The African Unions Security Architecture: Operational Mandate and Challenges for Actualisation of the Responsibility to Protect

I. INTRODUCTION

The AU was founded in May 2001, and launched in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa. The Constitutive Act (Kristiana, 2005: 4) of the African Union and its Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, laid a new emphasis on building a continental security regime capable of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. In addition to this security framework, the principles underlying the AU dynamic and emerging peace and security agenda rests on the idea of a protectionist mechanism, as stipulated in the ICISS report, The Responsibility to Protect. The Responsibility to Protect clearly specifies the provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of member states through military force, if necessary, to protect vulnerable populations from the infraction of human rights and genocide (Kristiana, 2005: 4). The creation of the African Union was also based on the realisation by African leaders that the OAU had achieved its hitherto stated objectives of decolonisation, eradicating apartheid regimes and maintaining the colonially inherited artificial boundaries after independence, and the ideological struggle, in which Africans found themselves entrapped, which had resulted in a shift of attention in respect to the challenges of peace, development and security facing the African states (Aning, 2016: 209).

The transformation from the OAU into the African Union was further triggered by the expectation among the African leaders that the new international institution (AU) would have the strength and the capacity to deal with the security dilemma facing the continent (Aning, 2016: 209). Meanwhile, the shift in international thinking and debates concerning military intervention after the Kosovo conflict of 1999, the Somalian war of 1993 and the Rwandan genocide of 1993-1994 led for the first time to the endorsement of the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), in 2005 (Omorogbe, 2012: 143). The emerging African Union's responsibility to protectionist regime, as would be discussed in this paper, underscores the AU commitment to undertaking a robust military intervention towards the prevention, and resolution of conflicts on the continent of Africa. Therefore, the paper examines the AU Constitutive Act and its emerging security architecture at the level of the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Also, the paper delves into the role of the Peace and Security Council in selected conflict zones (Burundi and Darfur) in Africa. Finally, the paper considers the challenges militating against the AU normative mandate to peace initiatives and security management in Africa.

II. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

2.1 Protection

This article employs The Principle of Responsibility to Protect to conceptualise the AU commitment and mandate to intervene in conflict situation in Africa. The concept of "protection" informs the use of military intervention to protect the vulnerable population, or non-combatant during armed conflicts. This paper notes that the AU intervention in Burundi and Darfur points to a constituted legal enforcement purpose for the protection of civilians. However, the first AU humanitarian protection (Peacekeeping Operation) on African continent was deployed to Burundi in 2003-2004 to facilitate the implementation of various cease-fire agreements that were signed by the rebels. The AU took the Burundi's conflict upon itself and deployed troops because the condition was not conducive for the UN to deploy its troops. The African Union's peacekeeping mission in Burundi were made up of Ethiopian, Mozambican, and South African soldiers that facilitated disarmament and demobilization exercises of about 20,000 ex-combatants, and thus prepared the ground for the UN which later took over the peacekeeping mission in June 2004 (Abdellaoui, 2010: 28). In Sudan, the African Union deployed its troops in Darfur region in 2004. The AU mission in Darfur has been the biggest peacekeeping operation since its inception in 2002. As the conflict expanded, the UN was called to intervene, though was rejected by the Sudanese government. Ultimately, the UN and the AU collaborated to form the Hybrid force UNAMID (United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur), which later failed despite the huge resources to mount the operation (Abdellaoui, 2010: 28). However, this paper may still be a useful inquiry as much as it investigates the AU normative principle of "responsibility to protect" and the strategies it employs, as well the challenges it faces in building an effective security architecture in sub-Saharan Africa.

III. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)

The most fundamental developments in global politics in last decade has been a significant focus that state sovereignty comes with responsibilities – a theoretical ideal that resonates on domestic and international – to protect people threatened by devastating and mass atrocity (Thakur and Maley, 2015: 1). However, the global call and responsibility to protect came into limelight on 16 September 2005 when the United Nations General Assembly took a historical resolution to end crimes against humanity. At this time, the world leaders took a collective decision to end turmoil and crimes perpetrated against humanity (Cooper and Kohler, 2009: 1). The resolution reached in the meeting affirmed, "Each individual State has the responsibility to protects its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" (Glanville, 2014: 1). In 2007, the International Court of Justice ratified the resolution that, all states shall have legal obligation within the existing law, to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleaning, and crimes against humanity (Bellamy and Dunne, 2016: 3).

international society to stop or respond to complicity to mass killings underscored a rethinking of traditional definition of state sovereignty (Tutu and Havel, 2012: xxv). As argued by Tutu and Havel (2012: xxvi), responsibility to protect may be described as the responsibility of the international society or sovereign's body to protect its population from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The debates on the responsibility to protect has gained prominent since the 2005 World Summit, which emphasises the requisite obligation of the international community to protecting population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Cunliffe, 2011: 1). The concept of responsibility to protect came into international focus, in 2001 by the correspondent report of the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICIS). The report was initiated and sponsored by the Canadian government as a step towards reviewing the long-awaited disputed humanitarian intervention by individual state or international community (Besada; Goetz, and Werner, 2010: 2). Following the release of the report by the ICIS, the African Heads of state held a World Summit, in 2005 to discuss the R2P. The summit rests squarely on three major pillars. These pillars describe the condition and criteria by which an intervention may be carried out in the case of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They include the following:

• The of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, an responsibility d crimes against humanity, and from their incitements.

• The commitment of the international community in meeting up these obligations; and

• The responsibility of the member states to respond in a timely and decisive manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection (Tutu and Havel, 2012: xxvi).

In response to the above, according to Article 2(4) of the UN security system, no State or States shall be allowed to use military force for humanitarian purpose unless such intervention has been expressly and explicitly granted or authorised by the UN Security Council (Kuwali, 2011:149). Consequently, in March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) launched a military intervention against the government of former Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the Albania people Kosovo. NATO's intervention in Kosovo was declared illegal. It was morally justified for humanitarian purpose but lacked the international legitimacy and approval of the UN Security Council (Badescu, 2011: 1).

IV. THE AFRICAN UNION OPERATIONAL MANDATE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The AU has a functional legal framework otherwise known as the Constitutive Act of the AU, established in July 2000, by the OAU Assembly of African Heads of states at its Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session (Packer and Rukare, 2002: 371). According to Ben Kioko, one of the central objectives for co-operation among the African States under the new legal instrument of the African Union was to promote respect for human rights, condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government and democratic governance (Kioko, 2003: 807). The transformation of the OAU into the African Union was a turning point and a shift from a governing principle of non-intervention, thus empowering the Union the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (The Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000), whereas Articles II and III of the OAU placed a premium on sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in member states' internal affairs (Frankel, 2008: 232). The Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) Act includes important provisions (The Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000). First, Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of the AU aims to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent" (The Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000: Art. 3f). The AU peacekeeping mandate is sacrosanct as was enshrined in Article 4(h) that "the Union shall have the right to intervene in a Member State according to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity" (The Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000).

In May 2004, the AU launched the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Williams, 2009: 603). The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council was adopted in 2004 by the Assembly of the AU at its First Ordinary Session for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution and specified the operational goal and objectives of the AU Peace and Security Council (Bernan Press, 2004: 236). As argued by Williams (2009: 604), the PSC was not an embodiment of the African Union Constitutive Act (AUCA), but rather adopted in Lomé, Togo in July 2001. It metamorphosed out of ad hoc efforts to "reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, which had been adopted by the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1993" (Williams, 2009: 604). The AUPSC was acknowledged to have joined the ranks of the Economic Community of West African States Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (ECOWAS Mechanism) and the South African Development Community Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC Organ) as one of three African institutional security mechanisms created to prevent and manage conflict through military intervention on the African continent (Levitt, 2003: 110).

V. THE PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND R2P

The most powerful body of the AU is the Peace and Security Council. It has the capacity to project the will and action of the Union (Aning, 2011: 31). The PSC represents the 'Board of Directors' of the AU, with specific reference to its collective security apparatus, while the chairperson of the AU Commission serves as the chief executive officer (CEO) (Aning, 2011: 31). The power and functions of the PSCAU are highlighted in Article

7 of its Protocol to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts; to undertake and carry out peace-building functions; authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support operations; lay down general guidelines and rules governing the operational efficiency of the Union; implement the common defence policy action of the Union; ensure the implementation of the AU's convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions to combat international terrorism; approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, in reference to a decision made by the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act, and support and aid humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict or major natural disasters (African Union, 2000).

The new legal framework has three main organs; the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force (Levitt, 2003: 120). According to Article 11(3) of the PSCAU, the Panel of the Wise "advises the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission about the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa" (African Union, 2002). It is made up of five eminent African personalities of impeccable character who have made "outstanding contributions and success to the cause of peace, security, and development in Africa" (African Union, 2002). Article 12 of the Peace and Security Council Protocol provides for the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts (African Union, 2002). The Commission works and collaborates with the United Nations, its agencies and other relevant international organisations to facilitate the effective implementation of the Early Warning System (African Union, 2002). It has eight Regional Mechanisms which are considered to be part of the operational structure of the CEWS, including the "Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the East African

Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD)". (Tiruneh, 2009:3-4). The eight Regional Mechanisms work at different regional levels. It is argued that the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can be considered the most effective and integral to the overall security architecture of the Union (Cilliers, 2005: 9).

Pursuant to the Article 4(h) and (J) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Peace and Security Council of the AU is responsible for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) for "observation and monitoring missions" (African Union, 2002). The Peace and Security Council of the African Union derives its authority from article 20 of the African Union Constitutive Act (as codified by article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act 2003), and pursuant to article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (African Union, 2002). The PSCAU stands as a key decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as serving as "collective security and early-warning system to aid timely and efficient response to crisis and conflict situations in Africa". (African Union, 2002). Central to the norms and objectives of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, article 22 of the PSC thus replaced the Cairo Declaration and the decisions of the OAU relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (MCPMR) in Africa (African Union, 2002). Article 3 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PREPSCAU) stated that the objectives of the Peace and Security Council should be to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa, prevent and anticipate conflicts; promote and implement post-conflict reconstruction activities; coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating terrorism; develop a common defence policy for the Union; promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, and protect human rights and respect for the sanctity of human life (African Union, 2002).

The statutory composition of the AUPSC is not unique. Its composition and structure were formed in line with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly on issues concerning membership, core function, and the electoral process (Levitt, 2003: 116). This is because most of the AU staff relied on the UNSC staff and experts during the drafting process of the Protocol (Levitt, 2003: 116). Perhaps it can be argued that central to the principle of democratic representation, the AUPSC membership is more democratic than the UNSC permanent membership, as it is composed of fifteen Members, elected by equal rights, that serve by two and three-year terms (African Union, 2002).

In addition to the democratic principle of the AUPSC, membership election is also based on "the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation" (African Union, 2002). while the representation and election of members into the AUPSC shall be based on the criteria of "the capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership". "willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives", "contribution to the Peace Fund and/or Special Fund created for specific purpose," respect for the norms of democratic governance as stipulated by the Lomé Declaration, and commitment to the financial obligations of the AU (African Union, 2002). The UN Security Council remains the only jurisdictional and appropriate international organisation which can endorse military intervention for humanitarian purposes as may be requested for approval by such regional or sub-regional organisations (AU, ECOWAS, and SADC) in respect to the UN Chapter VII (African Standby Force, 2006). In respect to the Constitutive Act of the AU and the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol, however, the right of the AU to military intervention in a member state is governed by specific norms. These norms place importance on sovereignty but also the responsibility of the Union to conduct a military intervention for humanitarian purposes in member states; this tension poses serious ambiguities in respect to both the constitutive act and the protocol. For example, Article 4 specifies the legal mandate and right of the AU to intervene through military force. In February 2003, pursuant to Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the assembly of the AU heads of states and government amended Article 4(h) of the protocol which extends the right of the Union to military intervention in member states in conditions of "grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (African Union, 2002).

As was rightly stressed in the Charter of the United Nations, however, article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU explicitly derived its source from the normative principle of the responsibility to protect. The right of the AU to intervention in conflicts lies on the power and approval of the UN Security Council (Kuwali and Viljoen, 2014: 1). Although the intervention of the AU after the 2007-2008 electoral crisis in Kenya, the political impasse in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya, the deadly conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur in Sudan, Northern Mali and Somalia, have made the implementation of Article 4(h) of the AU to be brought to the intellectual focus (Kuwali and Viljoen, 2014: 3).

Furthermore, the right to intervention under Article 4 (h) of the AU overshadows the place of sovereignty of the States over the citizens. The normative principle draws a sharp disparity to, the principle of State sovereignty and non-intervention, the very fundamental clause of the defunct Organisation of African Unity. All the AU member States agreed that sovereignty is not a licence to perpetrate illegalities, but a responsibility to protect citizens in the time of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanities. Central to the responsibility to protect, Article 4(h) of the AU affirms the treaty-based or statutory intervention by the AU to prevent or stop genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanities (Kuwali, 2014: 13).

Based on this normative act, with respect to the legal mandate and the right of the AU governing military intervention, it means that both the AU Constitutive Act and the security protocol have unparalleled powers to override the sovereignty of a state to protect a vulnerable population and to restore peace and security. In respect to democratic governance and human rights, the AU Constitutive Act outlines the norms to address unconstitutional change of government and "respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance" (African Union, 2002). Dan Kuwali (2014: 25) has noted that the main purpose of Article 4 (h) intervention is not to fight against the targeted State, but to deter and stop genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Africa.

Similarly, in 2007, the AU adopted a more comprehensive framework known as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance to strengthening and promoting democratic governance in Africa. The Charter specifically broadened the scope and definitions of unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government and forms of sanctions that may apply to states or individuals. The Charter notes that unconstitutional changes of governments are mostly responsible for insecurity and conflicts in Africa (African Union, 2007). According to Article 5, "state parties shall recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people" (African Union, 2007). Also, Article 10 affirms that "state parties shall entrench the principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the political organization of the State" (African Union, 2002).

Nevertheless, the capacity of the AU and its member states to successfully initiate the R2P against targeted state depends largely on and measured by the ability of the Peace and Security Council of the AU to mobilise efficient and rapid reactions forces capable of diffusing and mitigating violence against vulnerable population. For this purpose, the African Standby Force is expected to offer rapid response, tactical, strategical and logistical advantages of African security architecture (Dallaire, 2010: xxi). Unfortunately, the ASF has been hampered by its inability to respond fully without depending on external support in the areas of transportation and training (Dallaire, 2010: xxi). Therefore, there is need for the African Union to be independent and strengthened to enable it carry out its mandate, particularly as stipulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.

The African Union Constitutive Act has a robust and sophisticated "responsibility to protect" three years before the UN adopted it as a global responsibility, although has some challenges in implementing this successfully. It has been argued that Africa has both recorded progress and retreats in normative and practical human rights advancement. Although the principle of the responsibility to protect has been embedded into the African Union security architecture of "non-indifference," but the problem lies on how these two negative normative frameworks are to be implemented (Mills, 2015: 4). Record shows that thirty-four African states are members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), but the AU has seldomly found accusing the IICC of being biased against Africa and advocated for withdrawal of all allegations and cases levelled against African states (Mills, 2015: 4).

For example, in respect to the AU commitment to the enforcement of, and compliance with human rights in Africa, the case in Darfur, is a good example. The International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) noted that the African Heads of State and Government at the conference of the African Union, held in Sirte on 3 July 2009, took a unanimous decision to prevent the arrest of President al-Bashir who has been accused of a war crime by the ICC (Worldwide Movements for Human Rights, 2009). The African Union had accused the International Criminal Court (ICC) of interfering in the peace efforts in the region, as well as unfairly targeting African leaders (BBC, 2013) within the ambit of the ICC's watch. In addition, Nigeria, as an advocate of peace efforts in Africa, especially in Darfur, also hosted al-Bashir in 2013 during the African Union World Summit in Abuja after the AU decision in 2009 that no member state should enforce any sanctions issued by the ICC against the Government of Sudan (BBC, 2013). Ultimately, if

Nigeria, an African regional power, and other AU members had failed to ensure compliance to arrest al-Bashir by the ICC during his visit to Nigeria, then it is valid to assert that the AU has compromised and failed in its commitment to enforce the AU Constitutive Act (Article 4), which is premised on the principle of the responsibility to protect the people of Sudan from the Sudanese government's act of crimes against humanities.

Linked to the above, is the question of sovereignty, which remains sacrosanct as the ultimate symbol of state power to a legitimate order. Mills (2015: 5) has noted that polarisation among Africa leaders, coupled with reversion and adherence to Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, serves as the major challenge against full realisation of human rights protection in Africa. African states tend to aspire for greater and fair participation in global politics, advocating, for example, more representative seats in the UN Security Council, and even a more robust collaboration and partnership between the AU and the UN (Mills, 2015: 5), but the will power and political will to implement the responsibility to protect have always be the challenges.

The problem of division among African states or leaders has further historical reference point on the principle of responsibility to protect by the AU. For example, on 10 March 2011, South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon had initially voted for a "no fly zone" over Libya to protect Libyan population against the repressive regime of Muhamad Ghadaffy. South Africa under Jacob Zuma later renounced its decision, citing the view that NATO overstepped the bounds of the relevant UN resolution (Khadiagala and Nganje, 2016: 1572). Zuma's back-pedalling on the Libya crisis raised doubts about policy consistency regarding Pretoria's commitment to the AU's Constitutive Act on peace and security architecture in Africa (Khadiagala and Nganje, 2016: 1572). The inconsistency of Pretoria in respect to regional democracy, peace and security is what Khadiagala and Nganje describe as "South Africa squandered the opportunity provided by the Arab Spring to reassert its leadership on peace, security and democracy promotion, particularly since Libya and most of North Africa had for a long time remained strongholds of authoritarianism in Africa" (Khadiagala and Nganje, 2016: 1572). It may however be valid to assert that South Africa, which has a greater influence in the Southern African region and the AU, has failed and contradicted the collective decision of the African Union in Libya's political crisis. Then, one could affirm that the dictum of "African responsibility to protect" may be described as a "mere illusion of collective and rhetoric agenda."

On the other hand, an advancement in regional security framework is credited to the AU approach in dealing with African conflicts. For those that berated the African Union's approach to protecting the vulnerable population during genocidal act, war crimes and crimes against humanities, records about the contribution and supply of troops to the United Nations peacekeeping missions underline the active involvement and contribution of the African states in peace operation (Dallaire, 2010: xxi). Evidently, as of 2008, three out of 10 contributing countries that supplied troops to the UN peacekeeping operations are African countries. Nigeria ranked fourth, Ghana fifth and Kenya ninth, and South Africa tenth. These figures underscored the responsiveness and willingness of the African states to the issues of peacekeeping missions in Africa. The deployment of 700 troops to the African Union Mission in Burundi in 2003 to monitor the deadly security situation there, underlined the ability of the AU to enforce the R2P to bring peace to the African continent (Dallaire, 2010: xxi). It has been argued that except for Europe, Africa has developed, notably in peacekeeping enforcement, although with varying degrees of successes. However, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among other troubled states on the continent of Africa, offered a critical illustration on the successes and failures of the AU in peacekeeping (Mills, 2015: 5). A few of these states in this paper include Darfur in Sudan, Burundi and Kenya.

VI. THE AFRICAN UNION FIRST PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN BURUNDI - A LITMUS TEST OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) DOCTRINE

A critical analysis of the African Union's role in conflict management in Burundi demonstrates the importance the AU lays on the responsibility to protect civilian population in conflict zones. Burundi is a small country, with a total population numbering over 8 million. About 400,000 killed and roughly 800,000 fled the country, some were internally displaced (Howard, 2011: 5). Burundi, located on the Great Lakes Region, has encountered series of wars since the period of its independence on 1 July 1962. Of these wars, two major conflicts have resulted in its greatest political and social upheaval. Historically, in April 1972, a group of rebels of southern origin, hiding under the springboard of Tanzania, attacked the country (Burundi) via the province of Bururi, where Tutsis were vehemently slaughtered, which was signaled by strong repressive reaction of the Burundian Army took the form of equal reprisals against Hutu members of the population, including the members of the elite in the country (Boshoff; Very and Rautenbach, 2010: 3).

The Burundi civil was significant in the innovative long-term leadership initiative training and decision-making that focus on the leaders across all the society, designed to develop and build strong foundation that sustains peace that enables a country to effectively tackle the arrays of challenges of post conflict reconstruction in Africa (Henri; Boshoff and Rautenbach, 2010: 3). The first round of peace negotiations through the AU mission in Africa took place in Arusha, Burundi from 15 to 21 June 1998, with seventeen parties on attendance: the government of Burundi, the National Assembly, Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU- the Burundian Democratic Front), Union pour le Progrês Nation (UPRONA-Union National Progress), Centre National de la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD- National Centre for Defense of Democracy), Parti pour Réconciliation Nationale (PARENA- Party for national Reconciliation), the Parti Libéral (PL-

Liberal Party), Parti Indêpendant des Travailleurs (Independent Workers' Party), Parti Social-démocrate (PSD- Social Democratic Party), Alliance Burundo-africaine pour le Salut (ABASA-Burundi-African Salvation Alliance). The parties to the peace negotiation were both led by Julius K. Nyerere (Crisis Group, 1998).

The Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the African Union (AU) convened its 91 ${}^{st}$ Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 2 April 2003, in a bid to review its readiness for the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The meeting took place under the chairmanship of Ambassador Basa Sangqu, Permanent Representative of South Africa (SA) to the AU. Under the peace building arrangement by the AU in Burundi, the AU Commission on the situation in Burundi ordered the deployment of an AMIB for an initial period of one year. The deployment of the AMIB was subject to renewal by the Central Organ, pending deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to be mandated by the UN Security Council, and as agreed by both the UN and AU (Henri, Boshoff and Rautenbach, 2010: 3).

In 2003, the AU intervened in Burundi's war to maintain peace and the formation of strong UN peace operations. To restore peace and orderliness in Burundi, an African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was established. The Mission represented the AU first peace enforcement entirely initiated, planned and carried out by its members, and the AMIB was mandated to build peace in dynamic situation in Burundi. In reference to the AU Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h), (j), the AMIB upholds a responsibility to protect. The AMIB mandate was to protect politicians returning to take active position in the transitional government. Other peace building tasks involved by the AU in Burundi was premised on opening secure demobilization centers and helping the Mission to reabsorb former militia members back into the society. The peace building tasks by the AMIB led to the establishment of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and creating the condition conducive for the internal displaced persons and refugees across the entire eight Burundian provinces, coupled with three refugee camps in Tanzania, and to return to their respective homes (Henri; Boshoff, & Rautenbach, 2010: 3).

Also, as part of the tasks and mandate of the AU peace building efforts in Burundi, it established a conducive platform for the United Nations peace operations to settle in Burundi and decimated the insurgencies. Initially, the UN was reluctant to engage in a situation in which there existed the impending reversion into conflict. AMIB role was focused in creating atmosphere conducive through which peace, albeit a fragile one could be established in the country. Moreover, throughout the AMIB operation, it has succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile condition, and later in 2004, the UN evaluation team reiterated that the country was peaceful to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in the country (Henri; Boshoff, & Rautenbach, 2010: 3).

However, despite the successful peacekeeping operations by the AMIB, a host of challenges remained in Burundi. As the UN Peace Mission was planning to take over from the AMIB, it faced the challenge of reintegration of internally displaced person (IDPs) and refugees and how the returnees would have access to land to ensure their livelihood. By 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi. Also, by 1 June 2004, Kofi Annan, former UN secretary-general, appointed a special representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head the commission. In the same vein, the entire troops of the AMIB were absorbed into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Between 2006 and 2010, military personnel in Burundi have been demobilized, but lacked economic opportunities, which posed a potential security threat in Burundi (Nhlapo, cited in Murithi, 2007: 76).

Admittedly, the African Union Mission in Burundi has clearly demonstrated a self-inward-looking approach, that obviously rested on the ability of the institutional and internal mechanisms in peacekeeping operation in Burundi. The commission serves as a litmus-test and a testing ground where the AU applied for the first-time peace and security operationalization in conflict situations in Africa. Also, the commission was able to restore order in Burundi before the interception of the UN Peace Operations. The next section discussed the AU's mission in Darfur region.

VII. THE AFRICAN UNION'S MISSION IN SUDAN, DARFUR REGION: EXPERIMENTING R2P

Sudan is one of the African countries that have experienced devastating civil wars in history, although the country has recently experienced a political impasse, which had resulted into a power sharing between the opposition and the Supreme Military transitional government, after Al Bashir, the former dictator was ousted from power. Darfur is a region in Southwestern Sudan. The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two militia groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan. During the upsurge of this great calamity in Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) alleged that the government of Sudan discriminated against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur. The crisis has claimed roughly 300,000 lives, with an estimated figure of 1.9 million people being displaced and dispersed across neighbouring countries (Ted, 2005). For example, Chad had hosted roughly 110,000 refugees from Darfur (IRIN, cited in Murithi, 2007: 6). Despite the evidence and calls for intervention by the International Crisis Groups (ICG), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), Nick Krist of the New York Times and Juan Mendez, then UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the UN failed to stop the genocide in Darfur (Nick, 2006). It is evident that if the international community is not ready and willing to intervene in African conflicts, it could be argued that Africa must be ready to devise a self and inward-looking approach, otherwise called "African solution to African problems".

The foremost international actor in Darfur has been the African Union (AU). Darfur remained a testing ground for the fledging organization in history. When the degree and levels of the catastrophe became too unbearable to ignore, in 2004, the AU created a monitoring mission in Darfur, comprising 60 monitors and 300 troops to protect Darfurians (Nick, 2006) from the ravaging deadly conflicts orchestrated by the rebels. The AU became actively involved within the scope of a Cease-Fire negotiation between the two parties in Chad and later assumed a key role in monitoring the Cease-Fire agreement thereby facilitating political dialogue between the government of Sudan and Darfur. In April 2004, the AU created a Cease-Fire Commission in Darfur to bring an end to the conflicts in the region. The Commission's roles were based on "planning, verifying, and ensuring the parties adhere to the Cease-Fire agreement entered into in March 2004". The AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) was charged under the leadership of Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director of the AU Peace and Security Department, to monitor the peace talks in Chad (Nick, 2006).

Accordingly, the African mission in Darfur (AMID) had failed to achieve a meaningful peace mission, although with a measure and little degree of success. For example, the AU was the first international organization to respond and intervene militarily in the conflicts. It failed to protect civilians despite the estimated 1,400 troops dispatched from Rwanda, Nigeria, and Gabon (Ted, 2005: 8). The inability of the African Union's Mission in Darfur (AMID) to bring a lasting peace in the region has also been credited to the AU financial constraints and the size of the AU force. The deployment of the AU force, albeit, small, was delayed for about four months after the Cease-Fire agreement has been signed by the two parties. Also, the Commission's mandate lacked the capacity and mechanisms, except reporting the violations of Cease-Fire agreement to the Joint Commission, which comprises the two parties and the international community (Ted, 2005: 8) in the conflicts. After an unsuccessful intervention by the AU in Darfur, in 2006, the government of Sudan and Darfur rebel groups negotiated the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), to limitless outcome.

The inability of the AU to bring lasting peace to the people of Sudan, had led to continuous deteriorating and excruciating human situation in Darfur, which later resulted in the intervention of the UN. In July 2007, however, the Sudanese government accepted to allow a Hybrid United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMIND), as authorized (Great Lakes Invitational Conference Association, 2007) by the UN Security Council resolution 1769 (Birikorang, 2009: 2) and accorded Chapter VIII mandate towards strengthening the AU-led Pease Mission in Darfur. An estimated 20,000 soldiers and 6,000 civilian police officers were deployed to Darfur region. Following the agreement by the Sudanese government and Darfur rebel groups in 2007, UNAMIND has worked effectively to fulfill its mandate and responsibility: protecting civilians, ensuring of availability of humanitarian aid, also working to ensure realizing the objectives of the DPA (UN, 2007). However, the UN peace mission Darfur faced a number of challenges. These include hostility within Sudanese inner circles; hostility of armed groups in Darfur and a fragmented political and social environment (Pierre-Antoine, 2006).

VIII. CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the AU security architecture and implications for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). An important note from the analysis in this paper is underscored by the AU security architecture in safeguarding the lives and properties of vulnerable population during and after conflicts through the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. The paper argued that as a continental body, the AU still lacks the power to enforce binding decisions on any warring party. For any International Organization to effectively arbitrate in conflict resolutions between the member states, such a common organization has been to be infested with powers so binding on the Union. The conflicts in Burundi were beyond the AU responsibility. AU is an emerging organization that still requires the efforts of the international community, to tackle security challenges in Africa.

Having said that, the AU remains the first continental organization that carried out the Principle of Responsibility to protect in the face of the deadline conflicts that nearly tore apart both Burundi and Sudan. One cannot underrate the challenges faced by the in the cause of carrying out its peacekeeping missions. In Africa These include the small size of the AU force, the financial constraints of the AU to mobilize its military personnel and equipment to the fields of operations, the power politics between Nigeria and South Africa in reaching common ground on the AU strategic objectives, lack of adequate and technical expertise to oversee and service broken down military equipment on the fields of operations, etc. However, these challenges could be overcome if the AU and all its member States agree on common ground, or modalities and steps set aside in its Constitutive Act towards ensuring proper implementation of its strategic goals and objectives. Moreover, strategic partnerships between international organizations, such as the EU and NATO, and AU cannot be over emphasized in the realization of its mandate in relations to African regional security architecture. The AU must be ready to partner with these bodies in the areas of intelligence gathering, training and retraining of its military personnel, and if possible, financial aids to the AU from these bodies, to enable the AU to overcome its financial challenges. Also, the AU members must be ready to remit their dues regularly to enable the Union carry out its mandate efficiently.