 2021).

### 5.2.10 Módulo de Oficina - Espaços Complementares (vagas)

A tabela que apresenta os dados obtidos por meio do levantamento de informações penitenciárias nacional também aponta dados sobre outros tipos de módulos de oficinas que, eventualmente, não se encaixem nas anteriormente examinadas (DEPEN, 2021).

No Pará, nenhuma unidade prisional apresentava módulos de oficinas diversos dos já classificados (DEPEN, 2021).

## 5.3 Quantidade de Pessoas Privadas de Liberdade em Programa de Laborterapia

Conforme o formulário sobre informações prisionais, os programas de laborterapia são subdivididos em setores primário, secundário e terciário.

O primeiro está relacionado com atividades rurais, agrícolas e artesanais. Nesse setor, os detentos exercem atividades como exploração vegetal, animal e mineral, produzidos para fins de comercialização, consumo pessoal ou industrialização.

O documento afirma que, na indústria do artesanato, o preso/produtor é proprietário dos meios de produção e participa de todas as etapas do processo produtivo, desde a coleta de matéria-prima até a finalização do produto, para venda ou para uso próprio.

Em relação às atividades da indústria secundária, o documento mostra que estão relacionadas às atividades industriais, e os trabalhadores atuam

apenas no processo de beneficiamento, como a construção civil. O setor terciário, por sua vez, envolve-se com a prestação de serviços como negócios, educação, saúde, telecomunicações e marketing, serviços de limpeza, serviços de copa e cozinha, bem como serviços administrativos.

De acordo com a tabela, 37 estabelecimentos prisionais possuem detentos em programas de laborterapia (DEPEN, 2021).

### *5.3.1 Quantidade de Pessoas em Vagas Obtidas Por Meios Próprios e/ou Sem Intervenção do Sistema Prisional*

Conforme o formulário sobre informações prisionais, essas vagas referem-se a casos em que o próprio sujeito privado de liberdade conseguiu a oportunidade de trabalho, sem que a Secretária responsável intermediasse (DEPEN, 2021).

No Pará, no período analisado, verificava-se que um total de 10 presos ocupam vagas dessa espécie em setor primário, 18, no setor secundário e 341, no setor terciário. Assim, no total, tem-se 369 detentos em vagas obtidas por meios próprios e/ou sem intervenção do sistema prisional (DEPEN, 2021).

### *5.3.2 Quantidade de Pessoas em Vagas Disponibilizadas Pela Administração Prisional Como Apoio ao Próprio Estabelecimento*

Segundo o formulário sobre informações prisionais, tais vagas estão relacionadas com aquelas disponibilizadas pelo próprio sistema prisional para a sua manutenção, como, por exemplo, refeição, limpeza, confecção de uniforme e outros (DEPEN, 2021).

Na pesquisa, constatou-se que 1.140 presos ocupavam essas vagas (DEPEN, 2021).

### *5.3.3 Quantidade de Pessoas em Vagas Disponibilizadas Pela Administração Prisional em Parceria Com a Iniciativa Privada*

De acordo com o formulário sobre informações prisionais, essas vagas são as ofertadas pela Secretária de administração prisional por meio de

parceria ou contrato com a iniciativa privada, com fins lucrativos (DEPEN, 2021)..

Na investigação, observou-se que um total de 74 presos ocupam vagas dessa espécie, no setor primário, 17, no secundário e 56, no setor terciário. Assim, no total, tem-se 147 detentos em vagas dessa espécie (DEPEN, 2021).

### *5.3.4 Quantidade de Pessoas em Vagas Disponibilizadas Pela Administração Prisional em Parceria Com Outros Órgãos Públicos*

O formulário sobre informações prisionais esclarece que essas vagas estão relacionadas com as ofertadas pela Secretária de administração prisional por meio de parceria ou congêneres com órgãos públicos (DEPEN, 2021).

No estudo, verificou-se que um total de 42 presos estavam nessas vagas em setor primário, 32, no secundário e 179, no setor terciário. Assim, no total, tem-se 253 detentos ocupando vagas desse tipo (DEPEN, 2021).

### *5.3.5 Quantidade de Pessoas em Vagas Disponibilizadas Pela Administração Prisional em Parceria Com Entidades ou Organizações não Governamentais Sem Fins Lucrativos*

O formulário sobre informações prisionais dispõe que essas vagas estão relacionadas com as ofertadas pela Secretária de administração prisional por meio de parceria ou contrato com organizações não governamentais sem fins lucrativos (DEPEN, 2021).

No exame, foi possível constatar que nenhum preso ocupa essas vagas nem no setor primário, nem no secundário; no entanto, 113 estavam em vagas dessa espécie no setor terciário (DEPEN, 2021).

Esse é o panorama encontrado, passando-se a analisar os dados em consonância com as premissas estabelecidas nesse estudo.

## VI. A RETROALIMENTAÇÃO DA VIOLÊNCIA ESTRUTURAL DOS EGRESSOS DO SISTEMA PRISIONAL PARAENSE PELA AUSÊNCIA DE ACESSO A ATIVIDADE PROFISSIONALIZANTES

Depois de realizada a análise dos dados relativos ao trabalho dos presos no Pará, extraídos do

levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias realizado de julho a dezembro de 2021, os achados de pesquisa foram sistematizados em forma de tabela, com o objetivo de garantir melhor visualização dos dados coletados e facilitar a compreensão das reflexões propostas a seguir.

*Tabela 1:* Módulos de Oficina e laborterapia nas Unidades Prisionais do Pará apresentadas no levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias realizado de julho a agosto de 2021

Atividade	Nº	%*
Vagas de Módulo de Oficina	181	0,98%
Laborterapia ocupados	2022	10,94%
* Para uma população carcerária de 18.478 presos		

*Tabela 2:* Vagas ofertadas em módulos de oficinas as Unidades Prisionais do Pará apresentadas no levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias realizado de julho a agosto de 2021

Oficina	Vagas	%*
Artefatos de concreto	0	0,00%
Blocos de tijolos	0	0,00%
Padaria e panificação	20	0,11%
Corte e costura industrial	49	0,27%
Artesanato	70	0,38%
Marcenaria	29	0,16%
Serralheria	13	0,07%
Total	181	0,98%
* Para uma população carcerária de 18.478 presos		

*Fonte: elaborada pelas autoras a partir da análise de dados*

*Tabela 3:* Vagas ocupadas em labor terapia nas Unidades Prisionais do Pará apresentadas no levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias realizado de julho a agosto de 2021

Laborterapia	Quantidade	%*
Vagas obtidas por meio próprio e/ou sem intervenção do sistema prisional	369	2,00%
Vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional como apoio ao próprio estabelecimento	1140	6,17%
Vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com a iniciativa privada	147	0,80%
Vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com outros órgãos públicos	253	1,37%
Vagas disponibilizadas pela administração prisional em parceria com entidade ou organização não governamental sem fins lucrativos	113	0,61%
Total	2022	10,94%
* Para uma população carcerária de 18.478 presos		

*Fonte: elaborada pelas autoras a partir da análise de dados*

Os debates sobre violência têm prevalecido nos congressos, academias, jornais e discursos políticos hodiernamente (SCHERER; NUNES; SANTOS, 2017, p. 3). A sociedade brasileira muito se preocupa com os índices alarmantes de criminalidade e a mídia reforça constantemente a noção de que a solução para a problemática é o tratamento mais severo (criminal), o endurecimento das penas e o maior policiamento nas ruas (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, 25017-25019).

Poucos envolvidos nessas discussões compreendem, verdadeiramente, a complexidade e a profundidade que envolve esse fenômeno, o que proporciona frequentes violações de direitos fundamentais (SANTOS, 2017, p. 3). Claramente, o uso indevido da palavra violência quando se quer falar de crime é apenas uma manifestação do problema (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2011, *passim*).

Já se verificou que o recurso ao direito penal não é medida capaz de, por si só, combater a violência. Na verdade, o que tudo indica é que é imprescindível a busca por políticas públicas de inclusão social como forma de reduzir desigualdades para combater a criminalidade (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, p. 25018).

Por meio desse raciocínio, percebe-se que a compreensão da violência requer a análise de

outros fatores, como economia, política e sistemas jurídicos (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, p. 25025). Ao separar a violência do seu todo, tem-se como objetivo ocultar as relações de exploração que são geradas e reproduzidas na sociedade. Uma investigação fragmentada desse fenômeno esconde uma série de processos sociais que se manifestam de múltiplas formas (SCHERER; NUNES; SANTOS, 2017, p. 3).

A análise do fenômeno da violência não pode se restringir a um fator uniforme e único, pois seu impacto na sociedade não é algo externo que pode ser explicado por relações causais como, por exemplo, "a pobreza produz violência". Pelo contrário, a violência deve ser analisada enquanto fenômeno polimórfico e multifacetado, cuja capilaridade atinge as mais diversas manifestações sociais, que conectam, interagem, (re) alimentam e fortalecem a chamada violência estrutural (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 34).

No entanto, essa noção muitas vezes é deixada de lado, pois não sinaliza, para a maior parte da população, um afastamento do que é considerado "prática política aceitável". A violência estrutural é mascarada pelo cumprimento de regras; é naturalizada porque sempre esteve diluída nas relações sociais; não é visível, visto não parecer

uma quebra de normalidade (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 33).

Na verdade, como essa forma de violência ocorre no dia a dia das instituições, acaba sendo vista como natural, de modo que o senso comum frequentemente não é capaz de perceber. Com isso, acaba-se atribuindo a violação de direitos somente à incompetência dos governantes (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 34-35).

É bem verdade que o Estado, por meio de sua estrutura e poder, é responsável pela garantia de condições de vida dignas à população, assegurando a promoção da igualdade e de melhor qualidade de vida (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 35). Por isso, a omissão no cumprimento desse dever significa perpetrar a violência sistêmica contra a população (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 35), negando ou reduzindo a qualidade dos serviços públicos prestados e de direitos fundamentais (SCHERER; NUNES; SANTOS, 2017, p. 11), o que se relaciona com uma espécie de violência estrutural vertical.

É por essa razão que as instituições não podem apenas ser vistas como instrumentos capazes de combater a violência, pois elas não estão fora do fenômeno. Na realidade, as instituições surgem e atuam no conflito, privilegiando aqueles que possuem interesses dominantes e marginalizando demandas por mudanças, o que acaba por fortalecer as desigualdades que constituem a violência estrutural (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 40).

Porém, não se pode considerar apenas o Estado e os seus órgãos como fontes de violência (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 33). A violência estrutural também pode se dar de forma horizontal, sendo executada por indivíduo e/ou grupos, manifestando-se de várias maneiras, como, por exemplo, por intermédio da distribuição desigual de recursos, oportunidades e papéis sociais em decorrência do preconceito e da discriminação (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 36).

Esse conjunto consolida todas as marcas da violência estrutural: não é produzida naturalmente, mas é fruto de um contexto histórico e social; está pautada nas relações de poder; tem um destinatário e objetivos definidos.

Aliás, o aspecto mais brutal da violência estrutural é o processo seletivo para decidir quais cidadãos receberão os benefícios sociais e quais serão socialmente excluídos dessa partilha (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 39).

Acabam por ser afetados, principalmente, os que possuem chances reduzidas de defesas, ou seja, a natureza violenta do Estado é sentida diretamente pelos mais pobres, marginalizados e negros. Frente a esses grupos, o Estado se expressa principalmente por meio de suas instituições coercitivas, que estão ausentes quando é para protegê-los, mas sempre fortes para reprimi-los (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 40).

A consequência é a restrição do acesso a direitos fundamentais, necessários para viver com dignidade, da qual resulta uma massa de indivíduos sujeitos à pobreza e à exclusão social (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 35), o que configura uma das expressões de violência.

Tal cenário torna possível constatar que os efeitos práticos da violência sistêmica são tão evidentes quanto os da violência aberta. Na verdade, as consequências podem ser ainda piores, visto que podem corresponder ao afastamento da possibilidade de exercer a autonomia pessoal, levando à desnutrição, à doença e até à morte. E isso impede os indivíduos de buscarem ou mesmo formarem suas próprias ideias de bem (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 32-33).

A violência estrutural possui, no centro, mecanismos ideológicos que a tornam invisível, a ponto de só nos lembramos da violência policial e da violência que a desigualdade estrutural gera de tempos em tempos e, muitas vezes, buscamos até justificativas para naturalizá-las. Todavia, ela opera todos os dias, voltada para os que se encontram em posições subordinadas (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 32-33).

A violência sistêmica amplia o sofrimento da minoria; gera fortes assimetrias no seio social; restringe oportunidades e itens fundamentais para a preservação da dignidade humana; obsta decisões racionais e propicia escolhas coagidas, como a opção pela violação de normas penais em

busca da sobrevivência (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 39).

O conceito de violência estrutural permite um exame mais abrangente das infrações penais. O crime é, de fato, uma das manifestações da violência, mas também é resultado da violência sistêmica perpetrada pelo Estado e pelos demais membros da sociedade contra outros indivíduos em geral, detentos e ex-presidiários.

Conforme mencionado anteriormente, no Brasil o criminoso condenado é encaminhado ao sistema prisional, onde sua dignidade deve ser protegida, de acordo com os princípios e as garantias constitucionais. Além disso, a prisão não pode servir apenas a fins de repressão e prevenção do crime. De fato, a pena deve também reabilitar o infrator, introduzindo meios de ressocialização para a sua reintegração social (GRECO, 2015, *passim*).

Buscando-se confrontar essas considerações com a realidade prisional do estado do Pará, cabe voltar à tabela com os dados dos trabalhos das pessoas privadas de liberdade no Estado do Pará, perquirindo de que maneira a gestão da profissionalização dos presos está impactando no ciclo de violência estrutural sofrida pelos presos e egressos do sistema prisional paraense.

Conforme já mencionado, o sistema prisional paraense, entre os meses de julho e dezembro de 2021, tinha capacidade de abrigar 15.339 presos. Todavia, possuía uma população prisional de 18.478 encarcerados. Logo, havia um total de 3.139 detentos a mais do que o limite (DEPEN, 2021). Tal fato já denota uma violência perpetrada pelo Estado contra os que estão sob a sua custódia, visto que a superlotação nos presídios viola direitos fundamentais, pois impede o cumprimento de pena em condições dignas.

Concentrando-se nos objetivos da presente pesquisa, resta analisar as informações relacionadas com atividades que garantem a qualificação profissional do preso. Entre os meses de julho e dezembro de 2021, constata-se que a infraestrutura dos módulos de oficina estava longe de um nível ótimo de qualidade: apenas 11,3% dos estabelecimentos prisionais do estado

possuíam sala de produção; e apenas em 51,8% havia banheiros instalados; sala de controle/supervisão e área de descarga inexistentes nesses estabelecimentos (DEPEN, 2021).

Na realidade, o que se observa é que pouco ou nenhum investimento era voltado a estruturar os espaços de qualificação dos detentos. Não se pode perder de vista que, para que os direitos fundamentais à educação e ao trabalho sejam exercidos em sua plenitude, o Estado tem o dever de garantir infraestrutura digna no cárcere. À sua falta, constata-se flagrante violação de direitos e uma verdadeira expressão de violência contra os sujeitos encarcerados no estado do Pará.

Se não bastasse a falta de infraestrutura, verifica-se, também, que a quantidade de vagas ofertadas em módulos de oficina é baixíssima e pouco variada. Não se verificam módulos que visem à qualificação, por exemplo, em atividades mais complexas e elaboradas, mas apenas oficinas de trabalho manual que, muitas vezes, fora do sistema do cárcere, garantem aos egressos pouca ou nenhuma remuneração, gerando obstáculos à vida digna.

Tome-se, por exemplo, o fato de que nenhuma unidade possui módulo que qualifique o preso na produção de artefatos de concreto ou em blocos e tijolos. Nas oficinas de padaria e panificação, a situação é precária: somente 3,7% dos presídios do Pará abrigam tal módulo. Um deles oferta apenas 10 vagas para um total de 429 detentos, enquanto o outro somente disponibiliza 10 vagas para um total de 1.956 encarcerados (DEPEN, 2021).

Em relação aos módulos de corte e costura, verifica-se que, apesar de estarem presentes em um número maior, aproximadamente 9,4%, o número de vagas ainda é extremamente baixo, por exemplo, um dos estabelecimentos oferece 5 vagas para 806 presos, enquanto outra unidade oferece 4 posições para 663 encarcerados (DEPEN, 2021).

As oficinas de artesanato estão presente em 5,6% dos estabelecimentos prisionais do estado e as vagas ofertadas para os módulos é igualmente baixa, havendo unidade que oferta somente 5

vagas para um total de 66 detentos no estabelecimento (DEPEN, 2021).

No que tange aos módulos de marcenaria, verifica-se que 3,7% dos presídios os possuíam, e um ofertava 12 vagas para 340 detentos; o outro, 12 vagas para 419. Igualmente, as oficinas de serralheria somente apareciam em 3,7% dos estabelecimentos, e um ofertava 10 vagas para 233 detentos; o outro, 3 vagas para 383 presos (DEPEN, 2021).

No Pará, nenhum outro estabelecimento abriga oficinas além das já classificadas (DEPEN, 2021). Portanto, levando em conta que os módulos são entendidos como cursos de capacitação para que os presos se profissionalizem e desenvolvam habilidades para o trabalho remunerado dentro e fora do presídio, a quantidade precária de vagas é preocupante.

O cenário também chama atenção negativamente quando se examina a quantidade de presos trabalhando. De acordo com o levantamento, apesar de se verificar que 69,8% dos estabelecimentos possuem detentos em programa de laborterapia (DEPEN, 2021), o que não é um número tão elevado, considerando que, em tese, o nível ótimo seria a presença em todas as unidades, a quantidade de presos que, de fato, laboram é extremamente baixa, senão vejamos.

Apenas 1,9% dos presos do estado conseguiram ocupar postos de trabalho por meios próprios, sem a intervenção da administração prisional (DEPEN, 2021), o que comprova a dificuldade de ultrapassar a barreira criada pelo estigma dentro do sistema prisional. Além disso, ainda que o sistema prisional intervenha, dando apoio na inserção do preso no labor, constata-se que somente 6,1% dos detentos do estado ocupam essas vagas (DEPEN, 2021).

No que se refere às vagas ofertadas em parceria entre o sistema penal e a iniciativa privada, tem-se que somente 0,7% dos encarcerados no estado ocupam nessas vagas. Em relação à mesma parceria com órgãos públicos, verifica-se que apenas 1,3% estão nessa forma de atividade laboral. E, quando a parceria é com entidades ou organizações sem fins lucrativos, o percentual de

presos do estado trabalhando cai para 0,6% (DEPEN, 2021).

Tais dados comparados com a média nacional denotam ainda maior negatividade. Enquanto que, nacionalmente, a média de presos trabalhando é de 16,26%, no Pará, somente 10,9% trabalham. Ademais, a média nacional de quantidade de vagas ofertadas em módulos de oficina representa 4,10% da quantidade de encarcerados no Brasil; no Pará, a quantidade corresponde a 0,95% do total de presos (DEPEN, 2021).

Verifica-se que a falta de oportunidades para a qualificação profissional dos encarcerados não é uma espécie de violência perpetrada somente no Pará, mas em todo o país, mas o estado se encontra muito abaixo da média nacional. É evidente que esse cenário implica inúmeros prejuízos para os presos e os egressos do sistema prisional, retroalimentando a violência estrutural a que já estão submetidos dentro e fora do cárcere.

O sujeito egresso, que já sofreu com as inúmeras violações de direitos fundamentais no sistema prisional, absorveu os piores padrões de comportamento e não teve à sua disposição instrumentos ressocializadores que reduzissem as barreiras à reintegração social, principalmente no mercado de trabalho, carrega o estigma eterno de ex-presidiário.

Portanto, fica claro que a migração dos castigos corporais para as prisões não pode ser vista como uma evolução da forma de punição. Pelo contrário, as prisões estão atualmente repletas de tortura, disciplina, humilhação e rebaixamento de pessoas privadas de liberdade (RODRIGUES, 2016, p. 2-3).

O que se observa, na verdade, são sistemas prisionais falidos, fundados na violência que, em tese, buscam coibir. Assim, o fracasso do encarceramento, aliado ao caráter insidioso da violência estrutural, contribuem para os problemas que cercam o atual sistema penal brasileiro e para a violência recorrente na sociedade (RODRIGUES, 2016, p. 5).

Os custos do cumprimento das leis e a complacência com uma distribuição assimétrica de benefícios dentro da sociedade, são suportados de forma mais elevada pelos que se encontram em condições mais precarizadas. Isso fortalece, por exemplo, aqueles ideários de estereótipos de "criminosos" e reforça preconceitos na polícia (MIGUEL, 2015, p. 40).

Acrescenta-se que entender a violência apenas como o ato individual de um sujeito isolado leva à construção da noção de um "sujeito perigoso", que precisa ser reprimido, ocultando, assim, a privação material e social sofrida pelos jovens pobres e marginalizados, de modo que o preconceito e a percepção de violência se manifestam por meio de atributos físicos tidos como indicadores de perigo (SCHERER; NUNES; SANTOS, 2017, p. 12).

Em razão disso, a condenação criminal de determinada pessoa induz à sua vulnerabilidade psicossocial, que a própria experiência carcerária agrava (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 141). A passagem pela prisão nesse cenário reforça o preconceito, a intolerância e o medo, além de provocar danos morais, psicológicos, físicos e a morte (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 39), levando à criminalização secundária do indivíduo (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 141).

Os egressos do sistema prisional sofrem discriminações, de modo que têm restringida ou anulada a igualdade do reconhecimento e do gozo dos direitos com os demais cidadãos. Egressos do sistema prisional raramente são aceitos pelos grupos sociais. O estigma estabelece um atributo que cria uma reputação generalizada na vida de um sujeito. Para os egressos estigmatizados, a própria sociedade restringe oportunidades, desqualifica os esforços e diminui movimentos, desvaloriza-os, priva-os de sua identidade social e provoca uma deterioração em sua imagem (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 148-149).

Esses sujeitos formam, assim, um grupo que é marcado pela coletividade como socialmente excluído, o que é em si uma forma de violência, que produz e retroalimenta a violência, pois, aos poucos, esses sujeitos são desintegrados da sociedade, excluídos do mercado formal de

trabalho e dos espaços de educação, gerando cada vez mais pobreza e aumento da criminalidade (FERNANDES, 2014, *passim*).

Considerando o exposto, a falta de emprego e de especialização profissional no sistema prisional paraense parece ser um fator que retroalimenta as diversas manifestações de violência contra os libertados. Causa e consequência do estigma, a reincidência torna-se a mais frequente escolha constrangida dos egressos, face à barreira intransponível para o ingresso no mercado de trabalho após o encarceramento.

Tomada em conjunto, a dinâmica do crime engloba a edição de normas criminais, a infração dessas normas e as respostas sociais às violações. Se, por um lado, o delito gera reação social, igualmente se verifica que as variadas reações sociais, institucionalizadas ou não, podem levar à criminalidade, como é o caso de sanções estigmatizantes e não ressocializadoras (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, 141-142), presentes no cenário paraense.

Não se pode perder de vista que o trabalho é essencial para que os sujeitos possam sobreviver e se desenvolver na sociedade. O labor agrega valor e é elemento constitutivo da própria existência humana, de modo que insere os seres humanos no meio social, garante qualidade de vida, eleva sua autoestima e proporciona o relacionamento interpessoal (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 139-140).

Em razão disso, qualquer política efetiva no sistema prisional deve garantir a valorização e o apoio a atividades laborais com o fim de promover a dignidade humana, a profissionalização e a ressocialização do encarcerado, de modo que seja possível reduzir as barreiras hoje existentes pelo preconceito no reingresso no mercado de trabalho (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 141), garantindo-se o combate ao ciclo de violência estrutural.

## VII. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

À luz do que foi exposto, é possível verificar que, no que se refere ao sistema prisional paraense, a carência de vagas em módulos de oficina e a baixa quantidade de presos em laborterapia parecem funcionar como vetores que retroalimentam as

diversas manifestações de violência contra os indivíduos em geral, os presos e os egressos, que passam a carregar o estigma de alguém que passou por encarceramento ocioso, aprendendo os piores padrões de comportamentos e sem adquirir qualquer qualificação.

Com isso, cria-se uma barreira quase que intransponível para a inserção do ex-detento no mercado de trabalho. Sem condições financeiras de sobreviver, a muitos egressos resta uma única escolha constrangida: a reincidência. Consequentemente, tem-se o aumento da criminalidade e o encarceramento em massa, gerando um ciclo infinito de violência estrutural.

Para tanto, o artigo examinou que o cumprimento da pena, no Brasil, muito mais do que reprimir o infrator penal, tem que ter por finalidade a ressocialização do sujeito preso. Nesse contexto, o labor dentro do cárcere funciona como um excelente instrumento, visto que propicia a qualificação profissional, garantindo experiência que poderá ser usada dentro e fora do cárcere (GRECO, 2015, *passim*).

Considerando isso, bem como analisando que o trabalho em condições dignas é um direito fundamental constitucionalmente previsto, pode-se concluir que o Estado tem o dever de ofertar, de forma satisfatória, vagas de trabalho e profissionalização no cárcere. Somente assim é possível combater os obstáculos para reinserção social do egresso, em especial, no mercado de trabalho.

Todavia, o que se verifica na prática, após a análise do levantamento de informações prisionais do Estado do Pará, região de interesse para os fins dessa pesquisa, é que os presos carecem de vagas e de variedade de oficinas profissionalizantes, havendo uma baixíssima quantidade de detentos ocupando vagas na laborterapia.

O resultado do quadro é que o sujeito, após o cumprimento de pena, passa a sofrer com a ausência de qualificação profissional e com os padrões inadequados de comportamento absorvidos em um sistema prisional falido, no qual sofreu, por parte do Estado, a violação de

direitos fundamentais, ou seja, suportou diversas manifestações de violência estrutural.

Diante disso, surge o preconceito e o estigma por parte dos demais cidadãos. O egresso passa, então, a sofrer uma espécie de exclusão social causada pela violência estrutural, que o afasta do pleno gozo dos seus direitos garantidores de dignidade.

Na verdade, tudo isso dificulta o ingresso no mercado de trabalho, no qual o preconceito contra o egresso ocorre na contratação, manutenção, promoção ou demissão, criando um muro intransponível entre o ex-detento e os meios de sobrevivência, restando, muitas vezes, como opção, a reincidência e o retorno ao sistema prisional (MARSON; LIRA, 2021, p. 151).

Assim, a violência estrutural sofrida leva diretamente à deterioração e ao declínio das condições de vida, especialmente para as classes mais pobres. À luz da realidade brasileira, é preciso deixar claro que pobreza, miséria e desigualdade não explicam o crime, mas são todos produtos da violência estrutural e constituem, em conjunto, um contexto propício para manifestações relacionadas (CRUZ NETO; MOREIRA, 1999, p. 51).

Assim, para evitar, controlar ou mesmo combater as infrações penais, é imprescindível o estudo multidisciplinar aprofundado das múltiplas expressões da violência, na medida em que o agravamento isolado de uma lei penal não terá o efeito desejado (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, p. 25030).

Ao contrário, diante do contexto de carência de oportunidade de profissionalização no cárcere, a exclusão social e a consequente reincidência reforçam a noção de que o direito penal é totalmente fracassado no combate à violência, sendo imprescindível o estabelecimento de políticas públicas que combatam a miséria, a exclusão social e a desigualdade (NETO; TEIXEIRA, 2021, *passim*).

Nesse sentido, entende-se que o Estado deve proporcionar aos egressos condições de ingresso no mercado de trabalho formal, por meio de instrumentos ressocializadores, dentro e fora do

cárcere, como, por exemplo, ofertando módulos de oficina e laborterapia, todavia, com a oferta de vagas em quantidade satisfatória.

Não se pode perder de vista que o trabalho digno é um direito fundamental que o Estado tem o dever de atuar positivamente para concretizar, de modo que negar isso configura uma expressão da violência estrutural.

Assim, conclui-se que, em decorrência da carência de atuação estatal, os presos no Pará sofrem com a precária oportunidade de profissionalização e de qualificação. Após o cumprimento de pena, muitos, apesar de libertos, carregam o estigma e os efeitos do encarceramento. Como consequência, possuem dificuldades para trabalhar e encaram a falta de moradia, alimentação e de outros direitos fundamentais.

Os egressos possuem direitos que precisam ser exercidos. A profissionalização no cárcere é uma política eficiente, capaz de reduzir as chances de reincidência, gerando benefícios para toda a coletividade, contribuindo para a superação das barreiras pós-prisão e para a construção de uma sociedade mais justa e humana (MARSON; LIRA, 2021). Tudo o que afaste os sujeitos presos ou os egressos dessas condições são manifestações de violência estrutural e retroalimentam outras formas de expressão desse fenômeno.

## REFERÊNCIAS

- BRASIL. Constituição (1988). Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: promulgada em 05 de Outubro de 1988. Disponível em: [https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/Constituicao/Constituicao.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao.htm). Acesso em: 10 outubro 2022.
- BRASIL. Decreto-Lei nº 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940. Disponível em: [https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/decreto-lei/del2848compilado.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/del2848compilado.htm). Acesso em: 2 nov. 2022.
- BRASIL. Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984. Disponível em: [https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/leis/l7210.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l7210.htm). Acesso em: 1 nov. 2022.
- CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA. Regras de Mandela: regras mínimas padrão das Nações Unidas para o tratamento de presos. Brasília: CNJ, 2016. 45 p. (Tratados Internacionais de Direitos Humanos). Disponível em: <https://bibliotecadigital.cnj.jus.br/jspui/handle/123456789/403>. Acesso em: 1 nov. 2022.
- CRUZ NETO, Otávio; MOREIRA, Marcelo Rasga. A concretização de políticas públicas em direção à prevenção da violência estrutural. *Ciência & Saúde Coletiva*, v. 4, p. 33-52, 1999.
- DEPEN. Departamento Penitenciário Nacional. 11º ciclo de Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/depen/pt-br/servicos/sisdepen/mais-informacoes/bases-de-dados>. Acesso em: 30 jun. 22.
- FERNANDES, Luís. A exclusão social como revelador das relações entre violência estrutural e violência cotidiana. *Quaderns de l'Institut Català d'Antropologia*, n. 19 (1), p. 175-186, 2014.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. Vigiar e Punir – nascimento da prisão. Tradução por Raquel Ramallete. 42 Ed. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes, 2014.
- GRECO, Rogério. Curso de Direito Penal: Parte Geral. 17 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Impetus, 2015.
- MARSON, Carla Neves; LIRA, Pablo Silva. Superando o estigma da prisão e efetivação de direitos e cidadania: Contribuições da Psicologia na inserção de egressos da justiça no mercado de trabalho. *Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública*, v. 15, n. 1, p. 138-155, 2021.
- MIGUEL, Luis Felipe. Violência e política. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, v. 30, p. 29-44, 2015.
- NETO, Homero Lamarão; TEIXEIRA, Eliana Maria de Souza Franco. Violência (estrutural) e criminalidade patrimonial. *Brazilian Journal of Development*, v. 7, n. 3, p. 25016-25033, 2021.
- OLIVEIRA, Luiz Francisco de. A utilização prática do trabalho do apenado como causa de (re)inserção social no sistema penitenciário. 2019.161f. Dissertação (Mestrado profissional e interdisciplinar em

Prestação Jurisdicional e Direitos Humanos) – Universidade Federal do Tocantins, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Prestação Jurisdicional em Direitos Humanos, Palmas, 2019.

14. RODRIGUES, Viviane Isabela. Prisões e violência estrutural: olhares críticos acerca da questão penal. Anais do III SERPINF – Seminário Regional de Políticas Públicas, Intersetorialidade e Família e I SENPINF – Seminário Nacional de Política Públicas, Intersetorial e Família: crise, conservadorismo e resistência. Porto Alegre, 2016. Disponível em: <https://ebooks.pucrs.br/edipucrs/anais/serpinf/2016/#!/trabalhos>. Acesso em: 30 jun. 2022.
15. SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang. Dignidade da Pessoa Humana e Direitos Fundamentais na Constituição de 1988. 10<sup>a</sup> Ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado Editora, 2015.
16. SCHERER, Giovane Antonio; NUNES, Cíntia Florence; SANTOS, Camila Bassôa dos. Violência estrutural e seletividade homicida das juventudes brasileiras na atual crise do capital. Anais do Encontro Internacional e Nacional de Política Social, 2017, Brasil., 2017.

*This page is intentionally left blank*



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# Saving the Future of Cameroon

*Julian Madrigal*

## ABSTRACT

Cameroon is a beautiful Central African country with lots of Natural resources. Unfortunately due to corruption in the government and lasting effects from colonialism most Cameroonians are living in poverty. The Cameroonians get caught in the same poverty traps over and over again and if no changes are being made at the micro level then these traps will keep occurring over and over again. It is very important that the children in Cameroon receive proper nutrition, healthcare, and stay in school so they can focus on their education to better their lives in the future and not have to get stuck working in harsh conditions their whole life.

*Keywords:* NA

*Classification:* DDC Code: 333.7 LCC Code: HD75.6

*Language:* English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333  
Print ISSN: 2515-5784  
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



© 2022 Julian Madrigal. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>, permitting all noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

# Saving the Future of Cameroon

Julian Madrigal

Cameroon is a beautiful Central African country with lots of Natural resources. Unfortunately due to corruption in the government and lasting effects from colonialism most Cameroonians are living in poverty. The Cameroonians get caught in the same poverty traps over and over again and if no changes are being made at the micro level then these traps will keep occurring over and over again. It is very important that the children in Cameroon receive proper nutrition, healthcare, and stay in school so they can focus on their education to better their lives in the future and not have to get stuck working in harsh conditions their whole life. I believe that the Cameroonian leaders need to look towards FBOs (Faith Based Organizations), to help improve their citizens lives and promote sustainability in the country. FBOs that are transparent in what they do and have a strong passion for helping those in poverty can end these poverty traps and give kids in Cameroon all their basic needs which is food, clean water, education, and food everyday. If the children's basic needs are meant then the families will no longer have to force their children into harsh labor because they will know at least their child is being taken care of in school now.

Cameroon is a central African country that is bordered by Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, The Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. I believe that this country is very interesting to study because it is still a relatively new country because it gained its independence from France in 1960. So far in this Country's history there have only been two presidents which are Ahmadou Ahhidjo from 1960-1982 and then Paul Biya who has been in office since Ahhidjo resigned and is now 89 years old still leading the country (Britannica).

On the HDI scale Cameroon in 2019 was 0.563 ranked and 153 out of all the countries (UNDP). This level of development would be considered medium level development but, on the IHDI scale

the number goes all the way down to 0.375. This shows how inequality in the country is a big problem and really hurts the development because this would be considered low level development when accounting for the inequality in the country. On the MPI scale Cameroon had the value of .232 in 2019.

Compared to the other developing countries that is higher than the average which is 0.105 (UNDP). In 2021 Cameroon's CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) is 27 which ranks it 144. The closer the number is to 0 the closer it is to complete corruption. For perspective Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland have the highest value which is 88. The lowest score is South Sudan with a score of 11 (Transparency International).

Cameroon was colonized by Germany in 1884. It was taken by force and was used for its natural resources and hurt the Native people badly and many died from harsh work serving the Germans in harsh conditions on the plantations (Britannica). Then in 1916 the Germans were exiled and Cameroon was taken control by the British and the French. Cameroon was split into two parts, the majority of the country by the French and then part of the east by the British. Once Cameroon got its independence from France it took control of the French part and then the next year they got independence from the eastern British side with a part of it being absorbed by the neighboring country Nigeria (Geography Now, 2015). This is why today the two official languages of the country are French and English. 80% of the population speaks French and 20% speaks English in 2 regions on the Eastern side of the country (Le Monde Afrique, 2018). The English speakers of this country have felt marginalized by the Government since they feel they do not have the same access to things like good English speaking teachers or lawyers as the French speaking citizens do with their language. This leads to a lot

of violence and unsustainability in the country between the Cameroonian army and the Anglophone separatists which has led to lots of death and violent attacks on both sides (Le monde Afrique, 2018).

The anglophone people of this country feel like they are socially excluded because the government and majority of the population is French speaking. They feel as though there is not much they could do to impact their society because they do not have the same access to opportunities as a french speaking citizen would. As we learned this term social exclusion leads to many other problems, like health problems because they are poor because they were never given a proper education which then can lead to crime because they are just trying to survive and have nothing to lose.

Women in this country also face very big problems with inequalities and social exclusion. More girls than boys in Cameroon do not go to school and because of this there is a huge gap in literacy between women and men in the country. A sad fact is in 2018 71% of girls 15 and older are literate with 82% of boys 15 and older being literate (UNESCO). These girls get pregnant at a very young age as well, before they are 18 and don't have any way to care for a baby properly. According to the NGO "Girls Not Brides" 31% of women are married before 18 and only 5% of boys are married before 18. This shows how women are not able to get their education because they are being taken advantage of at such a young age and being forced to get married. This is not ok and these girls need to be protected. There needs to be a shift in the culture and the promotion of education to women so this cycle does not continue.

There is a bad cycle in developing countries like Cameroon where kids are forced to work and not go to school in place of sick parents not being able to work, so the child works in harsh conditions as something like a miner which then leads to them getting unhealthy at a young age and then having kids and making their kids work to make money for the family because they are now too unhealthy to work. I do believe that looking at Cameroon

through this lens does help people understand the political and economic situations that go on in Cameroon better. I think when you look at these problems at a micro level it makes them feel more relatable and easier to find solutions that can change these problems for the communities because when you hear about problems of a country at a macro level and solutions at a macro level you feel the situations are too big to handle and they do not feel as personal when looking at it through that lens.

To fix these problems at the micro level of children being uneducated, not eating, and growing up poor and unhealthy there are many different ways people think of solutions. Many people think governments should do their best to help to give people the bare minimum to survive like free food, education, and healthcare. I think with the corruption of the government in Cameroon it is not realistic for the Government to come up with solutions to all of these problems. I think that the priority of this country is to have more support for the children because they are the future of the country, so in order for the country to progress the children need to be protected and educated.

Encouraging kids to go to school is a big change that needs to be made. One solution to this I find interesting is conditional cash transfers for kids going to school.

This way the families of these children can get paid for keeping their children in school and they don't have to worry about losing any money from their child not working because this can be their work. This would promote higher education in the country which leads to more people in the country being qualified for higher level jobs to get out of poverty. This will be especially good too because there's definitely a need for English speaking teachers as well in the country and with more education there will be more in the future with the english speakers being able to become teachers in the future.

This solution was done in Mexico and it showed very positive results especially with getting more girls in schools, which is exactly what Cameroon

needs. With this policy girls enrollment in secondary school increased from 67 percent to about 75 percent (Banerjee & Duflo, 2012, pg 79). Although I think there can be some problems with this solution in Cameroon. I think the conditional cash transfers would increase the number of students in school, but the school systems still won't be very strong in Cameroon, especially in the English region. The students living in poverty will still have other problems that come along with it like hunger and other health issues. People can also take advantage of this and just go to school to get money then drop out. Just because these children are going to school doesn't mean the conditions of these schools are great and they're actually getting a proper education.

This is why I believe that the best solution to promote children's development and sustainability for the future is for the leaders of Cameroon to encourage FBOs in the country. People working with FBOs have a strong passion for making changes and this can lead to a lot of positivity for the people in the country living in poverty because the FBOs can provide their basic needs. A great example of an FBO promoting sustainability at the microlevel is the organization from California that works in Uganda called the "Zozu Project". In 2014 this organization built a school in Aura, Uganda and it has been growing ever since. As of this year the school has 545 students, 39 Ugandan employees, they built 3 clean water wells, and created one full time medical clinic & pharmacy (Zozu Project). I think The Zozu Project is proof that if done right FBOs can, little by little, have a big positive impact on communities that are living in poverty and save people's lives and promote sustainable development. This FBO takes care of a lot of the problems children growing up in poverty have. Now they don't have to worry about getting sick from unsanitary water, now they have a medical clinic to take care of them if they do get sick, and this organization feeds the students too so they will not go hungry. I think Cameroon would really benefit from schools like this that take care of all the kids basic needs to keep them healthy and safe. This would help keep the girls in a safe place

as well in a school like this. They would not have to worry about any of the costs to attend school because this is all being paid for by sponsorships.

A lot of people can be skeptical of these organizations because they are very diverse with different beliefs and there's a lot of history of missionaries forcing people to convert or preaching hate towards certain groups of people. This is why I think it is important for these organizations to be as transparent as possible so people know who they are donating to and not be there to force their religion but to help everyone in need. If more organizations like that came to Cameroon the children can have all their basic needs met while promoting positive change for their futures which will help bring the country out of its poverty traps and promote more development.

Cameroon has many big problems in the country that are out of the people's control like corrupt government and conflict between the anglophone and Government. This is why I believe it is important to focus on helping with the microlevel problems in the country. Things that will immediately benefit people's lives. It's the little things that matter the most, like being able to drink clean water everyday or being able to go to school. Children should not have to be working in harsh conditions everyday to take care of their families. That is why I believe FBOs are one of the best solutions to help with all the problems citizens deal with on a day to day basis in Cameroon, especially the children.

## REFERENCES

1. Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2012). *Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. PublicAffairs.
2. Britannica. (n.d.). *Cameroon*. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 3, 2022, from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon>
3. Geography Now. (2015). *Geography Now! Cameroon! YouTube*. Retrieved June 3, 2022, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxyR8IgjzMA>.

4. Girls Not Brides. (n.d.). *Child marriage atlas*. Girls Not Brides. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/atlas/cameroon/>
5. Le Monde Afrique. (2018, November 15). *Crise anglophone : Pourquoi Le cameroun s'enflamme ?* YouTube. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EA8R1YAtWTo>
6. Transparency International. (n.d.). *2021 corruption perceptions index - explore the results*. Transparency.org. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021>
7. UNDP. (n.d.). *Human development reports*. | Human Development Reports. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CMR>
8. UNESCO. (n.d.). *Cameroon*. UNESCO UIS. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/cm>
9. Zozu Project. (n.d.). *Christian education for Children in Uganda*. Zozu Project. Retrieved June 4, 2022, from <https://www.zozuproject.org/>



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# A Psychoanalytic Study of the Mother Figure in August Strindberg's "The Father"

*Samiha B. Nessr*

## ABSTRACT

This paper is a psychoanalysis of the mother figure "Laura" in August Strindberg's play "The Father." Laura is an overprotective mother and a destructive wife who destroys her husband and might be the bane of her daughter's life. Thus, Laura is considered a mother and a female in her shadow face. This study will portray the shift of Laura's character from a mother/wife archetype in her fullness to a mother/wife archetype in her shadow face using Carl Jung's archetypal theories. "The contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly the feeling-toned complexes, as they are called; they constitute the personal and private side of psychic life. The contents of the collective unconscious... are known as archetypes." (Four Archetypes 2).

*Keywords:* NA

*Classification:* FOR Code: 170199

*Language:* English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333  
Print ISSN: 2515-5784  
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



# A Psychoanalytic Study of the Mother Figure in August Strindberg's "The Father"

Samiha B. Nessr

## ABSTRACT

*This paper is a psychoanalysis of the mother figure "Laura" in August Strindberg's play "The Father." Laura is an overprotective mother and a destructive wife who destroys her husband and might be the bane of her daughter's life. Thus, Laura is considered a mother and a female in her shadow face. This study will portray the shift of Laura's character from a mother/wife archetype in her fullness to a mother/wife archetype in her shadow face using Carl Jung's archetypal theories. "The contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly the feeling-toned complexes, as they are called; they constitute the personal and private side of psychic life. The contents of the collective unconscious... are known as archetypes." (Four Archetypes 2).*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Johan August Strindberg was born in Stockholm, Sweden. He was the third in his family. His mother died when he was young, and his relationship with his father was not good. He claims that he lived in poverty, that his mother "had rejected him in favor of his brother," and that she deprived him of love. (The Theatre of Revolt 96) Strindberg grew up and became a teacher, a librarian, and a journalist. Strindberg got married three times in his life, and each marriage ended up in failure. His wives had an impact on his writings; he presented women characters as evil and wicked women. Strindberg accused his three wives of infidelity and being control freaks, but then, he realized that "his ambivalent feelings stemmed from his own psychotic disorder." (The Theatre of Revolt 98) Strindberg divided women into two classes: "(1) the "third sex"... whom he detested for their masculinity, infidelity, competitiveness, and

unmaternal attitudes, and (2) older, more motherly women." (The Theatre of Revolt 97) August Strindberg is one of the prominent writers of modern literature and is considered the father of modern Swedish literature. His literary works are studied at universities since they carry many themes discussed nowadays. Some of his famous literary works are The Father, Miss Julie, The Dance of Death, and many more.

## II. METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this paper is the psychoanalytic methodology. Carl Jung's archetypal study is the ground this study stands on. Many other critics added relevant information on the different types of archetypes. Their material is of great use, in this study, in framing the selected female character in the chosen play. In his studies, Yung presented different male archetypes, such as the king, the magician, the warrior, and the lover. He also shows the different female archetypes, such as the mother, the trickster, the lover, and more.

### *Laura: The Mother*

The Father, written in 1887, is a play written by the Swedish writer August Strindberg. Robert Brustein declares that it is "by far the most aggressive work Strindberg ever wrote." (The Theatre of Revolt 104) The characters of the play are The Captain, the father; Laura, the mother; Bertha, the daughter; the Doctor, and many others. The Captain is a military man enjoying the control of his "women-filled" household. Throughout the first scenes of Act One, the Captain mentions that he wants his daughter, Bertha, to get an education and become a teacher since he believes that, later on, she will have a better future even if she gets married and becomes a mother - - an idea opposed by Laura,

who believes that her daughter should become an artist or have "religious training." (The Theatre of Revolt 104) This idea concerns him because he believes that women in Bertha's life destine her future. Later, Laura, after a discussion with her husband, knows that he has already planned everything for their daughter; he informs her that Bertha will leave soon. He declares that whenever a man marries a woman, he will be responsible for her and the kids and that they fall under his authority. From the first scenes, we can see that the relationship among all family members is a normal one and that every character plays their role until each character feels that their position is threatened. Declaring that the family falls under the Captain's authority, Laura becomes alarmed that she will lose control over her child, so she uses her weapon and turns everything upside down. After discussions about his parental rights, Laura wickedly poisons her husband's mind with the notion that the father cannot be sure that the child is his because the wife could be unfaithful.

Laura, first off, is an ordinary mother who dreams of her daughter being a wife just like her, and she also is an ordinary wife when it comes to her discussions with her husband about household matters. "The woman sees man as the archetypal father who begets children, who provides security – preferably also in the economic sense – for herself and her brood and lends her a social persona position in the community." (The Great Mother 36) Laura's role as a mother at the beginning was "all that is benign, all that cherishes and sustains, that fosters growth and fertility." (The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious 82) However, when Laura feels that she might lose control over her daughter's future, she feels threatened by the Captain's power. So, she transforms from a mother in her fullness to the mother in her shadow face, as Jung mentions, to a mother who may "connote anything secret, hidden, dark; the abyss, the world of the dead, anything that devours, seduces, and poisons, that is terrifying and inescapable like fate." (The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious 82) Tad Guzie and Noreen Monroe Guzie, in their article "Masculine and Feminine Archetypes: A Complement to the Psychological Types, argue

that "the dark side of the Mother shows itself in anxious nursing, smothering mothering, and a lack of trust in the other's strength." (Guzie 4) which is the same case in this play. Laura does not trust her husband's decisions and feels it is time to take the wheel.

In the scenes that follow, a doctor appears who is supposed to meet the Captain, but before he meets him, Laura insists on sitting with him and telling him that her husband is mentally ill. She tries her best to convince the Doctor that something is wrong with the Captain. She tells him about many actions the Captain does that concern her; she also tells him that the Captain is stubborn and that whenever he gets what he wants, he loses interest and begs her to decide. When the Doctor meets the Captain, he notices that Laura is right regarding decisions; he starts analyzing all the Captain's actions and links them to what Laura mentioned.

Before Act one ends, the Captain and his daughter, Bertha, have an honest conversation regarding her education, and it is clear that even Bertha has the will to study out of town. However, Bertha asks her father to talk to her mother and convince her because "she does not take notice of [her]." (The Father 20) It shows how Laura disregards her daughter's opinion - - which is evident since she already planned Bertha's future. Here, according to Jung, "the daughter leads a shadow- existence, often visibly sucked dry by her mother." (Four Archetypes 25) Later that night, the Captain and Laura face one another again, and that is when Laura shocks her husband by telling him that "no one can really know who a child's father is... you don't know if you're Bertha's father." (The Father 22) The Captain does not believe what she says, but then, she defies her husband and threatens his authority: "your authority would be at end... I'm applying your own principles." (The Father 22)

Laura declares that women are the "superior enemy" and says that she has "never been able to look at a man without feeling [she is] his superior." (The Father 23) Later in Act Two, Laura poisons the minds of everyone and convinces them that the Captain is mentally ill

and that she is innocent. And she learns that if the Captain is proven to be insane, she will be the legal guardian of everything the Captain owns, especially their daughter. So, Laura tells the Doctors that her husband got ideas that he might not be the father of his child, which the Captain starts to believe - - that that will destroy him scene by scene. The Captain is aware that Laura has been holding his mail and spreading rumors about him; he admits that "this is the onset of the madness that you've been waiting for." (The Father 33) Their battle is that of power and authority:

Captain: ... or maybe you want something else? Power over the child, perhaps, but with me kept as on the breadwinner?

Laura: Power, yes. What has this whole life-and-death struggle been about if not power?

(The Father 34)

In the following scenes, the Captain's mental state worsens and admits that she has the power and that he obeys her. Charles R. Lyons also argues that "the Captain's surrender to his wife is read as the archetypal action of the submission of the male to the female which is manifested in such mythical surrenders as that of Hercules to Omphale, Adam to Eve, and Samson to Delilah." (208) Laura, surprisingly, struck him by the news that she handed the court a copy of the paper where the Captain admits he is insane. She tells him that he has done his job and that he is no longer needed. Thus, the Captain loses his mind and throws a lamp at her.

The Final Act opens with Laura ensuring all doors are locked and all guns are empty. The Pastor, Laura's brother, joins and recognizes the evilness of his sister, but he takes her side. Laura, the Pastor, and the Doctor meet and agree on putting a straightjacket on the Captain. Bertha, later, meets her father and condemns him for his actions and flanks to her mother's side; the Captain responds: "No, you stick together, all of you against me. You've done so all along." (The Father 47)

The Captain crazily runs to get the revolver, but the nurse, the mother-like figure, calms him down and dresses him in the straightjacket - - the nurse is another mother figure in her shadow face. The Captain finally declares that everybody is his enemy and that Laura is Omphale; "In [this] play, the antagonist is a woman - more accurately, an emancipated woman - an Omphale who will not rest until she has reversed roles with her Hercules, and assumed his position of authority." (The Theatre of Revolt 103) He breaks down and cries upon the nurse's knees. After that, he stops breathing. "Robbed of his faith, broken in spirit and subdued, the Captain dies a victim of ... motherhood, which slays the man for the sake of the child." (Goldman 1914) Bertha cries: "Mother, mother!" and Laura responds: "My child! My own child!" (The Father 55)

"Just as the Great Mother can be terrible as well as good, so the Archetypal Feminine is not only a giver and protector of life but ... also hold fast and takes back; she is the goddess of life and death at once... the Feminine [symbol] contains opposites, and the world actually lives because it combines earth and heaven, night and day, death and life." (The Great Mother 45)

## REFERENCES

1. Brustein, Robert. *The Theatre of Revolt: An Approach to the Modern Drama*. Chicago: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991.
2. Goldman, Emma. "The Father - An Analysis of the Play by August Strindberg." *The Social Significance of the Modern Drama* (1914): 45 - 51.
3. Guzie, Tad & Guzie, Noreen Monroe. "Masculine and Feminine Archetypes: A Complement to the Psychological Types." *Journal of Psychological Type*, Volume 7, 1984. Pp. 3-11. CAPT, [https://www.capt.org/jpt/pdfFiles/Guzie\\_T\\_and\\_Guzie\\_N\\_Vol\\_7\\_3\\_11.pdf](https://www.capt.org/jpt/pdfFiles/Guzie_T_and_Guzie_N_Vol_7_3_11.pdf)
4. Jung, Carl Gustav. *Four Archetypes*. United Kingdom: Routledge, 2014.
5. Jung, C. G. *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*. London: Routledge, 2014
6. Lyons, Charles R. "The Archetypal Action of Male Submission in Strindberg's 'The

Father'." *University of Illinois Press* 36 (1964): 218 – 232. *Scandinavian Studies*. Web. 30/03/2020.

7. Neuman, Erich. *The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype*. United States of America: Princeton University Press, 1972.
8. Strindberg, August. *The Father*. Great Britain: Duckworth Overlook, 1899.



Scan to know paper details and  
author's profile

# The Ahom Mughal Conflicts with Special Reference to the Battle of Saraighat

*Swarup Singha*

## ABSTRACT

The conflict between Mughals and Ahoms first occurred in 1615 in the battle of Samdhara due to the imperial ambition of the Mughal emperor and to extend their territories further east beyond Bengal and also had to dominion of the largest part of Hindustan. Followed by several attacks such as the battle of Alaboi in 1669 the Battle of Saraighat in 1671 it lasted till 1682, where in the battle of Itakhuli 1682 Ahom got a decisive victory over the Mughals and with that the conflict between the Ahoms and the Mughals permanently stopped. Amongst the battles that fought between Ahoms and Mughals the battle of Saraighat of 1671 is considered as the last major attempt by the Mughals to occupy Assam.

*Keywords:* ahom-mughal conflicts, battle of saraighat, lachit barphukan, ram singh, assam.

*Classification:* DDC Code: 937.070922 LCC Code: DG277

*Language:* English



London  
Journals Press

LJP Copyright ID: 573333  
Print ISSN: 2515-5784  
Online ISSN: 2515-5792

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences

Volume 22 | Issue 20 | Compilation 1.0



# The Ahom Mughal Conflicts with Special Reference to the Battle of Saraighat

Swarup Singha

## ABSTRACT

*The conflict between Mughals and Ahoms first occurred in 1615 in the battle of Samdhara due to the imperial ambition of the Mughal emperor and to extend their territories further east beyond Bengal and also had to dominion of the largest part of Hindustan. Followed by several attacks such as the battle of Alaboi in 1669 the Battle of Saraighat in 1671 it lasted till 1682, where in the battle of Itakhuli 1682 Ahom got a decisive victory over the Mughals and with that the conflict between the Ahoms and the Mughals permanently stopped. Amongst the battles that fought between Ahoms and Mughals the battle of Saraighat of 1671 is considered as the last major attempt by the Mughals to occupy Assam. From the side of Mughal Raja Ram Singh of Amber appeared in Assam with a huge forces on the other hand Ahoms had a very limited number of soldiers; assessing this all situation the Lachit Barphukan the general of a Ahom's army and navy had adopted guerrilla tactics and his great diplomatic and military skills to defeat the mighty Mughals in the battle of Saraighat. The battle which can be said to be more a psychological war than an arms war between the massive Mughal army and the Lachit Barphukan. As a consequence of this war Ahom retake Guwahati from the Mughal and the Mughals did not even think of attacking Assam for a very year. In this paper I have tried to provide a detailed report of Ahom-Mughal conflicts with special reference to the Battle of Saraighat and Lachit Barphukan.*

**Keywords:** ahom-mughal conflicts, battle of saraighat, lachit barphukan, ram singh, assam.

**Author:** B.A. 5th Semester, Department of History Dispur College, Guwahati, Assam.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The historic naval battle the Battle of Saraighat of 1671 was fought between two great powers of history, one was the mighty Mughals and the other the extraordinary Ahoms. The battle occurred on the river Brahmaputra in a place called Saraighat, it was a war between two great powerful commanders of Ahom and Mughal. From the side of the Mughal it was led by the Rajput Raja Ram Singh of Amber and on the side of Ahom it was led by General Lachit Barphukan. Both were very intelligent in warfare, had high diplomatic knowledge and extraordinary courage. It was occurred to liberate Guwahati from the Muslim invaders the Mughals and to stop further expansion of them in Assam. Raja Ram Singh, general of Mughal knew very well that without defeating the Ahom general Lachit Barphukan they couldn't make a victory over the Ahoms. Therefore he implemented his diplomatic tricks to defeat Lachit such as one day he had sent a letter to the Ahom king Chakradhwaj Singha by an arrow allegeding Lachit Barphukan of bribery of rupees one lakhs from them. He also mentioned Lachit Barphukan was alleged to evacuate Guwahati for the Mughal and was in negotiation with the Mughal. But due to the able prime minister of Ahom Atan Burhagohain it failed. Although Atan Burhagohain succeeded partially, the disappointment of king Chakradhwaj Singha to Lachit Barphukan was not ended. So he ordered Lachit to immediately attack the Mughal without any prior discussion with him. Following the king's order Lachit Barphukan came out to openly attack on the Mughal. Therefore Ram Singh got a little success in this plan. The conflict took place at Alaboi plains around 5 August 1669 where Mughals were the victorious. Ahoms had to face a serious human loss in this battle, around 10000 Ahom soldiers died in this battle. Soon

after the battle king Chakradhwaj Singha died in April 1670.

Udayaditya Singha the brother of Chakradhwaj Singha succeeded him in 1670 CE. During Udayaditya's rule the mighty Battle of Saraighat had occurred on the river Brahmaputra. Lachit Barphukan was the general of Ahom forces at that time, who was in high fever during the battle. But instead of his ill condition he went to the battle and heavily attacked the Mughals. Ram Singh was unable to face him and had to retreat from Guwahati. Ahom successfully got victory over the Mughals. But soon after the battles Lachit Barphukan died due to his very poor health.

## II. OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER

*The main objectives of the work are:*

- To give a historical and detailed background information of the Battle of Saraighat from the treaty of Asurar Ali 1639 to the battle of Saraighat 1671.
- To give a detailed assessment of the Battle of Saraighat.
- To discuss the efforts of Lachit Barphukan in gaining victory over the Mughals in the Battle of Saraighat.
- To discuss the effects of the Battle of Saraighat.

Further to these the paper also aims to discuss the brutality of Aurangzeb to his general Ram Singh, which always lies below the line of traditional history.

## III. METHODOLOGY

To achieve the main objectives of the work both analytical and historical approaches have been used and the data collected from mainly secondary sources such as books, journals, newspaper reports, etc. The attempt made here is a careful examination and assessment of various data available at hand.

## IV. DISCUSSION

The Mughals of medieval India were very imperialistic in nature. They wanted the control of all over Hindustan in their hands. Due to this

imperialistic behaviour they either attacked the neighboring kings and provinces or compelled them to accept the Mughal dominion diplomatically. It was during the reign of Ahom king Pratap Singha the Mughals first attacked on Ahoms and got a victory in 1616. After this attack Mughals severely attacked in Assam; in some of them though they got victory for a certain period of time but ultimately they were defeated by the Ahom army.

In 1662-1663 the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb had ordered Mir Jumla the viceroy of Bengal to capture Assam because the Ahom king Jaydhwaj Singha (1648-63 CE) violated the Treaty of Asurar Ali 1639 which was signed between Ahom and Mughal. As per the treaty the western part of Assam started from Guwahati handed over to the Mughals from the Ahoms. Thus the Mughal retained the west of Barnadi on the bank of Brahmaputra and the east of Asurar Ali (a road name) in the south bank of Brahmaputra river. But Jaydhwaj Singha (1648-63 CE) had taken advantage of the Mughal's war of succession of the fifth Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1628-58 CE) threw out the Mughals from Guwahati and expelled them beyond Manas River. Apart from that Jaydhwaj Singha also demolished the territories near Dhaka and carried off Mughal subjects as war captives to Assam. As an effect of the conflict the Ahom lost Saraighat to Mir Jumla and Ramani Gabharu the royal princess of Ahom to the Mughal. A peace treaty signed between Ahom and Mughal was the Treaty of Ghilajharighat 1663. At the time when Ahom lost Saraighat Lachit the commander of Ahom army was in fight with the Nara kingdom (a kingdom situated in the east of Gargaon, the Ahom capital). Lachit successfully defeated the Nara rulers and informed that to the king Jaydhwaj Singha. King replied to Lachit, "You have won the Nara's but we lost Saraighat". Lachit was totally unaware of this, he was shocked after hearing the news. He immediately decided to retake Saraighat and to free the royal princess from Mir Jumla. He rushed towards the Mughal but when he reached Kaliabor he was informed that the princess was sent to Dhaka and Mir Jumla was no more.

Soon after the Treaty of Ghilajharighat 1663 Jaydhvaj Singha died, he was succeeded by his son Chakradhwaj Singha (1663-70 CE) in 1663 CE. After coming to Ahom throne Chakradhwaj Singha appointed Lachit to the supreme position of Ahom commander and army the Barphukan and presented him a golden handel sword called 'the Hengdang' and the customary paraphernalia for his bravery and to protect the kingdom from the enemies. It is already mentioned that Mir Jumla captured Saraighat from Jaydhvaj Singha, therefore his son Chakradhwaj Singha promised to overthrow the Mughals from Assam. In his rule the mighty battle of Saraighat was commenced. But prior to the mighty battle a very sorrowful battle the battle of Alaboi took place where around 10000 Ahom soldiers had to lost their lives.

During the reign of Chakradhwaj Singha, the conflict between Ahom and Mughal went on a new shape. Under the leadership of Ahom prime minister Atan Burhagohain the Ahoms were preparing for war, producing war materials, repairing old ramparts and building new ones. In 1667 Ahom general Lachit Barphukan recovered Guwahati from Mughals as mentioned in the inscription at north Guwahati and Fatasil Ambari. Due to its topography Guwahati was found very suitable for defensive warfare and became the headquarter of the Barphukan.

In December 1667 the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb received the news of the retake of Guwahati by the Ahoms. Immediately after receiving it Aurangzeb dispatched a strong army to re-establish Mughal prestige in the North East Frontier specially in Assam. He appointed Raja Ram Singh of Amber who was a son of Mirza Raja Jai Singh. Aurangzeb selected Raja Ram Singh partly on account of his able generalship and partly as a punishment to him. Because Raja Ram Singh was alleged connivance at the escape of Shivaji and the Shikh Guru Teg Bahadur from his custody. The odium go which Ram Singh had been subjected by the deprivation of his rank and also the privilege of appearing at court so mentioned Jai Singh the princely Kuchwah of Amber, who has mentioned such distinguished service to the Mughals, and whose warlike frame

resounded from Kandahar to Bengal and from Bengal to the Maratha country that he could not long survive his sons humiliation and disgrace. Moreover Aurangzeb kept Krishna Singh, the son of Ram Singh in his custody before Ram Singh's expedition to Assam. Therefore Ram Singh came to Assam with a heavy heart.

Ram Singh came to Assam with a huge army, his army consisted of 21 Rajput chiefs, 4000 troopers in his own pay, 1500 gentle-men-troopers or Ahadis and 500 artilleryman and with reinforcement from Bengal his total army swelled upto 30000 infantry, 18000 Turkish cavalry, and 1500 archers, with a very high skilled commanders. He reached frontier garrison Rangamati in February 1669. Getting information of this all the Assamese commanders met at Guwahati and offered prayer to the temple of Kamakhya, they prayed, "Oh mother eat up the foreigners and protect all our people ". Lachit the Barphukan issued an order that every man must do his duty by holding fast to his charge, and if any remission was detected on the part of any commander or soldier his head would be taken off at once, and the possibility of royal intervention would come up afterwards. But Lachit Barphukan had realised that postponement of open encounter would enable him to bring his preparations to perforation in the light of enemy's superior strength. But Ram Singh was also a very farsighted person, he implemented his diplomatic skills here to defeat Lachit. Ram Singh knew very well that it would not be possible for them to occupy Guwahati without defeating Lachit Barphukan. Therefore one day he had sent a letter to Ahom camp by an arrow where he had mentioned, "Oh Barphukan , yesterday you accepted from us a reward of one lakh rupees and you signed an agreement to desist from fighting against us. But it appears you have not yet abandoned your war-carry. May I know the reason?" The letter was passed to Ahom king Chakradhwaj Singha and the king believed the letter therefore for some period of time Lachit was in high observation. But Atan Burhagohain the prime minister of Ahom dispelled the suspiciousness of Chakradhwaj Singha.

In the meantime Ram Singh again sent a letter to the Barphukan to fight in a duel battle to the king Chakradhwaj Singha in the presence of the two hostile armies. King Chakradhwaj Singha could not hold his patience and ordered Lachit Barphukan to immediately fight with Ram Singh or to put on girl's garments and dress. Though Lachit knew it well that that was a trick by Ram Singh he followed the king's order; a bloody battle between Lachit Barphukan and Ram Singh happened at Alaboi plains in 1669 where Ahom was defeated by the Mughals. Around 10000 Assamese soldiers died in that battle. At that Chakradhwaj Singha was ill and when he heard his army lost in the battle of Alaboi king's condition fell down and in 1670 Chakradhwaj Singha died.

Udayaditya Singha succeeded Chakradhwaj Singha in 1670. In his rule the mighty Battle of Saraighat had occurred. After the battle of Alaboi there were several conversations between Lachit Barphukan and Ram Singh for peace amongst them but that were not fruitful. In the meantime emperor Aurangzeb had sent a message to Ram Singh, "I have sent Ram Singh to fight with Assam not to make friends with the people there". Replied to that Ram Singh replied, "I have not refrained from fighting; but it has proven useless as there are no fields, fighting by spears, shields and guns in an impossible affair. The Assamese have erected an impenetrable wall of defense on both the banks. There is a possibility of one naval fight only". Apart from that Aurangzeb in Delhi was harassing Ram Singh's son Krishna Singh, Aurangzeb forced Krishna Singh to fight with tiger; it was also reported that Aurangzeb had proposed to convert Krishna Singh into Islam. Aurangzeb did these so that Ram Singh continued his fight with the Ahom.

Already Ram Singh had realised that negotiation with the Ahoms had been futile and ineffective and on the other way the Aurangzeb had lost his patience to occupy Guwahati. To satisfy Aurangzeb Ram Singh decided to resolve the issue by resuming offensive operations. Moreover he got information about the illness of Lachit Barphukan. He considered this as the ideal situation to enter Guwahati. He sent five Mughal

captains including two Firingis fired their guns and shot their arrows from boats at Andharubali. Ram Singh succeeded in it, entering on the north bank of Guwahati occupied Andharubali. Assamese soldiers pursuing the Mughal fleet moored their boats at Aswakranta.

Lachit Barphukan was very ill at that time and being deprived of his personal command the Ahom did not entertain much hope of success. Some Ahom soldiers loaded their boats to retreat. The commander of Aswakranta asked the Lachit Barphukan to come to rescue his men who were deserting their ranks. Lachit Barphukan was watching all the situation from his sick bed at his archery store. He witnessed the advance of the Mughal fleet from Juria towards Aswakranta. At that time Lachit was too weak to move. But to protect his country from the Muslim invaders he went from his bed and led the entire Ahom army. But when he proposed to rush upon the enemy the royal astrologer Achyutananda Doloi dissuaded Lachit from attack as according to him the time was not auspicious for such an action. This was the most critical condition for Lachit Barphukan because there was one side the Ahom army was losing their confidences and on the other side the astrologer warned him to fight. Also, it was the order of the Majesty to obey the astrologer's findings and calculations. Lachit was losing his endurance. A few hours later the astrologer was allowed to attack. Lachit Barphukan immediately came down the steps of the gate-house being supported by one Nadai of Kharagi, and boarded his boat accompanied by six war vassals.

A rumour went out that Lachit Barphukan dealt with the oarsmen produced consternation and terror in the hearths of his army. The rumour went out that the general began to kill his own man indiscriminately with his own hands, and to throw them into water. It spread like wildfire amongst the Barphukan's army. Having been exhausted at all, Lachit Barphukan shouted at the high pitch of his voice, "let the Mughals capture me alive, and let my people go home in peace". Fired volleys from his guns and rushed towards the enemy with seven boats. The Assamese fleet who were on the bank of the river saw that

Barphukan was approaching the enemy. They got inspired and went with him with their boats. The Ahom soldiers discharged their gun, arrows, from the bank as well as from the boats. A brutal battle fought between the two groups. The greater Brahmaputra river between Kamakhya, Itakhuli and Aswakranta filled with boats and men struggling to escape drowning. The Ahoms at the command of Lachit Barphukan erected an improvised bridge across the river Brahmaputra by placing one boat after another over the whole breadth of the River. The Assamese were fighting for life and liberty with patriotism in heart. There were heavy casualties of Mughals, some who survived were clashed down at Pandu. Lachit intended to chase them still further but the astrologer Achyutananda Doloi dissuaded him and with that it was a decisive victory of the Ahom against such a huge Mughals.

## V. CONCLUSION

Lachit Barphukan who was the general of Ahom commander integrated his all armies in the Battle of Saraighat 1671 brilliantly. Though he was ill, then also he moved to the battle and successfully defeated the Mughals. Ram Singh who was the Mughal General also praised Lachit and the Assamese soldiers as like this, "Every Assamese soldier is expert in rowing boats, in shooting arrows, in digging trenches, and in wielding guns and cannons. I have not seen such a specimen of versatility in any part of India".

The news of Assamese victory over the Mughals was promptly communicated to king Udayaditya Singha at Gargaon. He dispatched valuable gifts and presents to all the victorious commanders. But the joy of victory was marred by the death of the general Lachit Barphukan. Soon after the Battle of Saraighat Lachit Barphukan died due to his poor health. For his indomitable courage and true patriotism he fought with the Mughals and although he was ill. The Mughals who were defeated in the Battle of Saraighat didn't not attack on Assam as heavily as the Battle of Saraighat.

## REFERENCES

1. Battle of Alaboi: Lost in pages of history. (2021, August 5). PressReader. <https://www.pressreader.com/india/the-assam-tribune/20210805/281681142928523>
2. Bhuyan, S. K. (1935). LACHIT BARPHUDAN: A great Assamese Contemporary of Shivaji Maharaja, and the successful antagonist of the Mogul General Raja Ram Singha of Amber. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1, 2–3. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44202311>
3. Bhuyan, S. K. (1947). Lachit Barphukan and His Times: A History of the Assam-Mogul Conflicts of the Period 1667 to 1671 A. D. Government of Assam in the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies.
4. Das, D. (2011b). Lachit Barphukan (684) (1st ed.). Amar Chitra Katha Pvt. Ltd.
5. Hussain, M. (1987). Muslims of the Indian state of Assam: a note. Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal, 8(2), 397–402. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02666958708716047>
6. Khan, S. M. (2022). Maasir-I-Alamgiri: A History of the Emperor Aurangzeb. The Asiatic Society.
7. Konwar, P. (2019). Mir Jumla's Invasion of Assam (1662–63), War Experience of a Dutch Sailor Heiden and Translator Glanius. Indian Historical Review, 46(1), 41–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0376983619856149>
8. Llc, B. (n.d.). History of Assam: Ahom-Mughal Conflicts, Ahom Dynasty, Srimanta Sankardeva, Ledo Road, Battle of Saraighat, Koch Bihar, Ahom Kingdom, Ka. Books LLC.
9. Neog, M. (1983). Lachit Barphukan, the Victor of the Battle of Saraighat. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
10. Rashmi Sarmah. (2008). Lachit Barphukan of Assam – the Hero of Saraighat Battle. Ishani, 2(6).
11. Sen, D. (1979). A FEW ASPECTS OF THE AHOM MILITARY SYSTEM. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 40, 552–556. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44141994>

12. Sethi, R. (2017). The Last Battle of Saraighat [Hardcover] [Nov 23, 2017] Rajat Sethi (2017th ed.). India Viking.